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ARTICLE

"CROSSING-OVER:" THE ISSUEPRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF A CIVIL/
CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION UPON A
PROCEEDING OF THE OPPOSITE
CHARACTER*
SUSAN

I.

W.

BRENNER**

INTRODUCTION

This article is devoted to the previously unexplored issue in

criminal litigation of using a favorable civil adjudication as defensive
collateral estoppel in a criminal proceeding. 1 Although a great deal of

This article is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Earl W. Rogers.
Susan W. Brenner is an associate with the firm of Silets and Martin,
**
Ltd. in Chicago, Illinois. She received her J.D. from Indiana University in 1981,
taught at the Indiana University Law School for two years and clerked for a federal
judge. She has graduate degrees in sociology and, prior to attending law school,
taught sociology at the undergraduate and graduate levels, specializing in criminology.
She has authored a number of law review articles analyzing issues in criminal law
and criminal sanctioning.
1. "The doctrine of collateral estoppel 'means simply that when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue
cannot be relitigated between the same parties in any future law suit.' . . . Collateral
estoppel may apply to sequential criminal as well as sequential civil litigation." United
States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 116 (D.C. Cir. App. 1980) (en banc), citing Harris
v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971); Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972); Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
"[Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to
foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated
unsuccessfully in an action with another party. Defensive use occurs when a defendant
seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated
and lost against another defendant." Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326
n.4 (1979).
The topic which is discussed in this article was considered, very briefly, in
Vestal and Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions,
19 VAND. L. REV. 683, 699-701 (1966), and even more briefly in Note, 64 HA~v. L.
RiEv. 1376, 1378 (1951).
*
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attention has been devoted to the role which collateral estoppel plays
in civil litigation, and some attention to its role in criminal litigation,
almost no attention has been devoted to the role which collateral
estoppel plays between civil and criminal proceedings. 2
This article is concerned with that issue and with its potential as
a tactical device in the representation of criminal defendants. The
article begins by tracing the history and development of the related
concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel, then examines cases
in which collateral estoppel has been asserted between civil and
criminal proceedings, and ultimately articulates a proposal for utilizing
"cross-over" 3 collateral estoppel as a defensive strategem in criminal
litigation.
This article is further divided into five sections: section II describes the historical evolution of the legal proposition that a validly
entered judgment has issue-preclusive effects upon subsequent litigation involving the same factual issues; section III discusses the role
which this proposition plays in the criminal law; section IV analyzes
the phenomenon of "cross-over" issue preclusion; section V presents
the aforementioned proposal; and section VI is a general conclusion
summarizing the materials presented in the preceding sections.
II.

ISSUE-PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS: "INTEREST
' 4
REIPUBLICAE UT SIT FINIS LITIUM "

That the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state
2. "Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is part of the concept of res
judicata and serves to prevent parties from relitigating issues necessarily determined
in a prior proceeding ....
The doctrine is applied between judicial proceedings in
four combinations-civil to civil, criminal to criminal, criminal to civil and civil to
criminal." Gregory v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Ky. 1980) (citations
omitted). For the articles that have considered this issue, see supra note 1.
3. This is the author's term for instances in which a civil/criminal judgment
has issue-precluding consequences for a criminal/civil proceeding. That is, "crossover" estoppel is the phenomenon which is encountered whenever a civil judgment
is asserted as collaterally estopping particular aspects of a criminal proceeding, or
vice versa. This phrase is borrowed from the music industry, which uses it to refer
to music which was originally intended to appeal to one audience (i.e., "country"
music) but which unexpectedly charms another audience (i.e., the "pop" market) as
well. So, too, can judgments "cross-over" from one niche into another.
4. "It concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 951 (4th ed. 1968). The corresponding maxim for criminal prosecutions
is usually quoted as "nemo his punitur pro eodem delicto" or "nemo debet bis vexari
pro eadem causa." Id. at 1189. Both alternatives convey the idea that "no one ought
to be twice vexed for the same cause."See also United States v. Throckmorton, 98
U.S. 61, 65 (1878); Liddell v. Smith, 345 F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1965).
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of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the
controversy at rest, is a rule common to all civilized systems
of jurisprudence.'
Although "common to all civilized systems of jurisprudence",
the concept of issue preclusion differs markedly between legal systems. 6 This section traces the historical evolution of the concept,
outlines its essential terminological and conceptual distinctions; and
describes the requirements which must be met before a judgment may
have issue-preclusive consequences.
A.

EVOLUTION OF "RES ADJUDICATA" '

According to early Roman law administered by the praetor, the
defending party was able to overcome a plaintiff's accusation not
5. II H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 759 (2d ed. 1902)

[hereinafter BLACK, JUDGMENTS].

6. See, e.g., Schopflocher, Civil Procedure: A Comparative Study of Some
PrincipalFeatures Under German and American Law, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 234, 25859; J. RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 48-53 (Rev. ed.
1926); A. ENGELMANN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 149 (Millar trans.
1927).
7. "The term most commonly [used to refer to the issue-preclusive effects of
judgments] is res judicata (or, as it sometimes appears, res adjudicata), meaning the
'thing' or 'matter adjudged.' " R. CASAD, RES JUDICATA 3 (1976) [hereinafter CASAD,
RES JUDICATA]. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1968). The phrase
is commonly used to refer to the issue-preclusive effects of civil judgments. However,
as is discussed in more detail in Section III, infra, the concept applies with equal
force to judgments entered in criminal prosecutions. This section will, however,
discuss the principle in its commonly-understood form, as applied in civil litigation.
It is also useful to distinguish res judicata from certain other doctrines: Stare
decisis is like res judicata in that "it concerns the controlling influence on later suits
of a decision rendered in an earlier one." CASAD, supra, at 6. However, it differs
from res judicata, in that stare decisis is concerned with the general effects that are
to be given to a particular interpretation of the law, whereas res judicata is concerned
only with the effects which an interpretation has upon specific litigation. See id. at
6-8.
"Law of the case" is another doctrine that superficially resembles res judicata.
Actually, however, law of the case is narrower than res judicata, since the ruling is
binding only on the later conduct of the very case in which the ruling was made.
Basically, the 'law of the case' doctrine means that a question of law once
resolved in the course of litigation will not be reconsidered at later stages in the same
litigation, even if the point was erroneously decided. Id. at 9. See also Developments
in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 822 (1952); Note, Law of the Case,
40 COLUM. L. REV. 268, 273-74 (1940); Note, Successive Appeals and the Law of the
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only by a direct denial of the facts alleged to have occurred, but also
by inducing the praetor to admit, based upon equitable grounds,
certain defenses. The net result was not to render the action destroyed
ipso jure, but to make it completely "ineffective through use of the
exception. Ultimately, the exception avoided the cause of action.
For our purposes, the important exception to be remembered was
the exceptio rei judicatae, or plea of former judgment. The term res

judicata was granted any claims defense, or disputed question which

had previously been explicitly ruled upon by the court or judge. Such
a matter was determined transit in rem judicatam, and regarding
the issues decided upon, was binding and conclusive upon the parties.
That it could not later be denied or impeached by the parties was
Case, 62 HARv. L.

REV. 286 (1948).
"Election of remedies" refers to the "rule that, as between the same parties,
a plaintiff who chooses to pursue one of two remedies available for a single wrong
is barred from suing on the other where the nature of the remedies is such that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover on either but not both." Developments in the Law:
Res Judicata, supra, at 823. See also CASAD, supra, at 13-16.
Finally, there is a concept known as "judicial estoppel" or as the "preclusion
of inconsistent positions." CASAD, supra, at 16-17; Developments, supra, at 823-24.
That doctrine holds that one cannot allege facts in a pleading that are
inconsistent with facts previously pleaded by him in a prior action. Usually
application of the doctrine is limited to pleadings that were made under
oath. It differs from the issue-precluding effects of res judicata in that it
does not depend upon a judgment having been rendered in the prior action.It
is the violation of the oath that seems to be the main justification for the
doctrine, although sometimes different rationales are offered for it, and in
some cases it has been applied even to pleadings that were not verified under
oath.

CASAD,

supra, at 16-17.

It is also important to keep in mind the fact that the phenomenon of issue
preclusion is the product of compelling policy concerns rather than of the inherent
infallibility of the adjudicatory process:
In the trenchant words of Professor Brainerd Currie, 'the first lesson one
must learn on the subject of res judicata is that judicial findings must not
be confused with absolute truth.' And so courts have repeatedly recognized
that res judicata is not defeated by error in the initial judgment; the most
famous observation may be that 'the res judicata renders white that which
is black, and straight that which is crooked.'
18 C. WHITE, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403
(1981) (footnotes omitted). See also Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel: Limits
of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 315 (1957); Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 325 (1927); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 510-11
(1903); Iselin v. Meng, 307 F.2d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. denied 372 U.S. 909
(1963); Rubens v. Ellis, 202 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1953); Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 How.
(63 U.S.) 352, 363-64 (1859); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
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declared in the maxim, res judicata pro vertitate accipitur,
The resulting exception was merely a plea by the defending party
that the issues presented by the plaintiff had already been determined
by the previous judgment and were no longer the subject of litigation.
However, to produce such effort, the earlier judgment should have
been upon the very same issue between the very same parties. 9
This principle, that in order to have preclusive effects a judgment
should be upon the identical point and between the identical parties,
was adopted early on in English law.' 0 However, English law already
contained another, dissimilar principle by that time period.

Prior to the adoption of the Roman plea device, collateral

estoppel, involving the binding force of previous determinations where
the latter suit is based upon a different cause of action, evolved into
English law from medieval Germany. There the preclusion was given
effect through what was alleged and proved at trial, with the stress

8. "A matter adjudged is taken for truth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1471
(4th ed. 1968).
9. BLACK, JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 761-62. See also BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK
OF ROMAN LAW 690-92 (1921). The requirement that the judgment have been entered
in an action involving the same parties was expressed in the following maxim: "Res
inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt." ("Matters adjudged in a
cause do not prejudice those who were not parties to it.") BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1471 (4th ed. 1968).
10. Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952).

See also Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35
Nw. U.L. REV. 41, 44 (1940). One commentary has explained the proposition as
follows:
[a] judgment entered in an action upon one
At common law. ....
form of action did not prevent a litigant from pursuing another form of
action, although he would not be allowed more than one recovery for a
single loss. The determination of issues was binding only as between parties
to the record in the first action. This meant that a party could not relitigate
an issue with a person against whom he had already litigated that issue, but
he would not be prevented from relitigating the issue against someone
else.These rules reflected the concepts underlying common law trial procedure. The common law 'action' was a proceeding on a writ, not a comprehensive investigation of responsibility for an alleged injury. And the basis
for precluding relitigation of an issue was not that a party had already had
an opportunity to litigate the issue but that he could not contradict a record
to which he was a party.
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 530-31 (2d ed. 1977). See also McCaskill,
Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614 (1925); Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912). What James and Hazard are
describing is, of course, an amalgam of res judicata as derived from Roman law and
of "estoppel by record". See also text accompanying note 11.
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on the judgment. As a result, the common law record became the
authoritative source for determining what issues were to be considered
binding.
Based not on the judgment of the court, but rather on the
statements of a party, this motion of preclusion was called an estoppel.
Despite this, final judgment was required to grant the 'estopped by
record' conclusive effect. Much confusion resulted from the different
practices and efforts of these two doctrines, and it was not until
pleading differences and the requirement that 'record' proof establish
the estoppel were nullified that the Roman and Germanic doctrines
came to be recognized as one common procedural device."1

11. Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 820-21. "In the
Germanic practice, the preclusion bound not only the parties, but all those who had
been present at the judicial assembly which heard the case, because those bystanders

had a right to enter the proceedings." Id. at 820 n.4, citing A.

ENGELMANN, HISTORY

149 (Millar trans. 1927). See also 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 147-54 (3d ed. 1944). Since a final judgment
was required before "estoppel by record" could be conclusive, the practice also came
to be known as "estoppel by judgment", "despite its inaccuracy as a description of
the source of the estoppel." Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10,
at 821 n.6. See also 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 150 (3d ed.
1944). The history of the terminology has been explained as follows:
[Tihe word 'estoppel' only means stopped. You will find it explained by
Coke in his Commentaries on Littleton (19th ed., 1832), vol. II, s. 667,
352a. It was brought over by the Normans. They used the old French
'estoupail.' That meant a bung or cork by which you stopped something
from coming out. It was in common use in our courts when they carried on
all their proceedings in Norman-French. Littleton writes in the law-French
of his day (15th century) using the words 'pur ceo que le baron est estoppe
a dire,' meaning that the husband is stopped from saying something.
From that simple origin there has been built up over the centuries in
our law a big house with many rooms. It is the house called Estoppel. In
Coke's time it was a small house with only three rooms .... But by our
time we have so many rooms that we are apt to get confused between them.
Estoppel per rem judicatem, issue estoppel . .. and goodness knows what
else.
McIlkenny v. Chief Constable, Ct. App. [19801 2 W.L.R. 689, 700-701 (Denning,
M.R.).
Holdsworth describes the modern concept of estoppel "as a rule of evidence
that when, as between two parties to a litigation, certain facts are proved, no evidence
to combat these facts can be received." 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 144 (1926), citing Low v. Bouverie, [1891] 3 Ch. at p. 105 per Bowen, L.J.
Holdworth continues stating that:
this view of the nature of an estoppel is essentially a modern view. It was
not the view which prevailed when the doctrine of estoppel first made its
appearance in the law. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries cases were
OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
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In differentiating between the two, it was determined that estoppel
by record was originally a true estoppel from the Germanic period,
much the same as the later developed estoppel by deed or estoppel in
pais. In its finest form, the basis of the doctrine was a party's inability
to recede from the situation which he had previously created. The
party was not allowed to contradict his previous allegations or admissions in the subsequent hearing. As a result, it is the method of
recovery and the allegation upon that method that are given preclusive
effect.
Next, when the Roman principle came to be accepted, the Germanic estoppel was not discarded, but each was forced to coexist,
albeit with different functions. The Roman principle was used to
preclude any new action with its basis upon the prior action, as well
as preventing an unsuccessful defendant from altering the right previously adjudicated. However, if preclusion was sought against the
same plaintiff from mentioning a different action against the same
defendant, or the same defendant against the same plaintiff on a
different claim, this could only be accomplished with the use of
estoppel by record. The estoppel extended to every material issue
decided previously, as well as all admissions throughout the pleadings.
To be effective, it was necessary that a judgment be rendered to
authenticate the estoppel. As a result, the doctrine of this judicata
had an application, for all issues concerning the prior verdict and its
preclusive effect upon the present action were governed by the selfcontained principle of estoppel by record. 12

decided, not by a process of reasoning from evidence offered to the court,
but by modes of proof selected by the parties or ordered by the court. In
those days the matters relied upon to create an estoppel were regarded as
operating as modes of proof ....

Probably the earliest way of proving one's

case by means of an estoppel, and therefore the earliest form of estoppel,
is that which is known as estoppel by matter of record; and it is a direct
result of that machinery for the enrollment of pleas which was instituted in the twelfth century ....

It was becoming clear that estoppels

...depended ultimately on the words or acts of the parties; and since a
trial was coming to be regarded as an adjudication upon the facts in issue
by the light of the evidence offered, they were regarded as operating, not
as modes of proof, but as conclusive presumptions which precluded the
necessity of offering further evidence.
Id. at 144-46.

12. Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and
Anglo-American Law, 39 MIcH. L. REv. 238, 238-39 (1940) (footnotes omitted). See

also Outram v. Morewood, 3 East. 346, 355, 102 Eng. Rep. 630 (1803); Millar, The
Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 Nw. U.L.

REV.

41
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The processes by which the dominion of estoppel by record
declined and was replaced by the concept of res judicata are far too
(1940); CASAD, RES JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 19-20. Miller continues with the
following observations on the role which the common law reserved for res judicata:
Outside of the common-law courts, the technical principle of estoppel
by record found no recognition. And as that principle depended upon the
system of pleading it could not in strictness apply even in a common-law
court, where the previous proceedings invoked by a party had been had in
other than a common-law court, or, if had in a common-law court, were of
such a nature that no pleadings had been employed in their conduct. For
the wide field thus existing, beyond the province of the common-law
principle, the preclusive effect of the former proceedings, in respect of the
premises of the decision as well as of the decision itself, necessarily depended
upon what the courts conceived to be the operation of the principle of res
judicata.
39 MICH. L. REV. at 239; see also 35 Nw. U.L. REV. at 56-57.
Holdsworth offers the following description of the early career of the doctrine
of estoppel by record:
The general principle upon which estoppel by matter of record depends
is that matters solemnly recorded by the king's court must be accepted as
proof, so that no averment to contradict them can be received. This conclusive quality of the matters recorded by the king's court, and its absence in
the case of matters transacted in other courts, was beginning to emerge in
the early years of the twelfth century. It is said in the Leges Henrici Primi
that a record of the king's court cannot be denied, though the judgments
of other courts can be denied by men who were present and understood the
plea; and the same distinction is drawn by Glanvil between the record of
the king's court and the judgments of other courts .... All matters recorded
by the king's court, and authenticated by his seal . . .were records, and
were accorded the same conclusive effects ...
This conclusive effect of the facts recorded by a court of record is
abundantly illustrated in the reports, from the days of the earliest Year
Books. In 1293 it was said that a judgment of the king's court could not be
proved by the country, but only by the rolls-i.e., they were in themselves
a proof which needed no other proof. In 1307 it was said that 'a thing
which can be averred by the judgment and record of the court is not to be
tried by an inquest'-i.e., the production of the record was so conclusive
that there was no need for a further trial. In 1308-1309 a defendant to an
assize of novel disseisin successfully pleaded a fine, and the record of a
judgment in an assize of mort d'ancestor, between the same parties-'it was
awarded by the Court that the plaintiff took nothing by his writ, for he
showed no title of later date than the previous actions in which he had
taken nothing.' In 1425 it was admitted that a fine, which showed that land
had been conveyed by the ancestor of the plaintiff to the ancestor of the
defendant, could be pleaded as an estoppel to an action by the plaintiff
against the defendant for a trespass upon the same land.
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 147-49 (1926) (footnotes omitted).
Holdsworth suggests that "the reason given for this incontrovertability of matter of
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complex to be described here. 3 For the present discussion it suffices
to state that, although estoppel by record was the prevailing concept
in English law at the onset of the nineteenth century, by the close of
that century it had "substantially merged" with the principle of res
judicata. 14 In civil law countries, "the important doctrine of res
record, and for the estoppel which resulted from it" changed from the twelfth century
until "[in Hynde's Case in 1591 the conclusiveness of matter of record was said to
be 'for the avoiding of infiniteness which the law abhors.' " Id. at 149, citing Hynde's
Case, 4 Co. Rep. at f. 71a.
This would seem to show that, with the change in men's ideas as to the
nature of a trial, it was coming to be thought that this species of estoppel
was based, not so much upon the idea that the production of the record is
a mode of proof, but rather upon the idea, which was present to the mind
of the Roman lawyers, that there ought to be a decent finality about the
decisions of courts.
Id. at 149 (footnotes omitted). Holdsworth concludes that "the rules thus evolved,
as restated and developed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are the
basis of our modern law." Id. at 150.
13. For a description of this evolution, see Millar, 39 MICH. L. REV. at 239253. See generally supra note 12.
14. 39 MICH. L. REV. at 251. According to Millar, by the end of the nineteenth
century, "[t]he common-law principle of estoppel by record, although paid formal
homage . . . ha[d] in reality, through supervening changes in procedure which ...
deprived it of its common-law mechanism, become a method of approach-and an
extremely awkward one-to the application of the principle of res judicata." Id.
Writing in 1940, Millar described the contemporary English rule in the following
terms:
[I]f the ground of decision becomes apparent either from the terms of the
judgment itself, or by absolutely necessary illation from those terms, or
becomes apparent from the judgment itself, taken in connection with the
pleadings and other constituents of the record or, at least in cases where
there are no pleadings, in connection with evidence aliunde, it is to be
considered as having been conclusively adjudicated, so as to bind the parties
in a suit on a different cause of action. To such extent the property of res
judicata attaches to the premises of the judgment.
39 MICH. L. REV. at 252 (footnote omitted). The traditional common law rule did
not permit the use of evidence aliunde to establish the parameters of an estoppel by
record. Id. at 252 n. 190; Sintzenick v. Lucas, 1 Esp. 43, 170 Eng. Rep. 274 (1793).
As noted in the text, the classic statement of the operation and effects of
estoppel by record came in Lord Ellenborough's holding in Outram v. Morewood:
The recovery of itself in an action of trespass is only a bar to the future
recovery of damages for the same injury; but the estoppel precludes parties
and privies from contending to the contrary of that point, or matter of fact,
which having been once distinctly put in issue by them, or by those to whom
they are privy in estate or law, has been, on such issues joined, solemnly
found against them.
3 East. 346, 355, 102 Eng. Rep. 630 (1803). See also Rock v. Layton, 1 Ld. Raym.
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judicata has been adopted with its main features unchanged from the
aspects they wore in the age of the Antonine jurists."'" That is, where
the requested relief and the legal basis of the claim are identical to
those adjudicated in a prior action between the parties, a second
action is barred. However, when all of these requirements are not
met, there is nothing outside of collateral estoppel preventing the
relitigation of specific issues that were not included in the previous
judgment. 16
Historically the American law of res judicata evolved quite
differently than its English counterpart. In America, res judicate was
not especially troubled by any requirement that there exist an identity
of purpose or object between the two suits as a condition of conclusiveness.17 The leading treatise on the issue, Abraham Clark Freeman's
A Treatise of the Law of Judgments,'8 offers the following observations on the "American rule": "The only matter essential to making
a former judgment on the merits conclusive between the same parties
is, that the question to be determined in the second action is the same
589, 1 Salk. 31, Comb. 87, 91 Eng. Rep. 273, 11294, 92 Eng. Rep. 973 (1700); Aslin
v. Parker, 2 Burr. 665, 97 Eng. Rep. 501 (1758). By the end of the nineteenth
century, the English courts were speaking of the issue-preclusive effects of judgments,
rather than of estoppel by record. See, e.g., Priestman v. Thomas, 9 Prob. Div. 210"
(1884); Alison's Case, 9 L.R. 24 (Ch. App. 1873); In re South American and Mexican
Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 37 (1894).
15. BLACK, JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 762.
16. Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 821 (footnote
omitted), citing CODE CIVIL art. 1351 (50th ed., Dalloz, 1951) (France) and
Comment, 2 LA. L. REV. 347, 353-65 (1940). See also BLACK, JUDGMENTS, supra
note 5, at 762-63. The Harvard article goes on to describe the procedure that has
been developed to accomplish the same end:
The absence of the estoppel concept ... has been met, however, by creation
of a special procedure to give conclusive force to decisions on specific issues.
Thus, either party may raise an issue for a binding determination, and the
court will then state its decision on the point in a declaration that accompanies the judgment disposing of the claim principally in issue. This procedure has the advantage of giving a clear statement of what was decided, as
well as preventing preclusion of issues that were perfunctorily contested or
only impliedly decided in the first action.
Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 821 (footnotes omitted).
17. Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and
Anglo-American Law, 39 MIcH. L. REV. 238, 253 (1940).
18. Freeman's treatise was originally published in 1873, and the fifth and final
edition appeared in 1925. No other comparable work was ever issued on this topic,
at least, not until the appearance of the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS in 1942. See Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at
821.
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question judicially settled in the first."' 9 Nearly all American cases
have adopted the principle that a previous judgment is conclusive, if
upon the exact point, even though the objectives of the two suits are
20
different.
As Millar noted, the American law historically failed to differentiate between the common-law principle of estoppel by record and
res judicata. 2' As a result, a merger of the two principles developed
under what is today the general rubric of 'res judicata'. In practical
terms, there is no reason to consider the two principles separately.
Presently, the question of preclusion is not determined based solely
on the grounds of decision, but more appropriately upon inquiring
whether the point in issue had been the subject of issue in the earlier
22
suit.
This "notion" found its clearest support in the Supreme Court's
decision in Cromwell v. County of Sac. 2 3 After holding that, where a
second suit is upon the same cause of action as the first, the judgment
is conclusive as to every ground of claim or defense that was or might
have been advanced, 24 Justice Field went on to hold that:
where the second action between the same parties is upon
a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or
points controverted, upon the determination of which the
finding or verdict was rendered. . . .[t]he inquiry must always
be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined
in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated
and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment
25
conclusive in another action.
In Cromwell, the Court did not adopt "the common-law principle
of estoppel, for-to say nothing of the verbal imprecision in referring
to the 'estoppel of a judgment'-that principle recognized as conclusive not only the decided issues, but also, except as against attack by

19. II A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 1418 (5th ed. 1925)
[hereinafter FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS].
20. Id. at 1420.
21. Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and
Anglo-American Law, 39 MIcH. L. REV. 238, 253 (1940).
22. Id.
23. 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
24. Id. at 353.
25. Id.
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way of confession and avoidance, material admissions." 2 6 Eighteen
years later, however, in Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining

Co.,27 the Court enlarged the holding of Cromwell v. County of Sac

and recognized the conclusive effects of a material admission which
2
occurred during the course of the pleadings. 1
Last Chance Mining involved the effect to be given a judgment
by default. The Court held that such a judgment is just as binding
upon the parties for all the issues necessary to support the result as a
decision reached after answer and contest. The facts asserted by the
complaint are taken to be true when the party fails to answer, and as
a result, the court is permitted to base its determination upon the
admission of these facts. 29 This holding is reminiscent of the old

common-law doctrine of estoppel by record inasmuch as it defines
the issue-preclusive effects of a particular adjudication in terms of
the contents of the record produced thereby.30 As such, the old
distinction between res judicata and estoppel by record has survived

in present law.3

26. Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and
Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 238, 254 (1940) (emphasis in original).
27. 157 U.S. 683 (1895).
28. Millar, supra note 26, at 255.
29. 157 U.S. at 691. In Cromwell v. County of Sac, the Court had held that
"a judgment by default only admits for the purposes of the action the legality of the
demand or claim in suit: it does not make the allegations of the declaration or
complaint evidence in an action upon a different claim." 94 U.S. at 353.
30. This concept survives today, in the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, which presents the "general rule" on issue preclusion, and
provides as follows:"Where an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined
by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment,
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether
on the same or a different claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27
(1982).
Comment d to § 27 addresses the issue as to "[w]hen an issue is actually
litigated":
When an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is
submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated
within the meaning of the Section. An issue may be submitted and determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a motion for
judgment on the pleading, a motion for summary judgment. .. , a motion
for directed verdict, or their equivalents, as well as on a judgment entered
on a verdict. A determination may be based on a failure of pleading or of
proof as well as on the sustaining of the burden of proof.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 255 (1982).
31. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968). BLACK'S definitions
provide a distinction between the terms "res judicata" and "estoppel". The former
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The purpose of this discussion has not been, however, to offer a
definitive treatment of the evolution and merger of these two doctrines, or even to offer a comprehensive treatment of the proposition
that valid judgments have binding, preclusive effects upon subsequent
litigation involving identical issues of fact. The purpose has been,
instead, to provide the reader with some background with which to
appreciate the peculiar complexities posed by the deceptively simple
task of determining whether a particular issue has already been
litigated and foreclosed.
As is apparent from the text above, the general concept of issue
preclusion has existed in Western law for approximately two thousand
years. And the concept that "litigation must have an end" is hardly
problematic. What is problematic, however, is to determine what has
actually been litigated and the effect it is to be given in a subsequent
proceeding that may very well bear little resemblance to the original
action. This dilemma has produced yet another dichotomy in this area
of the law; namely, the distinction between "direct estoppel" and
"collateral estoppel", distinctions which are discussed in the section
immediately below.
B. BASIC DISTINCTIONS

Estoppel is used to refer to the conclusive effect that a prior
judgment has on certain disputed issues. It is termed 'direct estoppel'
when the second suit is based upon a different claim or cause of
action.
Since most second suit claims involving the identical cause of
action as the first suit will have been entirely extinguished by the first
is defined as the "[riule that a final judgment or decree on [the] merits by [a] court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of [the] rights of [the] parties or their privies
in all later suits on points and matters determined in [the] former suit." Id. at 1470;
the latter being defined as "[a] prior judgment between [the] same parties which is
not strictly res judicata because [it is] based upon [a] different cause of action
operates as an 'estoppel' only as to matters actually in issue or points controverted."
Id. at 630. And Anglo-Indian law has provided two colorful descriptions of the distinctions between the two concepts:
In Casamally Jairbhai v. Ebrahaim, 36 Ind.L.R.Bomb. 214 (1911), it was
said: 'Estoppel and resjudicataare entirely different. Res judicata precludes
a man from averring the same thing twice over in successive litigation, while
estoppel prevents him saying one thing at one time and the opposite at
another.' And in Nanabhai v. Keshavji & Co., 36 Ind.L.R.Bomb. 283
(1911), it was said 'Res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of the court while
estoppel does no more than shut the mouth of a party.'
Comment, Res Judicata in Criminal Cases, 27 TEX. L. REV. 231, 232 n.4 (1948).
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judgment, "direct estoppel" is much less frequent. As a result, the
term "collateral estoppel" has all but displaced the other term and is
commonly used to discuss the preclusive effect a prior determination
will have regarding specific issues without discussing whether the
second suit is based on a similar claim or not.12
"Direct estoppel" is also referred to as "claim preclusion", and
is often considered to represent "true res judicata." 3 3 It treats a
judgment as the final determination between these same parties on
this specific claim. Once the plaintiff prevails, his claim merges into
his judgment, upon which no further relief on that claim will be
afforded. Alternatively, if the defendant prevails, his victory acts as
a bar to further action on this claim by the plaintiff. Under this
ruling, all issues that were relevant to the same claim of these two
parties, whether or not actually raised at trial, will be barred from
34
further litigation.
The Supreme Court has consistently used "res judicata" as a
term encompassing the concepts of merger and bar, while distinguishing "collateral estoppel" as denoting a very different concept. 5 The
32. CASAD, RES JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 4. See also Scott, Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 n. 5 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 comment b (1982); In re Duncan, 713 F.2d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 1983);
Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 n.4
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
33. Kasper Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535
(5th Cir. 1978).
34. Id. at 535-36. Accord United States v. Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 983
n.4 (3d Cir. 1984); Fuimara v. Fireman's Fund, Ins. Cos., 746 F.2d 87,90-91 n.1 (1st
Cir. 1984); Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust. Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 898 (1st
Cir. 1984); Miller v. Hartwood Apts., 689 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1982); Neoplan USA
Corp. v. Taylor, 604 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 (D.D.C. 1985). See also Developments in
the Law. Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 824; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 18, 19 (1982); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 48-54 (1943); Scott, Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1942).
35. The Court in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), stated that:
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior
suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on
the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the
other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the
judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated
and necessary to the outcome of the first action.
Id. at 326 n.5 (1979), citing IB J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.405[l], pp. 622-24 (2d ed. 1974). See Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591
(1948); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876). See also Cooper v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
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Court, like the lower courts and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, has often used the doctrine of collateral estoppel to refer to
"issue preclusion." '3 6 Issue preclusion recognizes that issues litigated

in one suit may have relevance in other suits. In order to minimize
the amount of repetitious litigation, this doctrine bars the relitigation
of issues actually adjudicated and essential to the judgment in a prior

trial between the identical parties.
However, this doctrine is much more demanding, for it is not
enough that some question of fact on law in a second suit was relevant

to a prior suit between these same parties. The issue in dispute must
actually have been litigated and necessary to the previous judgment
37
in order for issue preclusion to take effect.
The term "collateral estoppel" was "invented" by the authors
of the original Restatement of Judgments. The purposes and effects
U.S. 284 (1984); U.S. v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90 (1980); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147
(1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In Migra v. Warren
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), however, the Court noted the
modern tendency to include both collateral estoppel and claim preclusion in the
concept of res judicata, and indicated that its opinion was written in the language of
claim preclusion "[iun order to avoid confusion resulting from the two uses of 'res
judicata."' 465 U.S. at 75 n.l.
36. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984). See
supra cases cited in note 35. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27-

29 (1982).

37. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 536

(5th Cir. 1978). See also supra note 30 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 (1982)). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982) contains several

exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion. Section 28 provides that "[a]lthough
an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment....
relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded"
in certain circumstances. The circumstances are (a) that the party against whom
preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the
judgment in the initial action; (b) that the issue is one of law and the two actions
are substantially unrelated or a new determination is warranted due to an intervening
change in the applicable legal contest or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration
of the laws; (c) that a new determination is warranted by differences in the quality
or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating
to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; (d) that the party against whom
preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion in the initial
than in the subsequent action, or vice versa; and (e) that there is a clear and
convincing need for a new determination of the issue because of the potential for an
adverse impact on the public interest, because it was not foreseeable at the time of
the initial action that the issue would arise in a subsequent action or because the
party sought to be precluded did not have an adequate opportunity to obtain "a full
and fair adjudication" of the issue in the initial action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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of the concept were easily described. In a subsequent action between
the same parties involving a different claim, the second action is not
extinguished by the previous decision despite the fact that some of
the same questions were involved in the prior decision. However,
those matters which were actually litigated and determined in the
previous action cannot be relitigated and are said to be "collaterally
estopped".
The estoppel does not rise from representations made by one
party on which the other has relied, but from the principle that once
a party has fought out an issue in litigation previously, he is precluded
from doing it again. Collateral estoppel arises because the causes of
action involved between the parties is said to be different even though
some of the material issues may be the same.3" Scott also describes
the reasons why this particular term was selected. He tells us:
It was with some hesitation that we determined to use the
term 'collateral estoppel.' There is no doubt that the word
estoppel is frequently used very loosely. . . .It seemed unwise,
however, to invent a new terminology. . . . It seemed to us,
therefore, that it was best to use it in bringing out the
distinction between the effect of a judgment on the original
cause of action, where it operates by way of merger or bar,
and its effect upon other causes of action between the parties,
where it is conclusive only as to matters actually litigated and
determined by the judgment.3 9
JUDGMENTS

§ 28 (1982).

38. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1942) (foot-

notes omitted).
39. Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1,3 n.4 (1942).

Holdsworth describes a variation on this theme which prevailed under the common
law doctrine of estoppel by record:
The . . .rule was well established in the fifteenth century . . . that 'a matter
alleged that is neither traversable nor material shall not estoppe'. . . . Any
statement in a pleading which was not material to the issue was a departure,
so that it was only reasonable to hold that a statement in a record, which
was immaterial to the issue before the court, could not create an estoppel.
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 152 (1926), quoting COKE'S
COMMENTARIES ON LITTLETON K 352b (1552-1634). A more recent commentator
discusses this issue as it relates to the use of pleadings as admissions:
A basic problem which attends the use of written pleadings is uncertainty
whether the evidence as it actually unfolds at trial will prove the case
described in the pleadings .... The modern . . . system. . . use[s] ...
alternative and hypothetical forms of statement of claims and defenses,
regardless of consistency. It can readily be appreciated that pleadings of this
nature are directed primarily to giving notice and lack the essential character
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As noted above, 4° the general rule of collateral estoppel or issue

preclusion is that once an issue has actually been litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and that determination is
essential to the final judgment, the determination is then to be
considered conclusive in a subsequent action between the identical

parties, whether or not it's on the same claim. 4' Of course, the

conclusiveness of the judgment is subject to certain exceptions, paramount among which is the requirement that the adverse party must
have had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue in the
initial proceeding. 42 As such, favorable preclusion effects were only
available to one who would have been barred by an unfavorable
decision as well. Known as the rule of mutuality, this rule established

that a judgment was only binding on the parties involved and those
persons in privity with them. As a rule, the previous judgment could

of an admission . . Hence the decisions . . . deny them status as judicial
admissions, and generally disallow them as evidential admissions.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265 (3d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). McCormick also
discusses the problem of multiple, inconsistent pleadings under "the common law
[system which] evolved the use of counts, each a complete separate statement of a
different version of the same basic claim." Id. See also Hart v. Longfield, 7 Mod.
148, 87 Eng. Rep. 1156 (1703) (plaintiff should be stated as a different child in each
count, "multiplying him as many times as there were counts").
40. See supra note 30.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also lb J. MOORE,
0.405131, [4], (2d ed. 1984 rev.); Parklane Hosiery
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). For an explanation of the types of issues,
both legal and factual, to which collateral estoppel can attach, see CASAD, RES
JUDICATA,

supra note 7, at 122-70.

Holdsworth describes another rule which prevailed under the common law
doctrine of estoppel by record, namely, "that 'every estoppel ought to be reciprocal,
that is, to bind both parties.' " 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 152
(1926) (footnote omitted), citing COKE'S COMMENTARIES ON LITTLETON K 352a (15521634). Regarding the reciprocal nature of estoppel, Holdsworth continues that:
[it [reciprocity] is, as Coke points out, a direct result of the rule that the
judgment ... bound only the parties and privies; and this . . . is probably
due to the fact that the record . . . was regarded as a conclusive proof of
the matter in dispute, which must therefore bind both the parties to it.
Id. Holdsworth also discusses a peculiar corollary to this rule:
Considerations of obvious common sense are the basis of the rule, stated in
a curious case of 1443, that if contradictory statements were produced, both
of which would, if they had stood alone, have worked an estoppel, the
matter was at large-or, as Coke put it, 'estoppel against estoppel both put
the matter at large.'
Id. at 153 (footnotes omitted), quoting COKE'S COMMENTARIES ON LITTLETON § 352b
(1552-1634).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982). See supra note 37.
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only be utilized by the previous parties or those actually in privity
with them.4 3 The rule was subject, however, to explicit expectations
prompted by compelling need and circumstances that did not render
nonmutual preclusion a requirement."
Eventually, the ever-increasing exceptions combined with widespread criticism to produce the rejection of the rule of mutuality, at
least in the federal court system.4 5 The Restatement (Second) of
Judgments also abandoned the rule:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing
party ... is also precluded from doing so with another person
unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances
46
justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue.

43. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 4463 (1981)

[hereinafter

WRIGHT

&

MILLER].

TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
RES JUDICATA,

supra note 7, at 202-222.

See also IB J. MOORE, W.
0.411.[1] (2d ed. 1984); CASAD,

Holdsworth traces this requirement to the era when estoppel by record prevailed:
It was, from a very early period, the accepted rule that only the parties
to an action were estopped by a judgment in that action. This really follows
from the primitive conception of the mode in which this species of estoppel
operated. The record of an action between two parties operates as conclusive
proof of the matters decided therein; but it cannot affect the rights of other
persons who were not parties to the action. As against them it is no proof,
and therefore no estoppel arises. But it soon became clear that a judgment
in a real action, which decided a right to possession, must have a more
extensive effect ....
It was held, therefore, that in anaction in which the
right to possession had come into question and had been decided, both
privies and parties were bound; and that privies included, not only privies
in blood, but privies in estate, such as feoffees or lessees, and privies in
law, such as lords taking by escheat, and tenants in dower and by the
courtesy. An estoppel, therefore, could be said to run with the land.
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 150-51 (1926) (footnotes omitted).
44. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at § 4463.
45. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at § 4464. See Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980). ("[T]he Court has eliminated the requirement of mutuality in
applying collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of issues decided earlier in federal suits
.... and has allowed a litigant who was not a party to a federal case to use collateral
estoppel 'offensively' in a new federal suit against the party who lost on the decided
issue in the first case.") See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 32629 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
328-29 (1971).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). See also CASAD, RES
JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 218-222. Section 29 also provides that, in determining
whether a party should be allowed to relitigate an issue, consideration should be
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The Supreme Court offered its final pronouncement on the issue
in ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore.47 In that case Shore, the respondent,
brought a stockholder's class action suit alleging that the defendant
had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement. While
this action was pending, the SEC filed suit alleging essentially the
same complaint. After a four-day trial, the court entered a declaratory
judgment that the proxy statement was in fact materially false and
misleading.48 As a result, Shore moved for partial summary judgment
in the initial action, claiming that Parklane was estopped from
relitigating the issues that had previously been resolved in the SEC
action. 49 The district court denied the motion, holding that such an

application of collateral estoppel would effectively deny Parklane
their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.5 0
The Second Circuit reversed, "holding that a party who has had
issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity

given to the circumstances enumerated in § 28 and also to whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible with
an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom preclusion
is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination
of the issue that were not available in the first action and could likely result
in the issue being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between
himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on a preclusive was itself inconsistent with
another determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among
the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent action,
or apparently was based on a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another
party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would
inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the
legal rule upon which it was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be
permitted to relitigate the issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW,

§ 28, see supra note 30.

47.
48.
rescission
49.
50.

§ 29 (1982). For the circumstances presented in

439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 324-25. Shore's action, the original action, had sought "damages,
of the merger and recovery of costs." Id. at 324.
Id. at 325.
Id.
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to litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a
subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact." 5 ' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, asking the threshold question: "whether a
litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless
use that judgment 'offensively' to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding."5' 2 The Court first considered the utility of the doctrine of mutuality. As stated previously,
both collateral estoppel and res judicata promote the dual purposes
of preventing litigants from being forced to relitigate identical issues
with identical parties or their privy and preventing needless repetitive
litigation. However, the doctrine of mutuality was used, until recently,
to limit the scope of these doctrines by requiring both parties to be
bound by the previous judgment before either party could use such
judgment as an estoppel against the other party.
Presuming that it was unfair to allow a party to use a prior
judgment for estoppel purposes when he himself would not have been
bound, the doctrine of mutuality of parties allowed a losing litigant
from a previous action the opportunity to relitigate the issues from
the previous litigatiQn with any new parties. This process was criticized, almost from its inception, for failing to recognize that a party
who has never litigated an issue and one who has fully litigated and
lost stand on different footing. Recognizing the criticism, the Court
was willing to abandon the doctrine of mutuality (at least in patent
cases) in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation.
In that earlier decision, the Court had held that the full and fair
opportunity to litigate was a significant safeguard when determining
whether an estoppel could be essential against the party. This was
deemed more than a sufficient replacement for the doctrine of mu54
tuality.

51. Id. citing Shore v. Parkland Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 326. For the distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" use
of collateral estoppel, see supra note 1, quoting Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322 (1979).
53. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See also 439 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1979).
54. 402 U.S. at 329. In Blonder-Tongue, the Court explained its holding as
follows:
In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is
forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the
plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable
misallocation of resources. To the extent the defendant in the second suit
may not v'in by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully
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But Parklane differed from Blonder-Tongue in at least one
important respect. Blonder-Tongue involved defensive use of collateral
estoppel since the plaintiff was estopped from asserting a claim that
he had previously lost against a different defendant. Parklane, on the
other hand, involved offensive use of the doctrine since the plaintiff
sought to estop the defendant from relitigating an issue which he had
previously lost against a different plaintiff. In both situations, collateral estoppel was used against a party that had previously litigated
the issue and lost. However, there are specific reasons why the two
instances should be treated differently."
The first reason is that the offensive use of collateral estoppel
may not promote judicial economy as effectively as does the defensive
use. The defensive use forces the plaintiff to join all potential defendants in the first action by precluding the plaintiff from relitigating the
same issues against a different adversary. However, offensive collateral estoppel is exactly opposite, for it allows the plaintiff to adopt a
"wait and see" attitude since the plaintiff will be able to estop a
defendant by using a previous judgment against him, whereas he
himself will not be bound if the defendant prevails. As a result,
offensive collateral estoppel will actually increase the amount of
litigation since intervening in the first action would not amount to
6
any gain for the plaintiff.1
A second reason is the possibility of unfairness to a defendant.
When a defendant is sued for small or nominal damages, he would
have little incentive to defend the action vigorously. This is particularly
true if a future suit regarding the same issue is not foreseeable." It
would also be prejudicial to the defendant if the judgment relied upon
as a basis for the estoppel was itself inconsistent with any previous
and fairly, but unsuccessfully litigated the same claim in the prior suit, the
defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative uses ...

to

relitigation of a decided issue ....
Permitting repeated litigation of the same
issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either
the aura of the gaming table or a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness
on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning
rules of procedure.
Id. (citation omitted).
55. 439 U.S. at 329. See also Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010 (1967).
56. 439 U.S. at 329-30.
57. Id. at 330. See also Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346
F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965) (offensive collateral estoppel denied when defendant did not
appeal adverse decision awarding damages of $35,000 and was later sued for over $7
million).
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judgments in which the defendant prevailed." And finally, it is
foreseeable that the second action might afford the defendant some
procedural opportunities that were unavailable in the first action
which inevitably could lead to a different result.5 9
Despite these arguments against the use of offensive collateral
estoppel, the Court has not precluded the use of the doctrine, but has
instead granted trial judges broad discretion in applying the doctrine.
Generally, a trial judge should deny use of offensive collateral estoppel
by a plaintiff where that party could have easily intervened in the
previous action, or where, as discussed above, the use of the doctrine
would be patently unfair to the defending party. 6°
In Parklane, the Court finally rejected the doctrine of mutuality
and adopted the following: collateral estoppel is available whenever
the party against whom a particular determination is to be asserted
was afforded a "full and fair opportunity" to defend in the prior
proceeding. This issue will be considered in a rather different context
in Section V, infra.
III.

ISSUE PRECLUSION IN THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE DISTINCTION

BETWEEN RES JUDICATA AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution embodies
the "ancient [principle] that one should not be twice put in jeopardy
58. 439 U.S. at 330. The Court notes an example provided by Professor Currie:
[A] railroad collision injures 50 passengers all of whom bring separate
actions against the railroad. After the railroad wins the first 25 suits, a
plaintiff wins in suit 26. Professor Currie argues that offensive use of
collateral estoppel should not be applied so as to allow plaintiffs 27 through
50 automatically to recover. Id. at 331, n.14, citing Currie, Mutuality of
Estoppel: Limits of the BernhardDoctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 304 (1957).
59. 439 U.S. at 330-31. In a footnote, the Court indicates that this "problem
is ... particularly acute" when "the defendant ... [is] forced to defend in an
inconvenient forum and therefore [is] unable to engage in full scale discovery or call

witnesses." Id. at n. 15, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(2) Comment
d (1982).
60. 439 U.S. at 331. In a note, the Court points out that:
This is essentially the approach of [the Restatement (Second) of Judgments],
§ 88, which recognizes that 'the distinct trend if not the clear weight of
recent authority is to the effect that there is no intrinsic difference between
'offensive' as distinct from 'defensive' issue preclusion, although a stronger
showing that the prior opportunity to litigate was adequate may be required
in the former situation than the latter.
Id. at 331 n.16, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Reporter's Note
at 99.
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of life or limb for the same offense." ' 61 Although the two principles

are superficially similar in their application, there are fundamental

differences between the prohibition against double jeopardy and the
doctrine of res judicata. For one, the safeguard of the double jeopardy
rule is applicable only to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Since
61. L. Levy, The Origins of the Fifth Amendment 36 (1968), quoting II P.
158-59 (1950-54). See also Sigler, A History

HUGHES, THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND

of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL

HIST.

283 (1976). The amendment provides, in

pertinent part, that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless a presentiment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall

any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332 (1975), stated that:
The history of the adoption of the Double Jeopardy Clause sheds some light
on what the drafters thought [the principle] should mean .... At the time

of the First Congress, only one State had a constitutional provision embodying anything resembling a prohibition against double jeopardy. In the
course of their ratification proceedings, however, two other States suggested
that a Double Jeopardy Clause be included among the first amendments to
the Federal Constitution. Apparently attempting to accommodate these suggestions, James Madison added a ban against double jeopardy to the
proposed version of the Bill of Rights that he presented to the House of
Representatives in June 1789. Madison's provision read: 'No person shall be
subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or

one trial for the same offense.'

. .

. Several members of the House challenged

Madison's wording on the ground that it might be misconstrued to prevent

a defendant from seeking a new trial on appeal of his conviction .... One

of Madison's supporters assured the doubters that the proposed clause
merely stated the current law, and that this protection for defendants was
implicit in the language as it stood. Madison's wording survived the House,
but in the Senate, his proposal was rejected in favor of the more traditional
language employing the familiar concept of 'jeopardy.' . ..
Id. at 340-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also infra note 62. New Hampshire
was the state whose constitution embodied a double jeopardy provision, although
that provision did not bar a retrial after conviction. Id. at 340 n.7. This was not an
issue that troubled Congress during its consideration of the measure that would
become the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment:
From the brief report of the debate [on Madison's proposal] it appears that
both sides agreed that a defendant could have a second trial after a
conviction, but the Government could not have a new trial after an acquittal.
Representative Sherman commented: 'If the [defendant] was acquitted on
the first trial, he ought not be tried a second time; but if he was convicted
on the first, and anything should appear to set the judgment aside, he was
entitled to a second, which was certainly favorable to him.'
Id. at 341 n.9, quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 753 (1789). The Supreme Court has
interpreted the double jeopardy clause to the contrary. See id. at 342-43; North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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it is the placing of the defendant into jeopardy twice that is the harm
to be cured, the provision is not applicable until the first jeopardy
occurs. Jeopardy attaches either when the jury is sworn, for a jury
trial, or when the first witness begins to testify, for a bench trial.
After that point, the trial must continue until final judgment except
in rare special circumstances. If it is discontinued over the objections
of the defendant, in absence of special circumstances, the defendant
62
is not subject to retrial.
62.

IB J.

1861)

...

MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.41812] (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. One such "special
circumstance" is "manifest necessity" which includes "the death or incapacity of the
judge or other exigencies beyond the control of the parties." CASAD, RES JUDICATA,
supra note 7, at 11-12. Further,
[i]f a convicted defendant obtains a reversal on appeal, he may be prosecuted
again, for the same offense, although if he is convicted a second time the
punishment normally cannot exceed that to which he was sentenced upon
the first conviction. If the first prosecution results in neither a conviction
nor an acquittal, i.e., a 'hung jury,' it has generally been understood that
a second prosecution for the same offense is not barred by the double
jeopardy protection, although this seems anomalous.
Id. at 11. See also FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, supra note 19, at § 650.
The English concept of double jeopardy seems to have differed markedly from
its American counterpart:
[I]t appears that in a criminal case of a serious nature there must be a trial
in the technical sense to bar further proceedings for the same offense, the
English not being as concerned as the American courts over jeopardy ...
[Iun The Queen v. Charlesworth, I B.&S. 461, 121 Eng. Rep. 786 (K.B.
a prosecution was [brought] for bribery. The jury had been

empanelled and sworn, and eight witnesses produced on behalf of the
prosecution, when a ninth witness refused to give evidence. The prosecution
declined to proceed and requested that the jurors be discharged, which
motion was granted over objection and a request of the defendant that the
trial proceed so the jurors might render their verdict. In a subsequent
proceeding for the same offense the defendant contended that he could not
be again put in jeopardy. It was held that the second prosecution was not

. the only pleas known to the law

barred. The court said, at page 507: '.

.

acquitted.ln that I cannot concur ....

When we talk of a man being twice

of England to stay a man from being tried by an indictment or information
are the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, and it is clear that
this statement of facts amounts to neither. It is said that a man is not to be
twice tried, and is not a second time to put in jeopardy; and that applies
equally to this case as to a case where a man has been convicted or

tried, we mean a trial which proceeds to its legitimate and lawful conclusion
by verdict; and when we speak of a man being twice put in jeopardy, we
mean put in jeopardy by verdict of a jury; and he is not tried nor put in
jeopardy until the verdict is given.'
Comment, Res Judicata in Criminal Cases, 27 TEX. L. REV. 231, 234 n. 11(1948).
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Apparently, the common law rule prohibiting double jeopardy
began as a counterpart in criminal cases of the general civil doctrine
of judicial finality. 63 Although the two doctrines are dissimilar, there

63. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418[2], citing Lugar,
Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REV. 317, 319 (1954).
See also Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943) and 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, "Res Judicata" 690 (2d ed. 1906-1918)
In England this principle (nemo debet bis vexari) took form in the plea
of 'res judicata' in civil suits and the pleas of 'autre fois acquit' and 'autre
fois convict' in criminal prosecutions. Whether on the civil or criminal side,
it was essential to the efficacy of the plea that a judgment had been rendered
in the former action. There was no plea of 'double jeopardy' known to the
common law, and no principle of the common law that anything short of
conviction or acquittal in a criminal action was a bar to a second prosecution
for the same offense....
It seems most likely that the framers of the constitutions that contain
the phrase 'twice in jeopardy' used it with its common law meaning, viz.,
after conviction or acquittal. The courts, however, have given it a much
broader meaning, and have held that a person is 'in jeopardy' as soon as a
jury has been empaneled, or been sworn, or been 'charged' with the prisoner,
and that after that the defendant cannot be tried again.
Administration of Criminal Law (Official Draft of Double Jeopardy with Commentaries, Introductory Note) (1935), quoted in Comment, Res Judicata in Criminal
Cases, 27 TEX. L. REV. 231, 236 n.20 (1948) [hereinafter Comment, Res Judicata].
See also supra note 61. The Comment cites an English case which suggests "that
there was a rule of practice at common law not to separate the jury until a verdict
could be reached, and it is possible that the American constructions came from this."
Id. (emphasis in original). The same source observes that the term "double jeopardy"
"was practically unknown to the common law" as a plea. Id. at 236. The Supreme
Court has commented, however, that "[elxpressions of the principle can be found in
English law from the time of the Year Books, and as early as the 15th century the
English courts had begun to use the term 'jeopardy' in connection with the principle
against multiple trials." United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340 n.5 (1975), citing
Kirk, Jeopardy During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 602 (1934).
In addition, the common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict were
pleas in bar by which "the defendant shews, by matter extrinsic to the record, that

the indictment is not maintainable." I T.

STARKIE,

A TREATISE

ON CRIMINAL PLEADING

298 (1814).
Pleas alleging a prior conviction, 'auitrefois convict' and pleas alleging
a former acquittal, 'autrefois acquit,' were both based upon the 'universal
maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life, more than once for the same offense.' An accused who

proved either autrefois convict or autrefois acquit established an absolute
bar to a prosecution based upon the same facts and the identical offense.

Shellow & Brenner, Speaking Motions: Recognition of Summary Judgment in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 107 F.R.D. 139, 148 (1985), quoting IV W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 335-36

(16th ed. 1825). In addition to the
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are instances where the prohibition against double jeopardy would
preclude a subsequent prosecution in many situations in which res

judicata would accomplish the same result. They are not functionally

similar in that a final judgment is a prerequisite for the use of res

judicata or collateral estoppel, whereas it is not for the use of double
jeopardy. Finally, although both the doctrines of double jeopardy or
res judicata may be unavailable, collateral estoppel may require certain
facts adjudged in one prosecution to be conclusively established in a
subsequent prosecution involving a different offense. 64
The relationship between double jeopardy and the "civil" principle of res judicata was the issue in United States v. Oppenheimer.65

In that case, Oppenheimer had been indicted for his involvement in
a conspiracy to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy. 66 He
argued that a previous adjudication of a former indictment for the
same offense was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in the
67
Bankruptcy Act.

pleas of former conviction or acquittal, there were two other pleas in bar, i.e., the
plea of autrefois attaint, which raised the bar of attaint by former judgment,
"outlawry or . . . abjuration", and the plea of pardon. Shellow & Brenner, supra,
at 148; see also IV BLACKSTONE, supra, at 336-37; I STARKIE, supra, at 313-15; 3 E.
COKE, INSTITUTES 212-13 (6th ed. 1680); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 33940 (1975). Coke apparently ascribed "the protection afforded by the principle of
double jeopardy [to] . . . [these] . . . common-law pleas." 420 U.S. at 340.
The common law pleas in bar survived into American criminal pleading up
until the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Shellow &
Brenner, supra, at 149-57. At least one American court held that the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment is based upon the common law pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict. See United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.
1959); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) and Ex Rel. Lange, 18
Wall. (85 U.S.) 163 (1974). Another court held, however, that the plea of autrefois
convict was a plea separate and distinct from a plea of double jeopardy. See
Commonwealth ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d 814 (1965). See also
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975).
64. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at
0.418[2]. See also
Mayers & Yarbrough, Bix Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv.
L. REV. 1 (1960); Perkins, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 1960 U. ILL. L.F.
533 (1960); Gershenson, Res Judicata in Successive Prosecutions 25 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 12 (1957); Bigelow, Former Conviction and Former Acquittal, II RUTGERS L.
REV. 487 (1957); Anderson, Res Judicata With Respect to Criminal Judgments, 102
N.Y.L.J. 2194 (1939); McClaren, The Doctrine of Res Judicata as Applied to the
Trial of Criminal Cases, 10 WASH. L. REV. 198 (1935).
65. 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
66. Id. at 85.
67. Id. at 86. The adjudication had "since been held to be wrong in another
case." Id., citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915). The issue
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Oppenheimer ultimately prevailed upon his motion to quash the
indictment. 6 The government appealed, "treating the so-called motion
to quash as a plea in bar," which in substance it was. 69 The Supreme
Court began by rejecting the argument which the government had
advanced that the doctrine of res judicata does not exist for criminal
cases except for the double jeopardy clause. The Court held that it
cannot be the case that the safeguards of an individual in a criminal
case are less than those protecting one from liability in debt. It cannot

be that an acquittal based on the running of the statute of limitations
is less of a protection from a subsequent trial then one on the grounds
of innocence. 70 The Court concluded by holding that:

[t]he safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has tended to give the impression that when it did
not apply in terms, there was no other principle that could.
But the 5th Amendment was not intended to do away with
what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice...
in order, when a man once has been acquitted on the merits,
7
to enable the government to prosecute him a second time. 1

presented, therefore, was whether
an erroneous unappealed judgment that a criminal prosecution was barred
by the statute of limitations ... bar[red] a second prosecution for the same
offense. There was no jeopardy, because the judgment was rendered on the
pleadings before a jury had been empaneled ....
[There was no] former
acquittal in the usual sense, because there was no verdict. Nor [was] it
characteristically collateral estoppel, because prosecution [was] for the same
offense. It seem[ed], therefore, that it must be res judicata and it was so
characterized by the Supreme Court.
Comment, Res Judicata, supra note 63, at 232-33.
68. 242 U.S. at 86.
69. Id., citing United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72 (1911).
70. 242 U.S. at 87.
71. Id. at 88, citing Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 How. 352, 364 (1859). In an earlier
passage, the Court adopted
the statement of a judge of great experience in the criminal law: 'Where a
criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court having jurisdiction to
hear and determine it, the adjudication ... is final as to the matter so
adjudicated upon, and may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecution
for the same offense... In this respect the criminal law is in unison with
that which prevails in civil proceedings.'
242 U.S. at 88, quoting J. Hawkins in Regina v. Miles, L.R. 24 Q.B. Div. 423, 431
(1916). The Court also cited Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25 (1869), in which
a conviction for assault and battery was held conclusive of the unjustifiableness of
the assault in a later prosecution for manslaughter. A subsequent case, Frank v.
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In many ways, the double jeopardy clause is much narrower than
res judicata. Double jeopardy acts only to protect defendants, whereas
collateral estoppel and res judicata operate in favor of either party.
Second, if judgment is rendered prior to the attachment of jeopardy,
then res judicata will still preclude a second prosecution. Finally,
double jeopardy acts only to preclude a second prosecution for the
same offense, whereas collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of
all the previous issues litigated between the same parties and those in
privity.72

Oppenheimer "established that [the] prohibition against double

jeopardy [contained] in the Fifth Amendment .. .does not supplant
or abrogate the traditional doctrine of [res judicata] in criminal cases,

but merely provides an additional protection for defendants accused
74
of crime." '73 A case decided some fifty years later, Ashe v. Swenson,

Magnum, 237 U.S. 307 (1915), held that
a question of fact or of law distinctly put in issue and directly determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot afterwards be disputed between
the same parties. The principle is as applicable to the decisions of criminal
courts as to those of civil jurisdictions.
Id. at 311. See also McLaren, The Doctrine of Res judicata as Applied to the Trial
of Criminal Cases, 20 WASH. L. REv. 198 (1935).
72. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418121 [notes omitted].
See also Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971); Laughlin v. United States, 344
F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961);
United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1955). See generally United States v.
Stearns, 707 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1047 (1984); United
States v. Griggs, 735 F.2d 1318 (lth Cir. 1984); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d
1200 (4th Cir. 1982). For an example of pre-jeopardy estoppel, see United States ex
rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 426 U.S. 950
(1979).
73. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418[2]. It appears that
English law has traditionally "use[d] the language of former jeopardy and the term
'res judicata' interchangeably." Comment, Res Judicata, supra note 63, at 236
(footnote omitted). See Hudson v. Lee, 4 Co. Rep. 43a, 76 Eng. Rep. 989 (K.B.
1589); The Queen v. Justices of Portsmouth, [1892] 1 Q.B. 491; Rex. v. Brackenridge,
48 J.P. 223 (1884); Bollard v. Spring, 51 J.P. 401 (1887); The Queen v. King, [18971
1 Q.B. 214.
74. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). A much earlier decision, Dunn v. United States, 284
U.S. 390, 393 (1932) had seemed to cast doubt upon the applicability of collateral
estoppel in criminal proceedings:
Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is
regarded as if it was a separate indictment .... If separate indictment had
been presented against the defendant ... and separately tried, the same
evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could not be
pleaded as res judicata of the other. Where the offenses are separately
charged in the counts of a single indictment the same rule must hold.
284 U.S. at 393 (citations omitted).
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established that collateral estoppel is an aspect of the Fifth Amend7
ment's protection against double jeopardy. 1
Ashe was tried and acquitted of armed robbery and the theft of
a car. 76 The trial resulted from an incident in which three or four
masked men robbed six poker players. 7 Ashe, who was accused of

having been one of the masked men, was tried "on the charge of

' 78
robbing Donald Knight, one of the participants in the poker game."
Knight and three other poker players appeared as government wit-

nesses, each testifying that an armed robbery had occurred and that
personal property had been taken from each of them. 79 There was,
however, very little evidence that Ashe had been involved, 0 and the

jury found him "not guilty due to insufficient evidence."

Six weeks later, Ashe was again brought to trial, this time for

the robbery of a different victim named Roberts. Ashe filed a motion

to dismiss based on his previous acquittal in the Knight case. However,

the motion was denied and the Roberts trial was conducted. Each of
the witnesses was the same, but each had a much more clear idea that
it was Ashe who was one of the robbers. Ashe was subsequently
found guilty and sentenced to 35 years in prison." After the Missouri

75. 397 U.S. at 442-44.
76. 397 U.S. at 437-39.
77. The poker players were engaged in a game:
in the home of John Gladson at Lee's Summit, Missouri. Suddenly three or
four masked men, armed with a shotgun and pistols, broke into the basement
and robbed each of the poker players of money and various articles of
personal property. The robbers . . .then fled in a car belonging to one of
the victims .... Shortly thereafter, the stolen car was discovered in a field,
and later that morning three men were arrested ... while they were walking
on a highway. [Ashe] was arrested . . .some distance away.
Id. at 437-38. It was never clear whether there were three or four robbers. Id. at 437.
78. Id. at 438.
79. Id.
80. Two of the witnesses thought that there had been only three robbers
...and could not identify [Ashe] as one of them. Another of the victims,
who was [Ashe's] uncle by marriage, said that at the 'patrol station' he had
positively identified each of the other three men accused of the holdup, but
could say only that the petitioner's voice 'sounded very much like' that of
one of the robbers. The fourth participant in the poker game did identify
[Ashe], but only by his 'size and height, and his actions.'
Id. at 438.
81. [T]wo witnesses who at the first trial had been wholly unable to identify
[Ashel as one of the robbers, now testified that his features, size, and
mannerisms matched those of one of their assailants. Another witness who
before had identified the petitioner only by his size and actions now also
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courts rejected Ashe's argument that the conviction violated "his right
not to be twice put in jeopardy," he brought a habeas corpus
proceeding in the federal courts. 2 The district court denied the writ
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, 3 both finding themselves bound by
4
the Supreme Court's decision in Hoag v. New Jersey.
In Hoag, the defendant was tried for robbing three men in a
tavern. The evidence was clear that a robbery had occurred, but it
was weak as to who committed the act. As a result, Hoag was
acquitted. Hoag was then brought to trial a second time against a
different victim, this time the jury finding him guilty.
When Hoag brought his appeal to the Supreme Court, his
conviction was upheld. The court found it unnecessary to decide
whether "collateral estoppel" is a due process requirement for state
criminal trials because it found persuasive the state's argument that
the previous acquittal did not give rise to an estoppel. 5 The Court
failed to approach the consideration of whether collateral estoppel is
an ingredient of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
6
jeopardy.
This was the issue presented in Ashe v. Swenson. The Court
began its consideration of the issue by examining the concept of
collateral estoppel. Although it is an awkward phrase, the court held
it to play an extremely important role in our adversarial system of
justice. Simply stated, the concept embodied the principle that once
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in a valid end time
judgment, that issue cannot further be litigated in a subsequent
controversy. Furthermore, it has been part of the criminal justice
system at least since the Oppenheimer decision.87 The Court found
that federal case law has made it clear that the rule of collateral
estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied hypertechnically or with

remembered him by the unusual sound of his voice. The State further refined
its case at the second trial by declining to call one of the participants in the
poker game whose identification testimony at the first trial had been
conspicuously negative.
Id. at 440.
82. Id. at 440. See also State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo. 1963) and
State v. Ashe, 403 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1967).
83. Id. at 440-41. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F. Supp. 871, 873 (W.D.
Mo.), aff'd 399 F.2d 40, 46 (8th Cir. 1968).
84. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
85. 397 U.S. at 441-42. See also 356 U.S. at 469-70.
86. Id. at 442.
87. Id. at 443.
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the archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but should be
applied with a realistic and rational purpose in mind.8 8
In doing this, it is up to the court to examine which issues were
actually deliberated upon by the factfinder in the previous decision
and determined whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict
upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose
from consideration. A test more technically restrictive would amount
to a rejection of the doctrine in criminal proceedings.8 9 The Court
applied this approach to the facts before it and found that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel makes a "second prosecution for the robbery
of Roberts wholly impermissible." 90 The Court held that:

[T]he ultimate question to be determined, then, ...

is
whether this established rule of federal law is embodied in the
Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. We do
not hesitate to hold that it is. For whatever else that constitutional guarantee may embrace, it surely protects a man who
has been acquitted from having to "run the gantlet" a second
time. 91

88. Id. at 444.
89. Id. at 444. The Court also notes that:
'If a later court is permitted to state that the jury may have disbelieved
substantial and uncontradicted evidence of the prosecution on a point the
defendant did not contest, the possible multiplicity of prosecutions is
staggering. . . .In fact, such a restrictive definition of 'determined' amounts
simply to a rejection of collateral estoppel, since it is impossible to imagine
a statutory offense in which the government has to prove only one element
or issue to sustain a conviction.'
Id. at n.9, quoting Mayers and Yarborough, Bix Vexari. New Trials and Successive
Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1, 38 (1960).
90. 397 U.S. at 445. The Court stated that:
the record is utterly devoid of any indication that the first jury could
rationally have found that an armed robbery had not occurred, or that
Knight had not been a victim of that robbery. The single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been
one of the robbers. And the jury by its verdict found that he had not.
Id.
91. Id. at 445-46 (citations and footnote omitted). Accord Collins v. Loisel,
262 U.S. 426 (1927). The Ashe court elaborated as follows:
It is true, as this Court said in Hoag v. New Jersey, supra, that we
have never squarely hold collateral estoppel to be a constitutional requirement. Until perhaps a century ago, few situations arose calling for its
application. For at common law, and under early federal criminal statutes,
offense categories were relatively few and distinct. A single course of criminal
conduct was likely to yield but a single offense .... In more recent times,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Ashe v. Swenson not only established that collateral estoppel is
an aspect of the protections embodied in the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against double jeopardy, it also illustrates the difficulty
in applying collateral estoppel when the judgment in question is a
general acquittal: Since collateral estoppel has a preclusive effect on
only those issues that were ultimately determined by the previous
judgment, and since a judgment of acquittal is usually based on a
general verdict of not guilty, it is often difficult to determine precisely
what issues were ultimately determined by the factfinder in a general
judgment of acquittal. 9
This difficulty, which is an issue that will be considered in Section
IV, infra, arises from the fact that American criminal law, like its
English counterpart, 93 does not differentiate between "not guilty"
with the advent of specificity in draftsmanship and the extraordinary proliferation of overlapping and related statutory offenses, it became possible for
prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numerous series of offenses from a
single alleged criminal transactionote ... As the number of statutory

offenses multiplied, the potential for unfair and abusive reprosecutions

became far more pronounced .... The federal courts soon recognized the

need to prevent such abuses through the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and
it became a safeguard firmly embedded in federal law.
397 U.S. at 445 n. 10 (citations omitted). See also Comment, Statutory Implementation
of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund ConstitutionalGuarantee, 65

YALE. L.J. 339, 342 (1956).
Chief Justice Burger dissented, for reasons which are apparent in the following
passage:
The collateral-estoppel concept-originally a product only of civil litigation-is a strange mutant as it is transformed to control this criminal
case. In civil cases the doctrine was justified as conserving judicial resources
as well as those of the parties to the actions and additionally as providing
the finality needed to plan for the future .... Very properly, in criminal

cases, finality and conservation of private, public, and judicial resources are
lesser values than in civil litigation.
397 U.S. at 464 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall joined in a special concurrence, the
thesis of which was that Ashe's second prosecution was barred under principles of
double jeopardy as representing a second prosecution for the "same offense." See
397 U.S. at 448-61.
92. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.41812].
93. English law, however, apparently includes "the doctrine that estoppels do
not bind the Crown, though it may take advantage of them." Comment, Res Judicata,
supra note 63, at 236 (footnote omitted).
There is one exception to the rule that estoppels ... bind both parties, and
that is in the case of the Crown; for it appears . .. that the king is not

bound by estoppels, though he can take advantage of them. Everest & Strode,
The Law of Estoppel 8 (3d ed. 1923). In the Queen v. Delme, 10 Mod. 198,
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and "guilt not proven." Scottish law allows jurors to return one of

three verdicts, i.e., "guilty", "not guilty" or "not proven." ' 94 A

verdict of "not proven" means that "the guilt of the accused is not
made out, though his innocence is not clear." 95
Lacking this distinction, American criminal law is reluctant to
extend issue-preclusive effects to general judgments of acquittal, Ashe
v. Swenson*notwithstanding. 96 But that is not an issue with which this
article is concerned. It is sufficient for the purposes of this article
that the Supreme Court has recognized that both res judicata and
collateral estoppel apply in criminal proceedings as well as in civil
litigation. However, this recognition gives rise to a corollary issue,
namely, what effect is to be given to a civil judgment in a criminal
proceeding and vice versa?
IV.

"CROSS-OVER" COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: ISSUE PRECLUSION IN A
PROCEEDING OF THE OPPOSITE CHARACTER

This section examines a relatively unusual and almost unrecognized legal phenomenon, namely, instances in which a judgment
entered by a civil/criminal court is asserted as precluding the litigation

88 Eng. Rep. 692 (Q.B. 1714), a defendant urged an estoppel against the

Crown in a criminal case. The court said, concerning privileges of the
Crown: ". . . nor will any estoppel bind the Crown."
Id. at 236 n.21. It appears that at least one treatise has indicated that "The King is
... bound by estoppels arising out of criminal proceedings, as he is necessarily a
party to them."Id. at 237, quoting EVEREST & STRODE, THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 8 (3d
ed. 1923). This statement, however, has been questioned as "conjectural" and as
being based upon two cases which represent "doubtful authority." See id. ("One
involves an unusual fact" situation, and the other concerns the use of the ancient writ
of melius inquirendum; both cases are rather old, and significantly no other authority
is cited.") See also Stoughter's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 168a, 77 Eng. Rep. 728 (K.B. 1610);
Attorney General v. Norstedt, 3 Price 97, 146 Eng. Rep. 203 (Ex. 1816).
94. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (4th ed. 1968).
95. Id.
96. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418[2]; CASAD, RES
JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 248-51; Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata
Variables: CriminalProsecutions, 19 VAND. L. REV. 683, 690-98 (1966).
[A] previous judgment is conclusive only as to those matters which were in
fact in issue and actually or necessarily adjudicated. Thus an acquittal of
the charge of seduction does not adjudicate the question of sexual intercourse
although that was one of the issues in the case, since the acquittal might
have been due to the failure to establish other facts essential to a conviction.

FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS,

supra note 19, at § 648.
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of issue pending before a criminal/civil court. The author will refer
to this phenomenon as "cross-over" collateral estoppel. 97
A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Generally a judgment in a criminal action is not determinative of any issue in a later civil proceeding other than the
fact of its rendition, nor is a civil judgment binding on a party
to a later criminal action. In the typical case, collateral estoppel
does not apply because the parties to the two actions are not
identical, and because different. degrees of proof are required
in the two proceedings. 9

The record of a conviction or of an acquittal is not,

according to a decided preponderance of authority, conclusive
97. Although the preceding discussion has often used the terms res judicata
and collateral estoppel interchangeably, as denoting the general notion that judgments
have preclusive effects, the succeeding discussion will be concerned only with the
concept of collateral estoppel. This is, of course, necessitated by the fact that there
can be no true "res judicata" between civil and criminal proceedings given that the
technical term "res judicata" signifies "claim preclusion" rather than the issue
preclusion which is indicates by use of the term collateral estoppel. Since the causes
of action, or "claims", necessarily differ between the civil and criminal law, there
can be no such phenomenon as "cross-over res judicata." This is true despite the
fact that certain of the cases which are discussed in this section insist on referring to
a civil judgment as being "res judicata" in a criminal prosecution and vice versa.
See, e.g., 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4474 (1981):
Claim preclusion does not extend from criminal prosecutions to civil actions.
Our traditional division between civil and criminal procedure does not
contemplate any opportunity for joining any civil claim with the criminal
prosecution. Thus is it manifest that a different claim or cause of action is
involved in a subsequent civil action between private parties, or in an action
brought by the criminal defendant against the government.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
98. Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 878 (footnotes
omitted), citing United States v. Kawasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1950);
Ashby v. Red Jacket Coal Corp., 185 Va. 202, 38 S.E.2d 436 (1946); Horn v. Cole,
203 Ark. 361, 156 S.W.2d 787 (1941); Harper v. Blasi, 112 Colo. 58, 151 P.2d 760.
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, supra note 19, at §§ 653, 655, 658. See also Note, Res

Judicata-What Judgments are Conclusive-Criminal Conviction on Plea of Guilty
is Conclusive of Same Issues in Subsequent Civil Suit, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1376 (1951).

The Developments article does note, however, that in Haynes v. Sanford, 185 Tenn.
576, 206 S.W.2d 796 (1947), a defendant who lost on the issue of the constitutionality
of a statute in a prior criminal action was bound by that determination in a subsequent
civil suit. Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 878 n.449.
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of the facts on which it is based in any civil action, nor,

ordinarily, is it even evidence of such facts. 99

A judgment in a civil case must generally be excluded
from evidence in a criminal prosecution, because the parties
are not the same, and were they the same, it would be improper

to receive a judgment in a civil case as evidence of the
commission of a crime of which the defendant is accused, for
the reason that such judgment may be founded on a mere

preponderance of evidence not sufficient to satisfy the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 00
These quotations represent the traditional wisdom on "crossover" collateral estoppel, a wisdom which denied that such a phenomenon existed. 10 ' A careful reading of the passages reveals that their

repudiation of the concept is based upon certain assumptions: (1) that
a judgment cannot be offered as evidence in a dissimilar proceeding;
(2) that the parties are not identical in the two proceedings; (3) that
a civil judgment is being offered in a criminal proceeding in order to
99. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, supra note 19, at § 653 (footnotes omitted). See
also BLACK, JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at § 529:
Since the parties to a criminal prosecution and those in a civil suit are
necessarily different, and as the objects and results of the two proceedings
and the rules of evidence which apply to them respectively are equally
diverse, it follows that the judgment in the former cannot be used by way
of estoppel in the later, save for the single purpose of proving its own
existence, if that becomes a relevant fact.
Id. at § 529.

100.

FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS,

supra note 19, at § 658 (footnote omitted). See also

Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 880, which states that:
When a civil judgment is offered as evidence to prove any issue in a criminal
proceeding, it is excluded by all courts and its admission has been held
prejudicial. This result seems proper in view of the severe consequences of
a criminal conviction as opposed to an adverse civil judgment and the greater
degree of proof needed to sustain a criminal conviction.
Id. at 880 (footnotes omitted), citing Lawton v. State, 152 Fla. 821, 13 So.2d 211
(1943); Helms v. State, 35 Ala. App. 187, 45 So.2d 170, cert. denied 253 Ala. 467,
45 So.2d 171 (1950); Hodges v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. App. 176, 222 P.2d 386 (1950).
101. For more modern perspectives on this issue, see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4474 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT
0.418[l]. Both
& MILLER]. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at
treatises caption their respective discussions as treating of the preclusive effect of
a criminal judgment in a subsequent civil proceeding, although MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE does address the converse situation in a brief paragraph which is disucssed
in the text above. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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establish the defendant's guilt or some aspect thereof; and (4) that
differing standards of proof absolutely preclude "crossing-over." 1 02
But what if these assumptions do not hold-is "crossing-over" still
an impossibility?
The first assumption has been partially altered by Rule 803(22)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that, with limited
exceptions, a final judgment adjudging the defendant guilty of a crime
punishable either by death or by imprisonment for a term greater
than one year, is not excluded by the hearsay rule for the purpose of
proving a fact necessary to sustain the judgment. 03 The Advisory
Committee Note explains that Rule 803(22) does not concern itself
with the substantive effect of the former judgment as a bar or an
estoppel where, under the doctrine of res judicata, the former judgment is conclusive. 0 4 Where res judicata is not applicable, Rule
803(22) allows into evidence judgments of felony convictions for what
they are worth.105
Most commentators agree that although a judgment of conviction
is technically hearsay, "since it is based on the opinion of twelve
persons who have not been cross-examined and have no personal

102. In addition to these assumptions and/or arguments against "crossing-over",
the argument has also been made that civil judgments cannot be introduced against
a criminal defendant because to do so could violate his right not to testify against
himself and could violate his right to confront adversarial witnesses. See, e.g.,
Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 879. See also 46 AM JUR

2D Judgments §§ 615-620 (1969).

103. The FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE provide in part that:
The following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule ... Evidence of a final
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea
of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government
in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be
shown but does not affect admissibility.

FED.

R. EvmD. 803(22).

104. FED. R. EvID. 803(22) advisory committee's note.
105. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 803(22)[01] (1985)
[hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE]. See also Note, Use of Record of Criminal
Conviction in Subsequent Civil Action Arising from the Same Facts as the Prosecution, 64 MICH. L. REv. 702, 703 (1966). FED. R. EVID. 803(22) advisory committee's
note continues as follows: "This is the direction of the decisions, Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
1287, 1299, which manifest an increasing reluctance to reject in toto the validity of
the laws factfinding processes outside the confines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel."
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knowledge of the underlying facts,"' 6 the hearsay objection is really
only a "purely technical obstacle to admission of judgments."" 7
And there is also the fact "that certified records of a conviction
would be eligible for admission under the public records exception of
the hearsay rule." 08
One treatise criticizes the traditional argument against admitting
evidence of prior convictions. The argument rests on the observation
that the parties in the prior proceeding usually differ from those in
the subsequent action, resulting in a lack of mutuality of parties. As
a result, admission into evidence of prior convictions would undermine
the common law maxim that a third party should not be prejudiced
by a transaction between two others. The treatise states that this
conclusion is ill-focused. The treatise suggests that in determining
whether the hearsay rule should be given effect, the correct concern
"is not the party's opportunity to have been present at the official
investigation but rather whether the investigation provided adequate
assurance of reliability."' 0 9 Although arguments against the admissibility of prior judgments in subsequent proceedings have been
overcome in one respect, Rule 803(22) is not without limits. The rule
encompasses only prior criminal judgments-with limited exceptions,
civil judgments are inadmissible as evidence because the lower burden
of proof in a civil proceeding renders a civil judgment less reliable
0
than a judgment in a criminal proceeding."
106. Id. at
803(22)[01], quoting Note, Judgments as Evidence, 46 IOWA L.
REV. 400, 402 (1961).
107. Id.
108. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 105,
803(22)[01], citing McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318 at 738-39 (2d ed. 1972). The public records exception is
contained in FED. R. EvD. 803(8), and excepts from hearsay objection the "[riecords,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies."
109. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 105,
803(22)[011 at 803-350, quoting
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 318 at 739 (2d ed. 1972). The maxim in question is "res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 105,
803(22)[01] at 803-350 n.7. Other reasons offered for excluding judgments of conviction have been "that criminal defendants do not always get a fair trial because of
lack of opportunity for discovery, which might alter the outcome of the civil action"
and "a distrust of judgments rendered by juries." Id. at 803-351 to 303-352, quoting
New Jersey Supreme Court, Committee on Evidence 197 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
Wigmore offered the following comment on the second issue: "For can we in the
same breath say that the jury is to be trusted to determine the fate of the parties in
the present case, but that juries generally are not to be trusted and that their verdicts
are worthless." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1671a at 689 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 105, at 803-352.
110. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 105,

at

803(22[01] (footnotes
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Therefore, Rule 803(22) has at least partially abrogated the

objection that judgments are not admissible as evidence in dissimilar
proceedings. Of course, this is not the issue that is presently under

consideration. It is necessary to distinguish, as many early commen-

tators failed to do, between the use of a judgment as evidence and
the use of a judgment as issue preclusion."' Whatever the merits of

the first alternative, this article will argue that there is no obstacle to
the use of a judgment as issue preclusion in a similar or dissimilar

proceeding.
In this regard, it is necessary to note that "[t]he doctrine of
collateral estoppel is applicable not merely to questions of fact but
also to questions of law." ' 12 Even if one assumes that the "differing
standards of proof" argument has some validity with regard to the
use of judgments as evidence in dissimilar proceedings, this argument
is far less applicable when the judgment is being offered as an
adjudication upon a question of law."'

omitted). FED. R. EvrD. 803(23) excepts from hearsay objection "j]udgments as
proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to
the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation."
111. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 318 (3d ed. 1984), which states:
Where the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or in modern
terminology claim preclusion or issue preclusion, make the determinations
in the first case binding in the second . . .the judgment in the first case is
not only admissible in the second, but it is as a matter of substantive law
conclusive against the party. If neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel
applies, however, the courts have traditionally been unwilling to admit
judgments in previous cases. The judgments have been regarded as hearsay
and not within any exception to the hearsay rule.
Id., citing 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1671a (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
112. Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1942). See
also CASAD, RES JUDICATA supra note 7, at 122-46.
113. Rulings on pure questions of law may have some binding effect upon
the parties in later litigation by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis or that
of 'the law of the case.' However, even where those doctrines have no
application, parties may be precluded from relitigating particular questions
of law through he operation of direct or collateral estoppel.
Rulings on questions of law are seldom made in the abstract. Nearly
always questions of law are decided with reference to particular facts ...
But a ruling embodying the application of undisputed legal standards to
admitted facts . . .is . . .a ruling on a question of law. Such a ruling may
at the same time establish one of the ultimate facts of the controversy. ...
If the legal significance of the same set of historical facts should again
become a matter of dispute between the parties, the principles of issue
preclusion should normally apply. ...
CASAD, RES JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 125-26 (citations omitted).
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Although the original Restatement of Judgments chose not to
address the issue,1 4 the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, at least
in part, recognizes the possibility of "cross-over" collateral estoppel.
Generally, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments would give issues
determined in a prior criminal judgment preclusive effect in favor of
the government in a subsequent civil proceeding between the government and the same defendant," 5 or between the government and a
third person whose claim is derived from the defendant's suit.11 6 As
well, issues determined in a successful criminal prosecution are preclusive in favor of a third person in a civil action against the same
defendant" 7 or against persons having certain relationships with the
defendant." 8 As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments acknowledges not only "cross-over" collateral
estoppel, but also rejects the mutuality requirement. The drafters
noted that "long before the mutuality rule was repudiated in civil
cases, well reasoned decision had extended the rule of preclusion to
operate in favor of third persons where the first action is criminal
and the second is civil." 9 This means, of course, that a "lack of
identity between the parties" in two dissimilar proceedings is no
longer an objection to the application of "cross-over" collateral
estoppel between the two. 20
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments does not address the
issue-preclusive effects of a civil judgment upon a subsequent criminal
proceeding.'2' Certain commentators concede that this is an acceptable
114. The RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS does deal with the effect of judgments
rendered in civil actions. However, it does not deal with the effect of a judgment in
a criminal proceeding, nor does it deal with the effect of a judgment in a civil case
upon subsequent criminal proceedings. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS scope note
at 2 (1942).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85(1)(a) (1982).
116. Id. at § 85(2)(b).
117. Id. at § 85(2)(a).
118. Id.at § 85(2)(b).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENrS § 85 comment e (1982) ("Judgment
for prosecution: preclusion in favor of third party"). See also id. at comment f
("Judgment for prosecution: preclusion against thirty party").
120. See also BLACK, JUDGMENTS, supra note 5 at § 529."[I]t may happen that
the parties are the same in the two actions, civil and criminal; and here, the main
reason of rule [against "crossing-over"] being taken away, the rule itself will not
always apply." Id.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, reporter's note at 3 (1982): "The
preclusive effect in a subsequent criminal prosecution of a prior civil judgment against
the government is outside the scope of this Restatement." Id., citing United States
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 1170 (1913); Yates v. United States, 354
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practice. 22 The issue is considered in more detail in Section IV(D),
infra. That section also returns to the arguments which have been
adduced against the permissibility of "cross-over" collateral estoppel,
and assesses their viability in present-day law.
Before venturing such an assessment it is necessary to examine
the decisional law in this area. As noted above, collateral estoppel
appears in four guises, "civil to civil, criminal to criminal, criminal
to civil and civil to criminal.' ' 23 The first two categories having been
considered and, presenting no difficulties in conceptualization or appplication, it is now necessary to consider the problematic categories,
i.e., "criminal to civil" and "civil to criminal."
B.

CRIMINAL TO CIVIL

The application of a criminal judgment as issue preclusion in a

subsequent civil proceeding is generally considered to be far less

97,648
U.S. 298 (1957); United States v. Mumford, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(4th Cir. Oct. 2, 1980); Commonwealth v. 707 Main Corp., 371 Mass. 374, 357
N.E.2d 753 (1976). See infra Section IV(B) or (C) for a discussion of each of the
cases cited above.
122. See, e.g., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418[l], which
states that:
[Blecause of the different standards of proof, a judgment of civil liability
is not conclusive of any issue in a criminal trial, and its admission as
evidence is error prejudicial to the defendant. In the converse situation, it
is arguable, however, that the same rationale should make a civil judgment
on the merits, that a defendant is not civilly liable, conclusive in his favor
in a subsequent criminal prosecution as to the issues adjudicated in the civil
suit.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Another commentator suggests that:
Instances in which issues litigated in a civil action will be accorded preclusive
effect in a later criminal suit are rare indeed. If the state was not a party to
the civil action, it cannot be bound by anything adjudicated in it. And even
where mutuality has been abandoned, the state will not be able to claim the
benefit of issues decided in an earlier civil suit to establish any part of the
crime because of the different standard of proof. Occasionally the state will
initiate a civil action against a defendant, and, after losing, prosecute the
defendant for a crime involving some of the same facts. In such a case, it
can be argued that the defendant should be able to rely upon the civil
judgment as conclusive on the common issue. Failure of the state to establish
its case under the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard of the civil law,
would indicate clearly that the criminal standard, of 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' could not be met. Cases actually holding this, however, are hard to
find.
CASAD, RES JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 261-62. It is useful to note that Casad was
writing in 1976, four years before the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS appeared
and abrogated the requirement of mutuality.
123. Gregory v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Ky. 1980) (citations
omitted). See also supra note 2.
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problematic than the application of a civil judgment as issue preclusion
in a subsequent criminal proceeding.1 14 The extent to which a judgment
in a criminal proceeding is available as collateral estoppel in a civil
proceeding is a function of several issues: (1) whether the judgment
was a judgment of acquittal or of conviction; (2) whether, if the
judgment was of conviction, it resulted from an adjudication on the
merits or a plea; and (3) whether preclusion is being asserted by the
government or by the defendant.' 25
1. Acquittal v. Conviction
Issue preclusion in a civil action that follows a criminal conviction
has emerged only in recent years. The traditional rule was that the
conviction was irrelevant in any subsequent civil action. This rule gave
way to decisions that permitted the conviction to be offered in
evidence. Evidentiary use of the conviction has in turn been trans126
formed into preclusion.
Perhaps the leading decision on this issue is Emich Motors Corp.
v. GeneralMotors Corp.127 The action was brought by Emich Motors,
a former Chevrolet dealer, in federal district court for the Northern
District of Illinois pursuant to the Clayton Act, alleging conspiracy
in restraint of trade. 12 1 Prior to this action, defendant General Motors
Corporation had been convicted in an Indiana federal district court
of conspiracy in restraint of trade. 12 9 At trial, the Illinois federal
district court allowed into evidence the prior criminal indictment,
verdict, and judgment.13 0

80;

124. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, supra note 10, at 878supra note 102, at § 4474; MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra

WRIGHT & MILLER,

note 62, at

0.418[l. "There is ... a growing tendency to admit a prior conviction

for a serious criminal offense in a civil action." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 318 (3d

ed. 1984).

125. Constraints of space and of the reader's patience militate against going into

the issue of third-party assertion of a criminal judgment as "cross-over" estoppel,
especially since the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS considers this issue in some
detail. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. See also MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 62, at
0.418[l]; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 102, at §
4474.
126. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 102, at § 4474.
127. 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
128. 340 U.S. at 559-60.
129. Id.
130. Id. This evidence was permitted pursuant to § 5 of the Clayton Act, which
provides in part:
A final judgment . . . rendered in any criminal prosecution . . . under the
antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated such laws shall be
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
verdict for plaintiffs, in part on the ground that the lower court erred
in allowing the jury to consider the evidence adduced from the prior
criminal action.' The Court of Appeals reasoned that the judgment
was prima facie evidence of a conspiracy only, and that the record in
the preceding criminal action should not have been exhibited to the
32

jury. 1

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the effect to
be given to a conviction in this situation.'
After considering the
history and purposes of the Clayton Act,' 13 4 the Court concluded that
the general doctrine of estoppel governed the proper evidentiary use
of a prior conviction.' 35 The Court acknowledged the preclusive impact
of a prior criminal conviction in favor of the Government in a
subsequent civil proceeding, but further remarked that "[sluch estoppel extends only to questions distinctly put in issue and directly
determined in the criminal prosecution. . .In the case of a criminal
conviction based on a jury verdict of guilty, issues which were essential
to the verdict must be regarded as having been determined by the
judgment.'1 6 The problem is, of course, to determine exactly "what
matters were adjudicated in the antecedent suit", particularly when
prima facie evidence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding
brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws as to all
matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto.
Id. at 559-60 (footnote omitted), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1, 26 Stat. 209, ch. 647 (July
2, 1890).
131. Id. at 560, citing Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d
70 (7th Cir. 1950), rev'd 340 U.S. 558, reh'g denied 341 U.S. 906 (1951).
132. Id. at 556.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 568. The Court found that, by enacting § 5 of the Clayton Act,
"Congress intended to confer, subject only to a defendant's enjoyment of its day in
court against a new party, as large an advantage as the estoppel doctrine would
afford had the Government brought suit." Id.
135. Id. at 568. It is unclear whether the Court was referring to the relatively
new concept of "collateral estoppel" as adopted in the original Restatement of
Judgments, or to the historical concept of "estoppel by record." See generally supra
Section II.
136. Id. at 568-69 (citations omitted). For the proposition that a conviction can
work an estoppel in favor of the government in i subsequent proceeding, the Court
cited United States v. Greater N.Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 53 F.2d
518 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), aff'd sub. nom. Local 167, I.B.T. v. United States, 291 U.S.
293 (1934); Farley v. Patterson, 166 App. Div. 358, 152 N.Y.S. 59 (1915); and
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, supra note 19, at § 657.
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37
the "antecedent suit" culminated in a general verdict of conviction.'
After considering the problems presented by such a verdict, the
Emich court held that the prior criminal judgment was prima facie
evidence of more than the general conspiracy. It was also evidence of
the means by which the GM dealers were coerced. In addition to
introducing the prior judgment as evidence of the existence of a
conspiracy, it was necessary for the plaintiff to introduce evidence of
the means.by which the conspiracy was effectuated in order to show
that the same means had been employed against plaintiff, and thus
that plaintiff had been injured by the conspiracy. From this reasoning,
that
the Court determined that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
138
the judgment was only prima facie evidence of a conspiracy.
The Court further held that "[w]hat issues were decided by the
former . . .litigation is . . .a question of law as to which the court
must instruct the jury." 13 9 The Court found that "it is the task of the
trial judge to make clear to the jury the issues that were determined
against the defendant in the prior suit.' ' 40 The trial judge is to
discharge this task by carefully examining the record in the prior
proceeding "to determine the issues decided by the judgment", and
is then to "reconstruct that case" in his instructions to the jury and
"explain [to them] the scope and effect of the former judgment on
' 41
the case at trial."'
Other decisions have followed Emich in according preclusive
effect to a criminal conviction preceding the institution of civil
proceedings involving the same subject matter. 42 And other statutes

137. Id. at 569.
138. Id. at 570-571.
139. Id. at 571.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 5712-72.
142. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Lafkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied 379 U.S. 962 (1965) (conviction for willful evasion of tax precluded relitigation
issue of fraud in subsequent civil action); Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353 (4th
Cir. 1965); Amos v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Salvatore, 140 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United States v. American Precision
Prod. Corp., 115 F. Supp. 823 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Schneider, 139 F.
Supp. 823 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); O'Neill v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also United
States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978); De Cavalcante v. C.I.R., 620 F.2d 23
(3d Cir. 1980); Gray v. C.I.R., 708 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct.
1709 (1984); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984); Considine v. United
States, 683 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1982); Haung Tang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 523 F.2d
811 (9th Cir. 1975); Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied
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have followed the anti-trust statutes in according preclusive effects to
criminal judgments of conviction which are offered in civil proceedings. 143 McCormick comments upon the reasons for the increase in
popularity:

450 U.S. 966 (1981); McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied 429 U.S. 855 (1977); Fontneau v. United States, 654 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981);
Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 567 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1977); Untied States v.
Thomas, 709 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1983); Berdick v. United States, 612 F.2d 533, 222
Ct. Cl. 94 (1979); Brown v. United States, 524 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Cf. Prosise
v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. granted 459 U.S. 904, aff'd 103 S.Ct.
2368 (1982).
The holding in Emich was anticipated by the Court's decision in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934), in which the Court
found that a judgment in a criminal case "conclusively established in favor of the
United States and against those who were found guilty that within the period covered
by the indictment the latter were parties tcF
the conspiracy charged." 291 U.S. at 298.
The holding came in a civil injunction suit for violation of the Sherman Act; the
civil suit followed an earlier criminal conviction for conspiracy to restrain and
monopolize interstate commerce. See id. at 295-6.
The oddest decision in this area may very well be Johnson v. Girdwood, 7 Misc.
Rep. 651, 28 N.Y. Supp. 151 (N.Y. Comm. Pl. 1894), aff'd 143 N.Y. 660, 39 N.E.
21 (1894), which held that a judgment of conviction in a criminal court of one who
was innocent of the crime charged does not bar a civil action against the person who
maliciously procured the conviction.
And there is a curious subset of decisions, primarily older state court decisions, which hold that a criminal conviction may be admitted in a subsequent
civil proceeding if the civil proceeding is the convicted defendant's attempt "to take
advantage of rights growing out of the criminal act" or to "profit" form his crime.
See, e.g., Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrara, 277 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960). See
also Mineo v. Eureka Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 182 Pa. Super. 75, 125 A.2d 612,
616 (1956); Eagle Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E.
314, 57 A.L.R. 490 (1927); Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1942);
Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kanote 1959);
Sovereign Camp. W.O.W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491 (1933); Fidelity-Phenix
Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387 (1933); North
River Ins. Co. of City of New York v. Miletello, 100 Colo. 343, 67 P.2d 625 (1937),
aff'd 104 Colo. 28, 88 P.2d 567; Lillie v. Modern Woodsmen of Am., 89 Neb. 1,
130 N.W. 1004 (1911); Goodwin v. Continental Cas. Co., 175 Okla. 469, 53 P.2d
241 (1935). The majority of these cases involve attempts to recover upon insurance
policies, the benefits of which issue upon death or destruction by fire, and the usual
holding is that the convicted killer/arsonist cannot profit by his own misdeeds. See
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 318 (3d ed. 1984).
143. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982), which states that: "A final judgment
or decree rendered in favor the United States in any criminal proceeding brought
... under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations
of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United
States." Id.
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In these situations, the part§ against whom the judgment is
offered was generally the defendant in the criminal case and
therefore had not only the opportunity but also the motive to
defend fully. In addition, because of the heavy burden of
proof in criminal cases, a judgment in such a situation represents significantly more reliable evidence than a judgment in
a civil case."14
Acquittals are not accorded equal effect. The classic decisions on
46
145
this issue are Wilkes v. Dinsman and Helvering v. Mitchell.
Wilkes involved an action brought against a commanding naval
officer by a marine who alleged, among other things, assault and
battery and false imprisonment.147 While on an exploring expedition
in the Pacific Ocean, the plaintiff's enlistment expired.' 4 Legislation
provided that in such instances the commanding officer was to provide
the enlistee with transportation back to the states. 49 The plaintiff
claimed his discharge and refused to perform further service, whereupon the defendant allegedly repeatedly flogged and imprisoned the
plaintiff. 50 Upon return to the United States, the plaintiff brought
suit against the commanding officer. In the meantime, a court-martial
had been brought against the same commanding officer, one of the
charges being based upon the same occurrences involved in the civil
suit. In the court-martial proceeding the officer was acquitted.
The civil trial court excluded this acquittal from evidence, the
jury found the defendant guilty, 5' and the defendant 'appealed, in
144. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 318 (3d ed. 1984). McCormick also notes that
'some courts ... hold that the judgment is conclusive proof that the party committed
the relevant acts with the state of mind required for criminal liability." Id., citing
Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
145. 48 U.S (7 How.) 89 (1849).
146. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
147. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 89.
148. Id. at 89-92.
149. Id. at 90.
150. Id. at 92-93. The full particulars are presented at a subsequent point in the
opinion:
[That] the said Wilkes did refuse to give [Dinsman and three other "private
marines"] their discharges ...

[and] did cause them .

.

. to be put in double

irons ... to be confined ... at a place infested with verminote . . and
inflicted on them one dozen lashes each; that he again confined them ...
[and] inflicted on them another dozen lashes each; that after this system of
lashing and confinement, for the preservation of their lives, the said marines
were compelled, against the terms of their enlistment and against their free
will, to do duty in the squadron, under the command of said Wilkes.
Id. at 97.
151. Id. at 91-92.
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part on grounds that the trial court erred in excluding the prior
acquittal from evidence.' 2
Affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court first observed that
the acquittal would bar subsequent indictments for the same offenses,
and that prior criminal acquittals had been deemed to bar subsequent
civil suits where the plaintiff in the civil suit is also the prosecutor in
the court-martial proceeding. The Court determined, however, that
under the circumstances the court-martial proceedings were not conclusive on the plaintiff, since the plaintiff had been neither the
prosecutor nor a complainant in the prior action.' 53
The Court considered this same issue approximately ninety years
later, in Helvering v. Mitchell.14 Earlier, Mitchell had been indicted
under a provision of the Revenue Act which made it a criminal offense
to willfully try to evade any tax.' 5 5 The first court had charged Mitchell
with the willful attempt to evade an income tax of $728,000. 56 Mitchell
was acquitted on all counts. 5 7 In Helvering v. Mitchell, the Commissioner found that Mitchell had fraudulently deducted alleged losses,
and alleged a deficiency of $728,000, the same item that had been
involved in the prior indictment.'5 8 The Commissioner also assessed a
fifty percent fraud penalty. 5 9
The Court of Appeals held that the prior acquittal was not res
judicata barring the deficiency assessment. 60 However, the court
found that the fifty percent fraud penalty, which was not involved in
6
the prior indictment, was barred by Mitchell's earlier acquittal.'
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the difference between the proof burdens in criminal and civil cases rendered res
judicata inapplicable.' 62 The Court stated that the prior acquittal was

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.at 96-97.
Id.at 123-24.
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
Id. at 396, quoting the Revenue Act of 1928 § 46(b).
303 U.S. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 395.

160. Id.

161. Id. at 396. In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals found that the
Supreme Court's decisions in Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) and in
United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 required it to reach this result. See infra
text accompanying notes 165-171 for discussion of Coffey.
162. 303 U.S. at 397. The Court also drew a distinction between subsequent civil
actions which were "remedial" in character and those which were "punitive" in
nature, holding that "[w]here the objective of the subsequent action . . .is punish-
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simply a determination that the proof was insufficient to overcome

all reasonable doubt of guilt.' 63 The Court asserted: "That acquittal
on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government
... arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding
was based has long been settled." 164
This assertion ignored Coffey v. United States,' 65 a case many
considered to be a decision holding to the contrary. 166 Coffey involved
a forfeiture action, brought by the United States pursuant to various
provisions of the internal revenue laws to seize brandy and distillery
equipment. Coffey appealed from the jury's general verdict for the
United States on grounds that he had already been acquitted of

violating those provisions in a prior proceeding.

The Supreme Court was of the opinion that such a judgment of
acquittal was a bar to the subsequent suit. The Court noted that one
of the penalties for violating the relevant statute was forfeiture of the
distiller's equipment, and that the proceeding to enforce this forfeiture
had to be a civil proceeding in rem. The Court asserted that an
acquittal in a criminal action instituted by the United States was conclusive as to the defendant in a subsequent civil trial brought by the United
States "where . . .the existence of the same act or fact is the matter

in issue, as the cause for forfeiture" in the later civil action.1 67 If the
Court had gone this far and no farther, then Coffey would merely
have been interpreted as standing for the proposition that no forfeiture
action can proceed absent an adjudication that an individual has.
ment, the acquittal is a bar, because to entertain the second proceeding for punishment
would subject the defendant to double jeopardy." Id. at 398. For other decisions
holding that an acquittal in a criminal case does not estop the government from
proceeding with a civil case, see United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bd.,
339 U.S. 485 (1950); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897); Polcover v.
Secretary of Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Burkhart,
501 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1974); Murry & Sorrenson, Inc. v. United States, 207 F.2d
119 (lst Cir. 1953); United States v. Gramer, 191 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1951); Chisholm
v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1981). By way of explanation, it
has been suggested that "j]udgments of acquittal . . .are . . .inadmissible in large
part ... because they may not present a determination of innocence but rather only
a decision that the prosecution has not met its heavy burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 318 (3d ed. 1984), citing Mew Sun
Leong v. Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 52 Hawaii 138, 472 P.2d 505 (1970); Massey
v. Meurer, 25 A.D.2d 729, 268 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1966).
163. 303 U.S. at 397.
164. Id.
165. Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 442-43.
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committed the criminal conduct which provides the occasion for the
1 68
forfeiture proceeding.
The Court acknowledged that one rationale for not allowing the
criminal acquittal to have a preclusive effect in a later civil suit was
that in the original criminal action guilt had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt,. and that on the same evidence in a subsequent civil
suit the United States might prevail under the preponderance of the
evidence standard. The Court declared that nevertheless, the fact
remained that following the acquittal in the criminal action there
could be no new criminal action, and that a subsequent civil action
would amount to the same thing, the only difference being in the
1 69
consequences to the claimant following an adverse judgment.
This dicta does not appear to have influenced the course of the
law, as courts continued to hold that an acquittal in a criminal case
was not a bar to a subsequent civil action. 17 It did, however, rather
confuse the law in this area, at least until subsequent decisions clarified
the perhaps unintentionally sweeping language included in the fore71

going discussion. 1

168. As an example 18 U.S.C. § 1963 is a civil proceeding which authorizes the
forfeiture of property used in, or acquired through, racketeering activities. See also

21 U.S.C. § 853.

169. Coffey, 116 U.S. at 443.

170. See, e.g., Stone v. United States, 64 Fed. 667, 12 C.C.A. 451, 29 U.S.
App. 32 (1894); United States v. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. 100 (D.C. 1896). See also In re
Smith, 10 Wend. 449 (N.Y. 1833); Rosenberg v. Salvatore, 1 N.Y. Supp. 326 (N.Y.
1888); Powers v. Davenport, 101 N.C. 286, 7 S.E. 747 (1888); Morch v. Raubitscek,
159 Pa. 559, 28 A. 369, 33 Wkly. Notes Cas. 567 (1894).
171. And one should be merciful that the decision went no further:
Whether a conviction on an indictment under section 3257 could be availed
of as conclusive evidence, in law, for a condemnation, in a subsequent suit
in rem under that section, and whether a judgment of forfeiture in a suit in
rem under it would be conclusive evidence, in law, for a conviction on a
subsequent indictment under it, are questions not now presented.
116 U.S. at 443-44. The Court did hold, however, that:
[w]hen an acquittal ... is pleaded ... by the same defendant, in an action
against him by an individual, the rule [of preclusion] does not apply, for
the reason that the parties are not the same; and often for the additional
reason that a certain intent must be proved to support the indictment.
Id. at 443. The Coffey Court, therefore, rejected the proposition that differing
standards of proof precludes "cross-over" estoppel, at least where an acquittal is
concerned, but whole-heartedly adopted the doctrine of mutuality.
As to the effects which Coffey had upon subsequent decisions, see United States
v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1961). In deciding whether an acquittal represented
collateral estoppel barring a forfeiture proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 7302, the Burch
court began by holding that "[a]s to the issues raised, it does not constitute an
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The Supreme Court clarified the holding in Coffey in a recent
decision involving the problem of forfeiture. In One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States," a proceding under 18 U.S.C. § 545,'11
the defendant entered the United States without declaring emeralds
to the U.S. Customs Service. He was tried and acquitted of smuggling
articles into the country with the intent to defraud the United States.
The government then brought a forfeiture proceeding. Relying on
Coffey, the district court held that the civil proceeding was barred by
collateral estoppel. The Circuit Court reversed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The Court observed that in the criminal
prosecution the government faced the burden not only of proving the
act of illegal importation, but also of proving an intent to defraud.
On the other hand, in a forfeiture proceeding the government would
only have to prove that the article was brought into the country
without a declaration having been made-no proof of intent would
be required. Therefore a criminal acquittal would not be determinative
of whether the property was brought into the country illegally. 7 4 The
Court then distinguished Coffey noting that a finding of intent was
necessary in the forfeiture proceeding as well as in the prior criminal
prosecution.'

adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence test which applied in civil proceedings." 294 F.2d at 3. The court then included the following comments in an
omitted footnote:
The doubt begins at this precise point. And its source is Coffey v. United
States, 1886, 116 U.S. 436, which held a criminal acquittal . . .conclusive
in a later forfeiture in rem action. [omitted quotation from Coffey regarding
the irrelevance of the differing burdens of proof and the conclusiveness of
the adjudication] ....
While this case has never been expressly overruled, this statement is
difficult to resolve with the decision in Helvering v. Mitchell [quoting that
holding as to the importance of the differing burdens of proof] ....
294 F.2d at 3 n.2. The Burch court resolved its doubts against Coffey and held that
the acquittal did not bar the forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 4-7. Aside from other
considerations, the court found that the precise issue had not been adjudicated in the
prior proceeding. But throughout the opinion, the court continues its criticism of
Coffey. See, e.g., id. at 4 ("The Coffey decision has been the subject of a great deal
of controversy, and no little criticism"). Id. at 5 ("[T]he language in Coffey seems
absolutely irreconcilable with later decisions").
172. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
173. 409 U.S. at 232-33.
174. Id. at 234 (footnotes omitted). See also supra note 181. The Court explicitly
indicated that it was not deciding "whether an acquittal under § 545 bars a forfeiture
under § 545." Id. at 233 n.3.
175. Id.at 235 n.5. See also supra note 178.
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Having reconciled its holding in Coffey, the Court then apparently
proceeded to refute the Coffey decision by stating that the different
burdens of proof in criminal and civil proceedings precluded a crossover application of collateral estoppel. Since a criminal acquittal might
represent nothing more than a determination that the evidence was
insufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of guilt, such an acquittal would not comprise an adjudication of the issues where the
76
burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.
Aside ftom the forfeiture context, in which there may be some
necessary relation between a criminal adjudication and the permissibility of the forfeiture proceeding, the decisions uniformly hold that
an acquittal does not preclude a subsequent civil proceeding arising
out of the same nucleus of operative facts. 177 This rule is premised
upon the theory that while proof in a criminal prosecution may be
inadequate to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that same
proof may suffice to support a civil judgment.178 Another rationale is

176. Id. at 235 (citations omitted), quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
397 (1938).
177. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 165. See also Murphy v. United States,
272 U.S. 630; Untied States v. Burch, 294 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1961); State v. Dubose,
152 Fla. 304, 11 So.2d 477 (1943); State v. Roach, 83 Kanote 606, 112 Pac. 150, 31
L.R.A. (N.S.) 670; Eagle, Star & British Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 110 S.E.
314 (1927); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932); People
ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theater, 161 Rptr. 562, 101 C.A.3d 296
(1980); East Hanover Tp. v. Cuva, 383 A.2d 725, 156 N.J. Super. 159 (1978);
Neaderland v. C.I.R., 424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 419 U.S. 828 (1971);
Galbraith v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 946 (1975); Lee v.
United States, 323 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Bredeson v. Croft, 326 So.2d 735,
295 Ala. 246 (1976); Board of Educ. of El Monte School Dist. of Los Angeles County
v. Calderon, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916, 35 C.A.3d 490 (1973); Beckner v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 84 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1970); Blackmon v. Richmond County, 162 S.E.2d 436,
224 Ga. 387 (1968); Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of City of
Boston, 268 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1971); Appeal of Darcy, 277 A.2d 226, 114 N.J.
Super. 454 (1971); Herndon v. City of Ithaca, 349 N.Y.S.2d 227, 43 A.D.2d 634
(1973); William Reilly Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 334 N.Y.S.2d 454, 70
Misc. 2d 651 (1964); aff'd 270 N.Y.S.2d 399, 25 A.D.2d 953 (1965); Carsey v. City
of Mansfield, 310 N.E.2d 263, 37 Ohio App.2d 241, 75 N.E.2d 404 (1975); Fiar
Food Stores v. Comm'r, II Pa. Commw. 535, 314 A.2d 528 (1974). Cf. Wilson
v. Wilson, 144 Cal. Rptr. 180, 78 C.A.3d 226 (1978) (widow's acquittal for murder
of husband foreclosed relitigation of wrongfulness of her act in shooting her
husband in civil action by stepchildren to recover insurance proceeds and other
property).
0.418[i]. In Royal
178. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at
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that the issues may not be identical in the civil and criminal proceedings. 19
2.

Adjudication v. Plea
Under the preponderant view a plea of guilty is admissible as
evidence in a civil action, as a judicial admission against
interest, even when the proffer of proof is made by a stranger
to the prosecution, and even though the plea was withdrawn
and a judgment of conviction did not eventuate. And, further,

the generally accepted rule is that a judgment of conviction,
based on a plea of guilty, is conclusive in a civil suit between
the same parties of all the issues that would have been determined by a conviction after a contested trial.'8 0
Guilty pleas are almost always held to be conclusive in subsequent
civil proceedings arising from the sequence of events that produced
the plea' 8' although there are considerations militating to the contrary.
The primary consideration in this regard is that the plea may represent
factors other than the defendant's guilt of the matters charged against
him. When a prior criminal action results in a guilty plea, the case is

Exch. Assur. v. Fraylon, 228 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1955), the court suggested that an
acquittal could be admissible in a subsequent civil proceeding if it is based upon a
finding of insufficient evidence to go to the jury.
179. See, e.g., Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 (1897). Lack of identity
of issues, of course, precludes the operation of collateral estoppel in any proceeding,
whether or not it involves the phenomenon of "crossing-over." See supra Section II.
180. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at (qar) 0.418[1] (footnotes
omitted). FED. R. Evil. 410 provides, of course, that a withdrawn guilty plea is not
admissible "in any civil or criminal proceeding ... against the defendant who made
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions" except (a) when another
statement made in the course of the same plea or the same plea discussions has been
admitted "and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with
it" or (b) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was
made under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel. The rule also applied
to pleas of nolo contendere. See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265 (3d'ed. 1984).
181. See, e.g., Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1977); In re
Raiford, 695 F.2d 521 (1lth Cir. 1983); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable,
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska, 1982); Alsco-Harvard Fraud Litig., 523 F. Supp.
790 (D.D.C. 1981); United States v. $23,530 in United States Currency, 601 F. Supp.
179 (D. Md. 1985). Cf. DeRochemont v. C.I.R., 628 F. Supp. 957 (D. Ind. 1986);
Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. granted 459 U.S. 904 (1982),
aff'd 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
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not fully presented, and as a result the issues are not .brought into
the controversy. A guilty plea may merely reflect the defendant's

decision that payment of a fine is preferable to litigation. The concern
for fairness to civil litigants, coupled with a desire to expedite the
administration of criminal justice bar the use of issue preclusion
against a person who first pleads guilty in a criminal action, and then
seeks to defend against a civil suit.' 82
These concerns notwithstanding, guilty pleas continue to be re-

garded as conclusive of all issues implicated in the offense(s) to which

the plea was entered.' 83 A different rule prevails for nolo contendere
pleas.
Under Rule 410 of the FederalRules of Evidence, nolo contendere
pleas cannot be admitted into evidence in any civil or criminal
proceeding except under very limited circumstances. 84 Nolo cotendere
182. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 605-06, 375
P.2d 439, 441 (1962). On this general issue, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265 (3d
ed. 1984); Graham, Admissibility in Illinois of Convictions and Pleas of Guilty to
Traffic Offenses in Related Civil Litigation, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 209. One commentator suggests that:
[tihe supposedly precluded party should be able to show relevant facts
concerning the criminal prosecution. If the guilty plea represented a desire
on the part of the defendant to avoid the time and expense of a criminal
defense because of ill health, then perhaps the court should deny preclusive
effect.
Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/ResJudicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19
VAND. L. REV. 683, 715 (1966) (footnote omitted).
183. See Brazzel v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Metros v. United
States, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1970); Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786 (8th
Cir. 1959); O'Neill v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); United
States v. Bower, 95 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Ivers v. United States, 581
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978); Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied 397 U.S. 962 (1970); Thompson v. Galaxy Enter., Inc., 414 F. Supp.
1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Abraham Lincoln Memorial Hosp. Corp. v. Gordon, 249 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App.
1969); Vavolizza v. Krieger, 336 N.Y.S.2d 748, 39 A.D.2d 446 (1972); Di Bone v.
Gambucci, 282 N.Y.S.2d 844, 54 Misc. 2d 446 (1967); United States v. Rubin, 243
F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); United States v. Eagle Beef Cloth Co., 235 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
McCottrell v. Benson, 178 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. 1961); Dimmick v. Follis, Ill
N.E.2d 486 (Ind. App.). Cf. Frey v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Tex.
1975) (guilty plea to violation of marijuana criminal law was not collateral estoppel
in adjudication for liability for marijuana transfer tax); Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d
1416 (5th Cir. 1983) (guilty plea to distribution of controlled substance did not
preclude civil action challenging legality of search of safety deposit boxes at issue in
criminal conviction).
184. See supra note 180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(b) advisory committee's note
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pleas are expressly authorized by Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and have been an historic feature of American
criminal law. ,85
The general rule is that nolo contendere pleas do not have issuepreclusive effects. Such an admission is limited to the purpose for
which it was made, and therefore does not have collateral estoppel

force in a subsequent civil

suit.186

Tempo Trucking and Transfer Corp.

v. Dickson s7 illustrates the language which is typically encountered

whenever a litigant seeks to use a nolo contendere plea as collateral
estoppel.

It states that numerous courts have distinguished between a

conviction following a plea of guilty or not guilty, and a conviction
following a plea of nolo contendere. The latter does not involve an
express admission of guilt, and thus the defendant should not be

precluded from denying the facts that formed the basis of his earlier
plea in a later civil proceeding. 8
While the nolo contendere plea would appear to be a convenient
way for a defendant to circumvent the preclusive effects which would

result from a guilty plea, it is subject to certain practical constraints.

Unless provided for by statute, the plea is unavailable for capital

offenses. In addition, some states limit the plea to misdemeanors.

(1974 amendment), which authorizes such pleas, makes it clear that the Committee
was aware of this aspect of the plea: "Unlike a plea of guilty, [a nolo contendere
plea] cannot be used against a defendant as an admission in a subsequent criminal
or civil case." Id., citing 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1066(4) (3d ed. 1940 & Supp.
1970); see also FED. R. EVID. 802(22).
185. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee note ("The plea of nolo
contendere has always existed in the Federal courts"); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 committee
note for the 1966 Amendment. The "nolo" plea is also known as a "non vult
contendere" or "non vult" plea. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1205 (4th ed. 1968);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265 (3d ed. 1984). The nonvult plea has the same
consequences and effects as the nolo contendere plea. See McCoRMICK supra, at §
265. See also United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 850, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1966).
186. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418[l]. See, e.g., Doherty
v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1984); Slayton v. Willingham,
726 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1984); Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32
F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1940); United States v. Lair, 195 F. 47 (8th Cir. 1912);
United States v. One Chevrolet Stylemaster Sedan, 91 F. Supp. 272 (D. Colo. 1950);
United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 88 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Berlin v. United
States, 14 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1926).
187. 405 F. Supp. 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
188. 405 F. Supp. at 517. See also Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 892 (1958).
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Finally, acceptance of the plea is discretionary. In exercising this
discretion, one factor a court might consider is whether the defendant
who offers the plea is likely to be confronted with a civil suit which
involves the same issues. While it may be that a judge in a criminal
prosecution should hesitate to accept a plea of nolo contendere where
the plain objective is to avoid issue preclusion in a subsequent civil
suit, the propriety of a criminal court weighing factors outside the
scope of the criminal prosecution in deciding whether or not to accept
the plea is questionable. s9
3.

Government v. Defendant

The proposition that a criminal judgment can be asserted as
collateral estoppel in a civil proceeding gives rise to four logical
possibilities as to the type of assertion which can ensue: (1) a defendant
can assert a judgment of acquittal; (2) a defendant can assert a
judgment of conviction; (3) the government can assert a judgment of
conviction; and/or (4) the government can assert a judgment of
acquittal. Pragmatically, of course, the most likely alternatives are (a)
that the defendant is asserting his acquittal of criminal charges which
arose out of the same transaction that is at issue in a civil proceeding,
and (b) that the government is asserting the defendant's conviction of
criminal charges which arose out of the same transaction that is at
issue in a civil proceeding.
189. Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19 VAND. L. REV. 783 714-15 (1966) (footnotes omitted). See also Hayden,
The Plea of Nobo Contendere, 25 MD. L. REV. 227 (1965). The federal rules provide
that: "[a] defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the consent of the court.

Such a plea shall be accepted by the court only after due consideration of the views
of the parties and the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). The commentary explains that:
A defendant who desires to plead nolo contendere will commonly want to
avoid pleading guilty because of the plea of guilt can be introduced as an
admission in subsequent civil litigation. The prosecution may oppose the
plea .

.

. because it wants a definite resolution of the defendant's guilt or

innocence either for correctional purposes or for reasons of subsequent
litigation .

.

. Under subdivision (b) ...

the balancing of the interests is left

to the trial judge, who is mandated to take into account the larger public
interest in the effective administration of justice.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) advisory committee note (1974 amendment). The 1974
amendment added the provision that the court, in deciding whether to permit the
plea, shall consider the views of the prosecution, the defense and the larger public
interest in the administration of criminal justice. Id. See also United States v. Faucette,
223 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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These alternatives, of course, represent what one might refer to
as the "typical" instances of this type of "cross-over" collateral
estoppel. They comport with the dictates of common sense and of
logic because the parties are remaining on the "right" sides: The
defendant is seeking to exploit his acquittal in order to avoid civil
liability, and the government is seeking to exploit the defendant's
conviction in order to arrive at that same type of liability. 190 And
these are the possibilities which have been implicit in the discussion
contained in Sections IV(B)(1) and (2), supra.
As noted above, preclusion is almost never allowed when a former
criminal defendant is asserting that his acquittal of criminal charges
estops the plaintiff in a civil suit from relitigating issues necessarily
involved in the criminal proceeding.191 This results from the "differing
burdens of proof" proposition, i.e., that the acquittal merely shows
that the government did not discharge its burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The government's failure, so the theory
goes, does not mean that a civil litigant cannot prevail under the
lesser preponderance of the evidence standard. 192
The argument would seem inapplicable where an alibi or insanity
forms the basis of true acquittal. Courts which hold these to be
affirmative defenses may require a criminal defendant to prove such
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In that event, the
standard for proving the same issue in a subsequent civil action would
be identical, and the "differing-standards-of-proof" argument against
preclusion would not apply. Thus, where an acquittal is based upon
an alibi or insanity defense, such defense may merit some preclusive
force. The state, in subsequent civil litigation, is bound by the prior
determination based on a preponderance of the evidence.' 93 There is
also the possibility that the defendant, or the government, for that
matter, can find themselves bound by the doctrine of judicial estoppel
from asserting positions inconsistent with those which they took in
the original action. 194
190. For a general, discussion of these two types of preclusive assertion, see
Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/ResJudicata Variables: CriminalProsecutions, 19
VAND. L. REV. 683, 701-08 (1966).
191. See supra Section IV(B)(1).
192. See, Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion-Res Judicata Variables: Criminal
Prosecutions, 19 VAND. L. REV. 683, 701-02 (1966). Cf. State ex rel. Hanrahan v.
Miller, 250 Iowa 1358, 96 N.W.2d 474 (1959).
193. 19 VAND. L. REV. at 702-03. See also Phillips v. United States, 502 F.2d
227 (4th Cir. 1974), reh'g granted 518 F.2d 108 (1975), vacated 424 U.S. 961, cert.
denied 424 U.S. 976, on remand 538 F.2d 586 (1976).
194. See 19 VAND. L. REV. at 703 n.76.
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Conversely, as was also demonstrated above, a judgment of
conviction is almost always given preclusive effect in a subsequent
civil proceeding which arises from the facts which were at issue in the
prior proceeding. 195 This, too, is a function of the "differing standards
of proof" rationale, although the rationale becomes much more
attenuated when the conviction is the result of a guilty plea. 9 6 And it
is possible that this practice has an effect upon the decision to plead
or to litigate guilt or innocence. 197
These two alternatives constitute the decisional law of "criminal
to civil" issue preclusion. That is, the reported cases consistently
involve instances in which either the government is asserting the
preclusive effects of a conviction, or the defendant is asserting the
preclusive effects of an acquittal. The residual categories, i.e., defendant asserting the preclusive effects of a conviction and the government
asserting the preclusive effects of an acquittal, appear neither in the
decisional law nor in the scholarly commentary on this subject.
Although at first glance they' offend both logic and common
sense, since who can imagine that any litigant would attempt to rely
upon a decision which he had lost, the residual categories may not be
as impracticable as they first appear. If a defendant can substantiate
an alibi defense by prevailing in a criminal prosecution, can he not
attempt to rely upon a conviction to the same effect? That is, assume
that a criminal defendant has been tried and convicted of robbing the
Acme Bank in Hospitable, Kansas between 1:00 and 1:35 on the
afternoon of Tuesday, March 11, 1985. Assume, further, that a civil
suit has been filed against this same defendant. The gravamen of the
civil suit is that at 1:20 on the afternoon of Tuesday, March 11, 1985,
the defendant was involved in a traffic accident in Locus, Missouri.
The civil suit seeks damages for what is alleged to have been the
defendant's negligence in causing this accident.
195. See supra Section IV(B)(1), (2).
196. See supra Section IV(B)(2).
197. If a criminal defendant knows that the finding in the crimirfal prosecution may have some preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation, his
attitude toward the criminal proceeding may be changed. The criminal
defendant is engaged in a weighing process. He must decide whether to plead
In an automobile accident case, where the criminal
guilty or to defend ....
charge might result in a fine and short jail sentence, the possibility of
preclusion in a civil action involving thousands of dollars may be a crucial
consideration. The defendant may choose to litigate fully the criminal charge
because of the potential liability where he otherwise would plead guilty to
avoid a costly trial and the concomitant publicity.

Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19
VAND.

L.

REV.

683, 717 (1966).
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Could not the defendant assert his criminal conviction as collaterally estopping the civil plaintiff from alleging that he was in Missouri
on the date and time alleged? Although the civil suit does not arise
out of the same facts that were at issue in the criminal prosecution,
the criminal prosecution did determine an issue which is central to
the civil suit, namely, the defendant's whereabouts at 1:20 p.m. on
Tuesday, March 11, 1985. Since this adjudication was made under
the heightened beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, it would
appear that the determination should preclude the civil plaintiff from
proceeding with his action. 9
The final residual category, i.e., the government's asserting a
judgment of acquittal, is far more difficult to conceptualize. The most
likely example would seem to be an instance in which a defendant
has been tried and acquitted, and is bringing a civil action for damages
allegedly resulting from the prosecution. The civil action could be for
constitutional violations, such as an improper search and seizure, or
for allegations of prosecutorial vindictiveness in initiating the criminal
proceeding.
It is conceivable that the government could assert the judgment
of acquittal as precluding civil liability, either insofar as it might
suggest that the government's investigatory conduct was acceptable
or to the extent that the acquittal might indicate that the prosecution
was not the result of improper motives or tactics.1 99 Such an assertion
198. This, of course, would not have been possible under the doctrine of
mutuality. See supra Section II. It should, however, be perfectly acceptable under
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, since the issue of the defendant's whereabouts was fully litigated in the original, criminal proceeding. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27-29 (1982). This is not, of course, a possibility which
has been included in the Second Restatement's provision in the effect of a criminal
judgment in a subsequent civil action. See id. at § 85; see also supra Section IV(A).
199. The only case which the author has found that even approaches this example
is Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Linberg, 529 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1981). The
church brought an action seeking damages and an injunction pursuant to Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for alleged violations of First and
Fourth Amendment rights in connection with a search and seizure operation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 529 F. Supp. at 948. The search and
seizure was undertaken pursuant to an investigation that led to criminal indictments
and the conviction of various members of the plaintiff church. Id. at 949-51.
The church filed petitions under the FED. R. CRIM. P. seeking the return and
suppression of property seized in the search. Id. at 949. The judge to whom the
petitions were assigned upheld the validity and execution of the warrants involved
in the search. Id.
Members of the church were then indicted and convicted based upon materials
which had been seized in the search that had been at issue in the Rule 41(e) petitions.
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would be analogous to a defendant's asserting that an alibi defense
or other matters had been adjudicated by a judgment of acquittal.
Unfortunately, however, the example seems to be highly unlikely and
even vaguely nonsensical.
There is a spectrum of views on the question of whether "civil
to criminal" issue preclusion ought to be permissible. This spectrum
results from the tendency to afford differing degrees of importance
to "standard of proof" and "identical parties" considerations. One
view proposes that issues litigated and necessary to the outcome of a
civil proceeding ought to be precluded from litigation in a subsequent
criminal proceeding when the same person is defendant in both
proceedings, and the civil court found, for the defendant. 200 The
rationale for this view is that the civil judgment for the defendant, in
light of the heavier burden of proof in a criminal proceeding, implies
that the state will be unable to meet the burden of proof for those
issues litigated in the civil proceeding. 20' A second view focuses entirely
on the identity of the parties. This view argues that "civil to criminal"
preclusion would give rise to collusion between potential criminal
defendants and civil plaintiffs in order to manipulate a civil finding
in the defendant's favor which would have preclusive effect in a
subsequent criminal proceeding. 202 A third view meshes the first two
Id. Afterwards, the church pursued the Bivens action, seeking damages for what it
still maintained was an improper search and seizure. See id. at 948-51. In that action,
the government argued that the earlier determination on the Rule 41(e) petitions
collaterally estopped the church from proceeding with the Bivens action. Id. at 96061. The court before whom the Bivens proceeding was brought declined to give
preclusive effect to the prior determination on the Rule 41(e) petitions, in part because
of a lack of privity between the criminal defendants and the church, and in part
because it found that the issue had not been properly adjudicated in the prior
proceeding. Id. at 960-65.
200. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418[1].

201. Id. MooRE's also states that:
[Blecause of the different standards of proof, a judgment of civil liability
is not conclusive of any issue in a criminal trial, and its admission as
evidence is error prejudicial to the defendant. In the converse situation, it
is arguable, however, that the same rationale should make a civil judgment
on the merits, that a defendant is not civilly liable, conclusive in his favor
in a subsequent criminal prosecution as to the issues adjudicated in the civil
suit.
Id. (notes omitted).
202. See Note, Res Judicata- What Judgments are Conclusive-CriminalCon-

viction on Plea of Guilty Is Conclusive of Same Issues in Subsequent Civil Suit, 64
HARv. L. REV. 1376 (1951). This article argues:
that since the state has a greater burden of proof in criminal proceedings,
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views by supporting the preclusion in a subsequent criminal proceeding

of issues 3litigated in a civil proceeding to which the government was
20

a party.
These divergent views as to the permissibility of "civil to crimi-

nal" issue preclusion reflect certain implicit assumptions as to the
nature and circumstances of the civil actions. 204 This author will argue
that, even if one assumes that the presence of these assumptions yields
the consequences postulated in the views articulated above, there are

situations in which these assumptions do not hold and in which "civil
to criminal" preclusion is proper. 25

To understand why this argument succeeds, it is necessary to

examine decisions in cases involving the issue of "civil to criminal"

no attention
preclusion. Curiously, these cases have received almost
26
in the literature on res judicata and issue preclusion. 0

a civil determination for defendant should bar subsequent prosecution based
on the facts alleged in the civil complaint... However, where a civil issue
has been resolved in favor of a private party, to give the civil determination
conclusive effect would present the danger of collusive civil suits instituted
solely to provide a bar to prosecution.
Id. at 1378 (citations omitted).
203. Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/ResJudicata Variables:CriminalProsecutions, 19 VAND. L. REV. 683, 699-701. See also Developments in the Law: Res
Judicata, supra note 10, at 808; Casad, Res Judicata, supra note 7, at 249-50.
204. These and other discussions of the issue generally assume (a) that the
adjudication in the civil action is being asserted against a criminal defendant, and
(b) that the civil adjudication involved the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence
or, more properly, his responsibility for the acts at issue in the criminal proceeding.
The discussions also tend to assume that the parties were not identical in the two
proceedings, but with the demise of the doctrine of mutuality this has ceased to be
a compelling consideration. See supra Section II.
205. See infra Section V.
206. There is an annotation that deals with the "admissibility in criminal
prosecution[s] of adjudication[s] or judgment[s] in civil case[s] or procedureis]." 87
A.L.R. 1258. The annotation is not, however, concerned with the issue-preclusive
effects of such judgments but is, instead, concerned only with the admissibility of
such judgments under applicable rules of evidence. See supra Section 1. For the treatment which the issue has received in scholarly articles and general treatises, see the
sources which provided the quotations considered above. One article suggests that:
it may be possible for the defendant to claim preclusion as to an issue
litigated and decided in [a civil] suit. The circumstances in which this might
occur are rather restricted since it is the government that has the burden of
On the other hand, the defendant may
proof in the criminal action ....
or some other defense and may
insanity
alibi,
be interested in establishing
wish to claim preclusion as to such matter arising from an earlier civil action
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a.

Supreme Court Cases
The case which is most often cited for the proposition that civil

judgments can have preclusive effects in criminal proceedings is Yates

v. United States2 °7, which resulted from a prosecution under the Smith
Act. The Smith Act became law in 1940 and made it unlawful to
"knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty,

necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States by force or violence." 20
Act

The Yates defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate the

20 9

and appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the convic-

tions. 21 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the petitioners' contentions that their convictions were unsound in any of several
respects .2 1' One petitioner argued that "in Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, a denaturalization proceeding in which he was
the prevailing party, this Court made determinations favorable to him
which [were] conclusive in this proceeding under the doctrine of
22
collateral estoppel.', 1
The Court held that it was "in agreement with petitioner that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is not made inapplicable by the fact
that this is a criminal case, whereas the prior proceedings were civil
in character. ' 21 But the Court rejected Schneiderman's argument
involving the government. This would seem to be reasonable.
Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/ResJudicata Variables: Criminal Prosecution, 19
VAND. L. REV. 683, 700 (1966). For the treatment which the issue of sanity has
received in this regard, see State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976)
and Gregory v. Kentucky, 610 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1980), both of which are discussed
infra in Section IV(B)(3).
207. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
208. Act of June 28, 1940, § 2(a)(l) and (3), 54 Stat. 670, 671, 18 U.S.C. §§
371, 2385, quoted in 354 U.S. 298, 301 n.l.The act also made it unlawful to print,
publish or distribute written materials advocating such activities and/or to organize
any society or group of persons dedicated to the realization of such ends. See id.
209. The defendants were accused of conspiring to advocate and propagate the
teachings of the Communist Party, and of organizing "units of the Party in California
and elsewhere." 354 U.S. at 301-02.
210. Id. at 302, citing Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (1955).
211. 354 U.S. at 303. The petitioners argued that the evidence was insufficient,
that the two lower courts erroneously construed the term "organize" as used in the
Act, that the trial court's instructions erred in excluding the issue of "incitement to
action" and that one petitioner's conviction was precluded by the Court's decision
in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Id.
212. Id. at 335.
213. Id. at 335, citing Untied States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
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because it found that the issues involved in the present proceeding
had not been conclusively adjudicated in the earlier denaturalization
proceeding.21 4 This means that, although the Court's statement is
favorable enough, Yates did not actually involve the determination
that a civil adjudication can have a preclusive effect in a criminal

proceeding.

A much earlier and almost unknown decision did reach this issue.
In United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company,215 the United
States sought reversal of a judgment which discharged the defendant
from prosecution under an indictment alleging failure to alter a bridge
216
according to an order by the Secretary of War.

The bridge had been completed in 1871, and was in full compliance with the law then in effect.21 7 On October 29, 1904, the United
States initiated an action against Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. 218 The essence of the complaint was that the railroad company
"owned, operated and controlled" the aforementioned bridge, and
that the bridge was "wholly inadequate to accommodate the present
commerce of the Ohio river ... and constituted a serious and
dangerous obstruction to ... navigation" 219 It sought injunctive relief
and specifically requested that "the said railroad company be required
within a reasonable time to remove the same or replace same with
such a bridge as shall conform to existing law." ' 220 A judgment for
the defendant was entered on February 27, 1905, and the government
promptly appealed the matter to the court of appeals. 22' The appellate
214. Id. at 336-38. Schneiderman had argued that the earlier proceeding had
determined that the teaching of Marxism-Leninism was not necessarily the advocacy
of the violent overthrow of the government, that it was reasonable to conclude that
the Communist Party desired to achieve its goal of socialism through peaceful means,
that it could not be presumed that membership in the Communist Party meant that
Schneiderman adopted an illegal interpretation of Marxist doctrine and that absent
proof of overt acts that he personally adopted a "reprehensible interpretation" of
these matters, the government had failed to discharge its burden of proof on the
criminal offense with which he was charged. Id. at 335.

215. 229 U.S. 242 (1913).

216. Id. at 245.
217. Id. The law was an Act of July 14, 12 Stat., ch. 167 p. 569 (1862).
218. 229 U.S. at 245-46. There were also two other defendants, "the Parkersburg
Branch Railroad Company . . .[and] John W. Davis, its receiver." Id. at 246.
219. Id. at 246.
220. Id. at 247.
221. The motion for a permanent injunction was prayed for in the [complaint] was heard.., and was decided on February 4, 1905, in an opinion
by District Judge Jackson. The injunction was refused. It was held that the
construction of the bridge under the authority conferred by the act of 1862
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court affirmed the decision of the lower court. 222 Nine months after
the circuit court's decision, the Secretary of War gave the railroad
company a notice, and the company's failure to obey that notice gave
rise to an indictment.223 The notice said that the bridge was an
"unreasonable obstruction" to navigation and ordered the removal
of a pier and the conversion of two "spans . . . into one channel
span. "224

The railroad company refused to comply, the government returned an indictment for the refusal, and the case was tried to a jury
which was instructed to find for the defendant. 225 The court based its
directed verdict on the hypothesis that the equity cause judicially
determined the defendant's right to maintain the bridge in its then
current condition. 226 The court entered a judgment "discharging the
railroad company from further prosecution", and the government
227
appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Court began by determining that the equity cause plainly
presented the issues of the Secretary of War's jurisdiction over the
bridge and the government's right to enforce its order that the bridge
be altered.2 28 Based upon this determination, the Court held that "the
decree in the equity cause was properly held to be res judicata as to
the facts averred in the indictment," and decisive as to the issue of
the applicability of the act of 1899 to the bridge.22 9
The holding is a perfect example of civil to criminal "cross-over"
collateral estoppel, but it has been undiscovered and unused since it
was handed down. None of the scholarly articles or treatises which
consider the issue of "civil to criminal" preclusion have ever considered it, and it does not appear to have been cited in any subsequent
decisions.230
Another Supreme Court decision addressed a proposition which
represents a residual premise of the proposal presented in Section V.
created a vested right to the use of the bridge of which the defendants could
not be deprived.
Id. at 248-49.
222. Id. at 250, citing U.S. v. Parkersburg Branch Co., 143 F. 224 (1906).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 245.

226. Id. at 251.
227. Id.

228. Id. at 253.
229. Id. at 253-54.

230. SHEPHERD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS show no entries for this decision,
which seems to indicate that it has been overlooked throughout the seventy-odd years

that have elapsed since it issued.
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The decision in McKinney v. Alabama,23 involved the use of civil
adjudications of obscenity in criminal prosecutions.
Chester McKinney "was convicted of selling material which had
been judicially declared obscene. ' 23 2 The declaration came in a civil
proceeding undertaken pursuant to an Alabama statute permitting
prosecutors to seek an adjudication of the obscenity of any "matter"
brought into their districts.2 33 The prosecutor for McKinney's district
initiated such an action and, on February 26, 1970, the Circuit Court
found the four magazines which were the subject matter of the suit
234
to be obscene.
Officers from the State Attorney General's office went to McKinney's bookstore to deliver the Attorney General's letter informing
McKinney of the decree and telling him which magazine had been
found to be obscene. 235 Three weeks later the officers returned to the
bookstore and purchased a copy of one of the magazines "which had
been specified in the ... decree and listed in the letter delivered to"

McKinney .236

McKinney was indicted, tried and convicted of violating Alabama
law by selling "mailable matter known . . . to have been judicially
found to be obscene." 2" At his trial, he argued in defense that the
magazine was not obscene and that the obscenity question ought to
be determined by the jury. 238 The trial court refused to submit the
question to the jury because it found that the issue had been deter23 9
mined by the civil proceeding.
231. 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
232. 424 U.S. at 670.
233. Id. at 670 n.l, quoting ALA. CODE Tit. 14, ch. 64A, § 374(5) (Supp. 1973)
(repealed 1977). The statute provided that "the solicitor for any judicial circuit or
county solicitor" could initiate an action to determine the obscenity of any "mailable
matter" that was being brought into his district for "sale or commercial distribution."
ALA. CODE Tit. 14, ch. 64A. § 374(5) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1977).
234. 424 U.S. at 671.
235. Id. at 672.
236. Id. The magazine was "New Directions" and it was devoted to portraying
nude men and women in a variety of exotic postures. McKinney v. State, 292 Ala.
484, 296 So.2d 228 (1974). Justice Faulkner, who wrote the opinion in which the
Alabama Supreme Court disposed of McKinney's appeal, was moved to offer the
following comments on "New Directions" subject-matter: "After review of pictures
of these grotesque nudes, a person of reasonable sensibilities will conclude that it is
no wonder God made man and woman to wear clothes. Without them some are the
most unattractive animals in His kingdom." 296 So. 2d at 229. Not surprisingly, the
court affirmed the conviction.
237. 424 U.S. at 673, quoting ALA. CODE Tit. 14, ch 64A § 374(4) (Supp. 1973).
238. 424 U.S. at 673.
239. Id. The trial court instructed the jurors that "they need only decide whether
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McKinney appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.240 The Supreme Court granted review and held
that the Alabama procedures violated McKinney's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights "insofar as they precluded him from litigating the obscenity ... of New Directions as a defense to his criminal
prosecution. ' '2 4' The holding was based upon the fact that McKinney

had not been a party to the civil proceeding.2 42
Although the Court condemned Alabama's ex parte procedure,
it did not find civil proceedings to be an unacceptable means for
procuring obscenity determinations.243 The best statement of the position which the Court took on this issue appears in a concurring
opinion authored by Justice Brennan. 244 Although arguing that the
Alabama law was facially unconstitutional, 241 Justice Brennan agreed
with the majority's position on civil obscenity adjudications and their
role in criminal prosecutions:
I fully agree ... that a State may not make any civil
proceeding binding in a criminal proceeding involving an
[McKinney] had sold material judicially declared to be obscene. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty." Id.
240. McKinney v. State, 292 Ala. 484, 296 So. 2d 228 (1971).
241. 424 U.S. at 673.
242. Id. at 676. The Court found that although there were parties who were
named as "respondents" in the civil proceeding, McKinney was neither named as a
respondent nor "in privity" with any of the named respondents. Id. at 675. Referring
to the effect of these respondents upon McKinney's rights, the Court said that:
[t]hose who are accorded an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding
established for determining the extent of their rights are properly bound by
its outcome, either because they chose not to contest the State's claim or
because they chose to do so and lost.
But it does not follow that a decision reached in the such proceedings
should conclusively determine the First Amendment rights of others. Nonparties like petitioner may assess quite differently the strength of their
constitutional claims and may . . . have very different views regarding the
desirability of disseminating particular materials.
Id. at 676. McKinney was never notified of the pendency of the civil proceeding and
therefore did not make a decision "not to contest the State's claim." Id. at 674.
Indeed, it appears that he did not even stock "New Directions" at the time that
proceeding commenced. Id. at n.3.
243. "[W]e need not condemn civil proceedings in general . . . to conclude that
this procedure fails to meet the standards required where First Amendment interests
are at stake." Id. at 676, citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Salton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973). See also id. 677-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 678-92. Justice Marshall joined in the opinion, and Justice Stewart
joined in all but one section of the opinion. Id. at 692.
245. Id. at 678-89.
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individual who was not a party to and who did not receive

notice of the civil proceeding. Moreover, a State cannot use

the result in a civil proceeding to bind a criminal defendant
on any element of a crime as a matter of collateral estoppel.
However, I do not think the Constitution prohibits a State

from making it a crime to disseminate material which was

judicially determined to be obscene beyond a reasonable doubt
in a prior civil proceeding in which the accused participated.
In such a case, the State will still be proving every element of
246
the crime at the criminal trial.

Implicit in McKinney is the proposition that if material was
determined to be obscene in a civil proceeding in which a particular
individual appeared and participated, then the determination collaterally estops that individual from contesting the issue in a subsequent
criminal proceeding. McKinney follows the Baltimore & Ohio decision
in recognizing that civil adjudications can have issue preclusive effects
in criminal proceedings, although the McKinney Court was concerned
with issue preclusion as asserted by the prosecution and against the
defendant.247
b.

Other Federal Cases

In United States v. Mumford,248 John Mumford was convicted
of mail fraud, securities fraud, illegal interstate securities transporta246. Id. at 689 n.5 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan would require,
however, that the determination have been made "beyond a reasonable doubt at a
proceeding in which the accused was a party and of which he received adequate
notice." Id. at 689. While the majority opinion expressed no position as to the
burden of proof necessary in such proceedings, Justice Brennan felt that "the hazards'
to First Amendment freedoms inhering in the regulation of obscenity require that
even in such a civil proceeding, the State comply with the more exacting standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 683-84. Both Justices Marshall and Stewart
joined in this aspect of Justice Brennan's concurrence.
247. The Baltimore & Ohio decision is never cited in McKinney, despite the fact
that both cases were concerned with the same general issue, i.e., the phenomenon of
estoppel that "crosses over" from civil litigation into criminal proceedings.The
approval of such a phenomenon is implicit in McKinney's holding that the Alabama
procedure violated McKinney's constitutional rights because he was not allowed to
be present and participate in the proceedings at which the obscenity determination
was made. This holding gives rise to a residual proposition, namely, that the Alabama
procedure for civil adjudication would have been constitutionally permissible if it
had included the opportunity to participate in such proceedings.
248. 630 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1980).
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tion and giving a false statement to a United States agency. 249 Mumford appealed his conviction arguing, in part, that an "earlier trial
on . . . charges brought by the SEC barred his criminal trial on the
' 250
ground of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 9
The criminal indictment against Mumford was returned in October of 1978.21 In December of 1977, the SEC initiated an action
for injunctive relief against Mumford as the result of his alleged
violations of various securities laws. 2 2 The district court dismissed the
claim for injunctive relief on the grounds that "the SEC had failed
to prove that he [Mumford] had either violated or was likely to violate
securities laws." 253 This dismissal was the basis of Mumford's argument
that his criminal conviction was precluded by the decision in the civil
25 4
suit.
The Fourth Circuit began by noting that the res judicata argument
presented a rarely heard and difficult issue. This is due to the fact
that the government, having lost its case in civil court, is unlikely to
255
institute criminal proceeding where it must prove a harder case.
However, the court went on to point out that only one circuit had
actually banned the government from trying again at the criminal
level. 256 The court found that res judicata did not apply "[slince the
two proceedings [did] not present the same cause of action. ' 25 7 The
court also noted the distinction between res judicata and collateral
estoppel stating:

249. Id. at 1025.
250. Id. at 1027.
251. Id. at 1025.
252. Id. at 1026. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. SEC v. Mumford,
618 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1980).
253. 630 F.2d at 1026.
254. Id. at 1027, citing Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1962).
See infra notes 279-295 and accompanying text, wherein the Dranow decision is more
fully considered. The court's observation, of course, completely overlooks the Baltimore & Ohio decision.
255. 630 F.2d at 1027.
256. Id. The court found that res judicata applies only "when the two proceedings present the same cause of action", and held that the divergence between the
SEC's equitable proceeding and a criminal prosecution precluded the application of
the doctrine. Id.
257. Id. For the proposition that collateral estoppel "crosses over" from civil
to criminal proceedings, the court cited Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. (1956) and
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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Unlike res judicata, . . . collateral estoppel may be applicable when the first cause of action was civil and the second
Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation
is criminal ....
of issues actually litigated which were necessary to the outcome
Mumford argues that collateral estopof the first action ....
question of his past criminal conduct
the
of
pel bars relitigation
since the order dismissing the SEC civil action stated that the
evidence 'falls short of that necessary to258find that he . . . had
willfully violated any of the SEC laws.'
This language notwithstanding, the court rejected Mumford's argument as to collateral estoppel.2 5 9 The court reasoned that the civil
court "did not intend to reach the merits of the charges" but simply
relief as a measure for preventing
evaluated the need for injunctive 26
0
laws.
SEC
the
of
violations
future
The Tenth Circuit was confronted with a similar argument in
United States v. Jensen.261 Jensen was convicted of "violat[ing] . . .
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) by committing fraud. in the sale of certain
securities.

' 262

a
Jensen appealed, arguing "collateral estoppel (from
263

civil case involving nine of [his] allegedly defrauded investors).
Jensen was the principal and sole owner of Associated Underwriters which was formed to serve as a brokerage firm. 264 In the
258. 630 F.2d at 1027.
259. Id. at 1027-28.
260. Id. An earlier portion of the opinion says that the SEC complaint alleged
that the defendants, including Mumford, "had violated, were violating and were
likely to continue to violate various securities laws." Id. at 1026. It would seem,
therefore, that the court necessarily considered Mumford's past activities in holding
that the government had failed to prove that an injunction was necessary to prevent
his committing future violations. It may be, however, that the Mumford court was
operating on the assumption that the lower court's dismissal of the injunction
complaint was the equivalent of an acquittal on a criminal charge, i.e., because it
represented a determination that the allegation was "not proven", it could not have
issue preclusive consequences.
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Harris v. United States, 261 F.2d
792 (9th Cir. 1958). In Harris, the defendant apparently sought to introduce "findings
in a civil case between other parties and on other issues" relating to the issues
involved in the criminal prosecution. 261 F.2d at 796.The appellate court held that
the trial court properly excluded the "findings" since "[tihese findings were not res
judicata as to any defendant. The issue in a criminal case is entirely different in any
event." Id.
261. 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1352. For a description of Jensen's alleged scheme to defraud
investors, see id. at 1352-53.
264. Id. at 1352.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

criminal proceeding, the government alleged that Jensen defrauded
his investors by representing to them that their investments would be
"risk free" when the nature of the investments assured that they
were anything but risk free, and by selling what he knew was worthless
stock to them at "high prices." 26
On appeal, Jensen argued that in the trial of the indictment
returned against him, two issues had already been decided in an earlier
case, and the government, therefore, should not have been permitted
to litigate those issues. 266 The prior case to which Jensen referred was
a bankruptcy hearing in which the parties actually substantively
adverse to Associated Underwriters were the investors who eventually
became the claimants in the present case. 267 Since the SEC was involved
in the bankruptcy hearing only in that it initiated the liquidation
proceedings, the government contended that estoppel was not appropriate in the criminal case on the grounds that neither party to the
268
criminal action was a party to the civil action.
Although the court found that Jensen's nonparty status in the
prior litigation did not foreclose the possibility of collateral estoppel,
it held that the doctrine was unavailable "because the government
was not a party to the prior case in the sense that it had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issues now sought to be used against
it."

' 269

The court found that the SEC had been only "a nominal

plaintiff" in the earlier proceeding, and that "the government had no
real interest in whether the investors or the SIPC 'won' " in that
270
proceeding.
At least one case was presented with the question as to whether
a settlement in a civil action can have issue-preclusive effects upon a
subsequent civil proceeding. 271 Unfortunately, the Second Circuit dis265. Id. at 1353-54.

266. Id. at 1355.
267. Id. at 1355.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1355. The court began by noting that "[r]ecent Supreme Court cases
have substantially eliminated the mutuality doctrine", and then went on to apply the
test that has been developed as a substitute for that doctrine, i.e., whether or not a
party has had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue for which preclusion
is sought. See id. Also see generally supra section II.
270. Id. at 1355.
271. United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978). "[W]e do not
overlook appellant's claim that the settlement of a civil suit, brought by members of
the Union against him and based upon the same factual issues here litigated,
constitutes a collateral estoppel against this criminal prosecution brought by the
United States." 576 F.2d at 976 n.2.
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posed of the issue with a simple statement to the effect that "[t]he

law

. . .

is contrary.

27 2

This outcome would seem to be correct, given

that settlements and consent judgments are usually not accorded
preclusive effects in subsequent civil litigation. 273
The Seventh Circuit used the "differing burdens of proof"
argument to reject "cross-over" preclusion in United States v. Konovsky, 274 although other considerations may have been at work as
well. Konovsky, who was the Superintendent of Police in Cicero,
Illinois, was convicted of conspiring to "deprive Negro inhabitants of
certain rights, privileges and immunities secured to them by the
' 275
Constitution of the United States.
One of the counts against Konovsky charged that he and his codefendants violated the civil rights of a gentleman named Harvey
Evans Clark, Jr. by denying Mr. Clark the right to enter and occupy
an apartment which he rented in the town of Cicero. 276 The government introduced into evidence a temporary injunction issued by a
civil court against Konovsky and others not involved in the criminal
suit which prohibited their interference with Clark's right to enjoy
the use of the apartment. 277 The government contended that the order
"was admissible, not as proof of violation of the
law by the defendants ... but, as a circumstance in the light of which the conduct of
the defendants should be evaluated. ' ' 278
The Seventh Circuit disagreed holding that the difference in
standards of proof prevents "civil to criminal" res judicata, and an
instruction to the jury that the civil decree not be used as evidence of
guilt would not vitiate the jury's natural tendency to follow the civil
279
court's finding.
272. Id., citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) and United States v.
Traumunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).

273. See, e.g.,

CASAD,

RES

JUDICATA,

supra note 7, at 150, 159. The theory is

that a judgment arrived at through any means other than litigation does not represent
an "adjudication" of the underlying issue(s) and cannot, therefore, be given preclusive
effect.
274. 202 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1953).
275. Id. at 724, citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 242 (1982).
276. 202 F.2d at 725-26.
277. Id. at 726. The trail court admitted the.order and so instructed the jury.
The government's theory was that, because Knovsky and his co-defendants had
stationed a "detail" around Clark's apartment building to keep him out and had
withdrawn the "detail" after the injunction issued, the withdrawal "was in the nature
of an admission" of wrongdoing. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 726-27, citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938), and
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Konovsky is, therefore, distinguishable insofar as it involved (a)
an evidentiary use of a civil judgment, and (b) the possibility that the
civil judgment was being used, or was inadvertently used, as conclusive
evidence that the defendants' guilt had already been determined in a
civil proceeding. And there is also the fact that, in accordance with
280
the subsequent holding in McKinney v. State, the defendants had
not participated in the civil proceeding and had not had2 a "full and
1'
fair opportunity" to litigate the issues involved therein.
s2
In Dranow v. United States3 the Eighth Circuit recognized that
judgment can represent collateral estoppel in a subsequent
civil
a
Hodges v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. App. 176, 222 P.2d 386 (1959). Hodges is considered
infra in Section IV(B)(3).
280. 296 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1974).
281. Indeed, only Konovsky was even technically a party to that proceeding.
His co-defendants were not named in the civil suit. 202 F.2d at 727.
For a similar conclusion, see United States v. Satuloff Brothers, 79 F.2d 846 (2d
Cir. 1935). Satuloff involved a conviction for violating "§ 1 of the Elkins Act, as
amended by Act June 29, 1906," in that the defendants unlawfully solicited a rebate
in the sum of $896.19 from a railroad company by filing "a false claim for the loss
of part of a carload of turkeys while in transportation in interstate commerce." 79
F.2d at 847. The defendants were officers and agents of a corporation. Id. Prior to
the institution of criminal proceedings, the corporation obtained a judgment against
the railroad in a civil action. Id. at 848. The judgment was for the loss of "18 barrels
of turkey", said barrels having comprised part of a larger shipment of "dressed
pultry." Id. at 847-48. The criminal proceedings involved those same barrels, the
accusation being that the defendants "surreptitiously removed" the barrels from a
railroad car and then submitted a false claim for their loss. Id. at 847.
The Second Circuit began by noting that "the issues were such that the verdict
for the appellant corporation in the civil action and judgment against the appellants
in this criminal action could not both be predicated upon true facts." Id. at 848. But
the court held that the civil judgment was not conclusive of the matters at issue in
the criminal prosecution (a) because the government was not a party thereto and
could not, therefore, be bound by the decision therein, and (b) because "the quantum
of proof required in one case is different from that required in another." Id. at 84849. The court noted that there was authority to the contrary, id. at 849, but held
that "the weight of reason . .. [was] with the authorities excluding the judgment."
Id. at 849.
Although the discussion is structured in terms of the civil judgment's admissibility
both as evidence and as "a bar to the prosecution on the theory of res adjudicata",
it emphasizes the first issue almost to the exclusion of the latter. And the opinion
cites almost no authority for the proposition that civil judgments cannot "cross
over", while noting that a number of decisions had held to the contrary. Id. at 849,
citing State v. Faulk, 30 La. Ann. 831; Commonwealth v. Harkins, 128 Mass. 79;
People v. Kenyon, 93 Mich. 19, 52 N.W. 1033, 1034 (1892); People v. Parker, 355
11. 258, 189 N.E. 352 (1934).
For a similar holding, see United States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1982),
appeal after remand 752 F.2d 499, cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 2141 (1985).
282. 307 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1962).
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criminal proceeding, although it declined to find that the principle
required the reversal of the conviction that was before it. Benjamin
Dranow was convicted of multiple counts of mail fraud, wire fraud
and "bankruptcy offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152. ' ' 213 He
appealed arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the indictment as "barred by the doctrine of res
' ' 28 4
judicata and collateral estoppel.
In 1952 Dranow became "a concessionaire or fur purchasing
agent" for the John W. Thomas Company and, in that capacity,
"caused fictitious, fraudulent merchandise inventories and false accounts receivable totaling around $449,000.00 . . . to be entered in
the records of the . . . Company" for the years 1952, 1953, and
1954.25 These false entries remained on the Company's books until
1958, Dranow having purchased all of the stock of the company in
1956.216 These and other machinations attributed to Dranow caused
the company's financial health to deteriorate to the point at which
"an 'arrangement' proceeding in bankruptcy became necessary and
was instituted in January 1958."287
In his appeal from his criminal conviction, which was based upon
these same machinations, Dranow argued that the questions at issue
in the bankruptcy proceeding were identical to the charges in the
indictment and that the bankruptcy proceeding, therefore, provided a
"final and adversary examination . .. into all acts and conduct of
the defendant for the very time at issue in the case at bar. ' 288 Dranow
contended that since the issues in the bankruptcy and in the criminal
prosecution were identical and since the lower court entered an order
confirming the bankruptcy proceeding, the factual issues alleged by
the government in the criminal proceeding had already been determined in Dranow's favor in the bankruptcy proceeding. 28 9 Therefore,
Dranow concluded, the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss the indictment as barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata.290
The Eighth Circuit began by agreeing that "[tihere can be no
doubt about the proposition that res judicata and collateral estoppel

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.
Id.at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

548.
556, quoting from Dranow's appellate brief.
554.
555.
556.

212
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are applicable in a criminal action though a prior proceeding was civil
in character. 29' But the court found that the proposition is subject to
the qualification" that both actions are based upon the same facts
and both have as their object, 'punishment' ",292 and that "[w]here
the object of the prior civil action and subsequent criminal action is
not 'punishment', res judicata is inapplicable." 93
The court then found that, because the bankruptcy proceedings
were not "punitive" in nature, neither res judicata nor collateral
estoppel applied. 294 The court found that the problem caused by the
fact that the nature of the two proceedings were different was
compounded by the fact that the plaintiffs in each suit were not the
same or reasonably related. 295 In reaching this result, the Dranow
court relied upon decisions which had held that civil judgments are
2 96
not res judicata precluding the institution of criminal proceedings.
These decisions, and Dranow, err in ignoring the distinct concept of
issue preclusion, the concept that civil proceedings can adjudicate
issues which are thereby precluded from being relitigated in a subse291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. This statement is followed by a "cf." citation to Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 318 U.S. 537 (1943);
Murray & Sorenson, Inc. v. United States, 207 F.2d 119, 122, 42 A.L.R.2d 628 (1st
Cir. 1953); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 634, 636.
294. Id. at 557. "The effect of 'confirmation' rendered in a bankruptcy 'arrangement' proceeding is in no sense punitive in character." Id. See generally People
v. Cryan, 123 Misc. Rep. 358, 205 N.Y.S. 852 (1924).
295. Id. at 557, quoting Blodgett v. United States, 161 F.2d 47, 53 (8th cir.
1947), and citing United States ex rel. Hatfield v. Guay, 11 F. Supp. 806, 810
(D.N.H. 1935). Hatfield was an action for habeas corpus, the purpose of which was
to avoid extradition to Canada for trial on criminal charges. 11 F. Supp. at 807. In
the course of ruling on the petitioner's petition, the district court found that an
earlier proceeding, a civil proceeding in Canada in which the petitioner falsely
prevailed upon a complaint for damages, did not represent res judicata barring the
initiation of criminal proceedings arising out of the same incident. Id. at 808-10.
Both the civil and criminal proceedings involved a claim which the petitioner
had submitted in which he asserted that he was entitled to be recompensed for
property which he owned and which had been destroyed in the course of the first
World War. Id. at 809. The New Hampshire district court rejected his argument and
found that res judicata did not apply because the Canadian proceedings had not been
criminal in nature: Therefore, "it cannot be said that Hatfield has been in jeopardy
in any former action." Id. at 810. This, of course, was a determination based solely
upon double jeopardy as a variant of res judicata and id not reach the issue as to
whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel could bar the subsequent criminal proceedings.
296. See Dranow, supra note 282, at 557.
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quent criminal proceeding. Instead, they focus exclusively upon the
concept of res judicata, or claim preclusion, which they also seem to
confuse with double jeopardy. 297 It is this confusion which is respon-

sible for the concern that both actions be "punitive" in character,

and it is this confusion which prompted the Dranow court's holding
that criminal proceedings can only be barred by a civil judgment if
the judgment was entered in an action the intent and purpose of
which was punishment.

c.

29

1

State Cases
In United States v. Lima,299 the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals was confronted with the argument

should result
that an estoppel against the government ...
from a determination in a prior civil proceeding. Appellee
reasons that a fact determined favorably in civil litigation by
a preponderance of the evidence cannot be logically determined
to the contrary in a subsequent criminal prosecution at a
higher standard of proof.?°
The appellee, one Ms. Lima, was convicted of shoplifting a blouse
from a Lord & Taylor department store. 01 While her criminal appeal
she successfully pursued her civil action against Lord &
was pending,
2
Taylor .10
297. For a discussion of the distinctions, see supra Sections II and III.
298. The author has not undertaken to determine whether it is possible that a
civil proceeding can trigger double jeopardy proceedings so long as its aim and
purpose was "punitive" in character. The decisions which address this issue appear
to construe civil proceedings for the forfeiture of property alleged to have been
involved in criminal activity and for the collection of fines and other penalties as
civil actions that can have some claim-preclusive effect upon criminal proceedings.
Since, however, such proceedings generally commence after a criminal proceeding
has concluded with a conviction, it is difficult to see what practical utility such a
doctrine might have, assuming that it is conceptually viable.
299. 424 A.2d 113 (D.C. 1980).
300. 424 A.2d at 116. In a passage preceding these statements, the court of
appeals held that "[c]ollateral estoppel may apply to sequential criminal as well as
sequential civil litigation", and notes that collateral estoppel "has been applied on
the basis of a prior criminal conviction to a subsequent civil action." Id. The court
then proceeded to consider whether the reverse is possible. See infra text accompanying notes 301-306.
301. Id. at 115.
302. Id. at 115. In addition to the issues addressed here, the appeal, which was
brought by the government after the lower court granted Ms. Lima's motion to
suppress the blouse as the result of an improper search, also involved the issue as to
whether fourth Amendment protections apply to searches conducted by private
security guards. The court of appeals held that they do not. Id.
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In the civil action, the jury returned a verdict for Ms. Lima
based, in part, on her contention that the store security officer
converted the blouse Ms. Lima was accused of stealing. 303 Ms. Lima
argued that the jury on the civil action conclusively determined the
ownership of the blouse, as is implied by the award for damages for
conversion, and that the government, therefore, should be estopped
from relitigating the issue of ownership. 3°4
The court of appeals rejected the argument because the government had not been a party to the civil proceeding and, therefore, had
not had "a full and fair opportunity" to litigate the matter.30 5 In dicta,
the court noted that "[p]reclusion from litigating the issue would...
'deprive the state of its day in court and could present the danger of
collusive civil suits instituted solely to provide a bar to prosecution.' ",06
Other decisions have refused to allow a civil judgment to preclude
the determination of issues involved in a criminal proceeding when
those issues were never adjudicated in the civil proceeding. Thus, in
Gregory v. Kentucky,30 7 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a
determination in a civil dependency proceeding did not foreclose
inquiry into the same area in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
The criminal proceeding resulted from charges that Jerry Clifford
Gregory had sodomized "his sons, both of whom were under three
years of age at the time of the alleged incidents."308 After being tried
and convicted, Gregory appealed, arguing that since a prior depend303. Id. Although this statement is not explained in the opinion, it appears that
Ms. Lima sued Lord & Taylor, claiming, among other things, that the private security
officer who arrested her for shoplifting improperly and unlawfully absconded with
the blouse which she was alleged to have stolen. The opinion does reveal that the
officer "recovered" the blouse from Ms. Lima's purse. Id.
304. Id. at 115-16. Although he court of appeals did not address this issue, there
would seem to be a question as to whether Ms. Lima's civil judgment could collaterally
estop the government from proceeding with a proceeding which it had won before
the civil proceeding ever commenced. It would seem more logical to conclude that
the judgment in the criminal proceeding could have been asserted as precluding the
relitigation of the ownership of the blouse in the civil proceeding.
305. Id. Once
again, this ignores the fact that there had been a criminal adjudication that preceded
the commencement of.the civil proceedings, so that the government had had a "full
and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue, and had prevailed.
306. Id., quoting MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at 0.418[1] n.5,
citing Note, Res Judicata- What Judgments are Conclusive, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1376,
1378 (1951). Moore's discusses this issue in language taken directly from that
appearing in the Note at page 1378. See infra Section V.
307. 610 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1980).
308. Id. at 599.
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ency proceeding found that he did not have deviate sexual intercourse
with his children, the state should have been collaterally estopped
from being tried on the sodomy issue. 3°9
The Kentucky Supreme Court began by recognizing that the
doctrine of "issue preclusion" can apply when a prior proceeding was
civil and the subsequent proceeding is criminal in nature.310 "Nevertheless, the doctrine makes conclusive in subsequent proceedings only
determinations of fact ... that were essential to the decision." '' The
court then found that the determination in the dependency proceeding
did not determine issues of fact which were essential to the sodomy
312
charges, and rejected Gregory's argument.
In State v. Bott,3 3 the Supreme Court of Minnesota reached o
similar conclusion concerning the use of a civil adjudicatiox- to
establish a defendant's mental state at the time he committed a crime.

In Bott the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a determination in a

commitment proceeding did not resolve the issue of criminal intent,
since "[tihe issue in the commitment proceedings was only whether
defendant was mentally ill and required hospitalization for his own
welfare or the protection of society, and the decision of that issue

the time the
does not estop the state from litigating whether 3at
14
wrong.1
was
act
his
knew
he
Gaulke
shot
defendant

309. Id.
310. Id. at 600, citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
311. Id., quoting 354 U.S. at 336.
312. Id. at 600. In the dependency proceeding, the court found that the best
interests of the children would be served by committing them to the care of the
Department for Human Resources, notwithstanding the fact that it also found that
there was an "absence of medical evidence indicating that [the boys] were subjected
to sexual abuse." Id. That court also found that Gregory "did not subject them to
deviate sexual intercourse."Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court found, however, that
"[t]he real effect of these findings is not that Gregory did not sodomize his children
but that the judge was not peisuaded by the evidence that he had sodomized them."
Id.
313. 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976). See also Mangus v. Western Cas.
& Surety Co., 41 Colo. App. 217, 585 P.2d 304 (1978).
314. 310 Minn. at 333, 246 N.W.2d at 19. The defendant had been committed
to a mental institution after he had shot and killed his neighbor. Id. He remained in
the institution for several months and until the court determined in a rehearing that
there was insufficient evidence to warrant continuing the commitment. Id. See
generally Mangus v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 41 Colo. App. 217, 585 P.2d 304
(1978).
In a similar case, Lovedahl v. State, 242 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.C. 1965), the
court held that "a civil action . . . is not controlling upon any criminal determination
of mental ability to determine right from wrong, or as to the factual situation
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A New York court reached a different conclusion in People v.
Klein,3" 5 which presented the issue as to whether findings in an
arbitration proceeding can preclude the determination of issues involved in a criminal proceeding. The defendants, William Overton
and Laura Klein, were charged with grand larceny and the falsifying
of business records.3 16 The indictment charged that they stole an
amount in excess of $1,500 from a psychiatric center and that they
caused false entries to be recorded in the books of the psychiatric
center. 17 The accusation was that Ms. Klein submitted time and
attendance sheets showing that she was working at the psychiatric
center when she was actually attending nursing classes elsewhere.' 8
Prior to the return of the indictment, these matters came to the
attention of the hospital's administrative staff, and an arbitration
proceeding was commenced against each defendant. 1 9 The proceedings
resulted from discipline notices which had been served on Overton
and Klein.320 These discipline notices were concerned with precisely
surrounding the commission of a crime." 242 F. Supp. at 944. Cecil Lovedahl pled
guilty and was sentenced for the murder of Cecil Shular; Shular was a family friend
whom Lovedahl shot one afternoon when the latter was "highly intoxicated." Id. at
941-43. Lovedahl then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was
mentally incompetent at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time
he entered his guilty plea. Id. at 939-44.
The district court reviewed the record in the matter and held that Lovedahl had
been competent at the time he pled and at the time the crime was committed. Id. at
939-47. One issue involved a civil action which
the widow of the deceased ... [had] successfully pursued ... before a jury,
and against the insurance carrier of the deceased, to recover benefits under
a double indemnity clause for accidental death .... It was determined by
the jury in that action that death was by accidental means. An important
issue in the case was ... proving that [Lovedahl] was highly intoxicated
and incapable of making a clear and sane judgment as to his course of
conduct at the time the rifle was fired, thereby resulting in the accidental
death of Cecil Shular.
Id. at 944. As is apparent from the passage quoted in an earlier paragraph, the
district court held that the civil judgment was not controlling in a criminal proceeding.
Additionally, there is the fact, once again, that the criminal conviction preceded the
civil judgment by a period of two years. See id. at 939, 944. See also Bennett v.
State, 100 Ga. App. 211, 110 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1959) (not error to refuse to admit
evidence of civil suit to establish that defendant was not intoxicated while operating
a motor vehicle).
315. 96 Misc. 2d 692, 410 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
316. Id. at 693, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 694, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
320. Id.
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the same conduct that would be at issue in the criminal proceeding.32
After convening a hearing at which "many witnesses" testified, the
arbitrator issued a report in which he found that neither Overton nor
Klein had been guilty of "conspiracy to steal from and defraud the
3 22
state."
Sometime thereafter, the indictment was returned and Overton
and Klein faced criminal charges.3 23 Prior to trial, the defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the "prior determination in [the] arbitration proceeding is determinative of a critical
factual issue in this case, thereby precluding a successful prosecution. ' 3 24 The New York Supreme Court for Suffolk County agreed
3 25
and dismissed the indictment.
In holding that the arbitrator's findings were conclusive of the
issue in the criminal action, the- court reasoned that since the "preponderance of the evidence" test used in the arbitration proceedings
was not met, it would be impossible to jump the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" hurdle required in the criminal action.3 26 More importantly,
the court concluded:
The issue tried at arbitration was not collateral but directly
related to the question of guilt or innocence. The outcome of
the criminal charges herein . . . turn[] upon . . . labor practices
previously litigated by the persons most familiar with them.
The court concludes that the People are estopped from
relitigating the time and attendance issues, and the findings of
the arbitrator are determinative of the issue of wrongful
taking.327

321. Id.
322. Id., quoting from the arbitrator's report. The arbitrator found, for example,
that "the evidence strongly supports the probability that Ms. Klein worked her time
as claimed, rather than the opposite." Id.
323. Id. at 694, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
324. Id. at 693, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13. In referring to the motion, the New York
Supreme Court said that the defendants "seek to add a new dimension to the doctrine
of collateral estoppel as applied to criminal cases." Id.
325. Id. at 693, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
326. Id. at 693, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
327. Id. (emphasis added). In an earlier portion of the opinion, the court
concluded that there was no barrier to collateral estoppel given that the two
proceedings involved identical issues and identical parties. 96 Misc. 2d at 693, 410
N.Y.S.2d at 15-16. Since the psychiatric center was a state hospital, the state was
also a party to the arbitration proceeding and, apparently, had a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate the issues involved therein. See id.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Court reached a different result in a
case that was decided the same year as McKinney and that also
involved the use of civil proceedings in obscenity adjudications.
28 was an appeal from the
Commonwealth v. 707 Main Corporation1
denial of motions to dismiss an indictment and/or for a directed
verdict of not guilty on the charges contained therein.

2

9

The motions

were based in part upon the contention that criminal proceedings
against the defendant were collaterally estopped by prior civil proceedings.330

Massachusetts had a statute granting its Superior Courts the
"jurisdiction 'to enjoin the dissemination of any matter which is
obscene.'

"I"'

In a proceeding initiated under this civil statute, the

court refused to enjoin the defendants from showing "Deep Throat"
32
due to the plaintiff's failure to prove that the movie was obscene.
The government appealed the ruling and while that matter was on
appeal, the defendant was indicted for violating the Massachusetts
333
criminal obscenity statute.
After its motions to dismiss and for directed verdict were denied,
the defendant was convicted of violating the statute. 3 4 The defendant
appealed its conviction arguing that the trial court erred in denying
its motions. 333 The Massachusetts Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that
the Legislature, [in] making [obscenity] enforcement through
concurrent use of civil and criminal proceedings available to
328. 371 Mass. 374, 357 N.E.2d 753, reprinted in 2 Media L. Rep. 1231 (1976).
329. 371 Mass. at 375, 357 N.E.2d at 755-56.
330. Id.
331. Id., quoting MASS. GEN. L. ANN., ch. 272, § 30 (West 1970). Massachusetts
also had a law that "provide[d] for [the use of civil] proceeding[s] to adjudicate the
obscenity of books, but not other materials." Id., quoting MAss. GEN. L. ANN., ch.
272, § 28C (West 1970). The statute also established criminal penalties for the
dissemination or possession of "any matter which is obscene, knowing it to be
obscene." Id. at § 29.
The fact of a § 28C filing is admissible in evidence in a criminal proceeding
under § 29 and a final decree of obscenity of nonobscenity in a § 28C
proceeding conclusively establishes a criminal defendant's knowledge or lack
of knowledge of obscene contents. § 28H. Consequently, a § 28C finding
of nonobscenity precludes criminal prosecution for dissemination ... while
a finding of obscenity permits criminal prosecution ....
371 Mass. at __, 357 N.E.2d at 756 n.1 (1976) (emphassis added).
332. 371 Mass. at 374, 357 N.E.2d at 753.
333. MAss. GEN. L. ANN., ch. 272, § 29 (West 1970). See also supra note 331.
334. 371 Mass. at 375, 357 N.E.2d at 754.
335. Id.
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prosecutors, did not intend that the first proceeding to reach

judgment would estop further action in the second proceeding.
Such an estoppel effect would make concurrent proceedings
meaningless .336
The conclusion was that recognizing the issue-preclusive consequences
of civil proceedings would do violence to enforcement scheme con-

tained in the Massachusetts obscenity statutes. This construction

appears, however, to be at odds with the plain language of the statutes
in question, at least one of which explicitly refers to the fact that
favorable decisions in civil proceedings preclude the institution of
33 7
criminal proceedings based upon the same subject-matter.
In a decision involving the validity of certain search warrants, a
California court recognized that the decision of a civil court can bind
a criminal court that is confronted with the same issue.33 In June of
1963, five search warrants were issued authorizing the search of the
respective premises of H. Edward Scofield and Doctor Everett W.
DeLong.33 9 Five months later, an indictment was returned which

336. 371 Mass. at 376, 357 N.E.2d at 757. In an earlier portion of the opinion,
the court discussed the purpose and effect of civil injunctive proceedings under MASS.
GEN. L. ANN. § 30, and held out the possibility that estoppel could result therefrom:
In this case public officials used the two types of enforcement proceedings [i.e., civil injunctive and criminal prosecution] concurrently. The same
acts ... formed the bases for both proceedings. Thus, the defendants
reliance on the civil judgment in its favor played no role in its allegedly
criminal conduct .... 3
3. If one reads § 30 as precluding the application . . . of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal suit, the civil defendant may
be substantially misled on the subject of his potential criminal liability
because the Commonwealth elected to use a § 30 proceeding as a primary
enforcement tool. We need not decide here whether we might find estoppel
in a case where the Commonwealth tried and failed to obtain an injunction
and thereafter, while appeal of an unfavorableresult was pending, proceeded
with criminal prosecution for alleged dissemination, after the date of the
civil decision, of the same allegedly obscene matter. The problem is one
that could be avoided easily by postponement of the criminal trial until the
civil appeal is decided.
357 N.E.2d 753, 757 n.3 (1976) (emphasis added). In addition to affirming the
defendant's criminal convictions, the court also reversed the civil judgment in which
the lower court had held that the state "had failed to prove that the matter was
obscene." 371 Mass. at 375, 357 N.E.2d at 753.
337. MASS. GEN. L. ANN., ch. 272, § 28H. See also supra note 329.
338. People v. Scofield, 57 Cal. Rptr. 818, 249 C.A.2d 727 (1967).
339. Id. at 819, 249 C.A.2d at 728.
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charged Scofield and DeLong with conspiracy and with substantive
40
fraud counts.1
Scofield, DeLong and several other concerned individuals unsuccessfully moved to suppress the search warrants that had led to the
indictment.341 After their motion was denied, they instituted a civil
proceeding for a writ of mandate, "seeking ... review of the [earlier]
orders and . . . an order . . . grant[ing] the motion to quash the
search warrants.13 42 Judge Wapner,3 43 to whom the proceeding was
assigned, held "extensive hearings" on the matter and denied the
petition for the writ of mandate.'" The petitioners unsuccessfully
sought to have the decision reversed by the California Court of
3 45
Appeals and the California Supreme Court.
When this failed, Scofield filed a pretrial document entitled
"Notice of Motion to Suppress the Evidence and to Dismiss the
Indictment. ' 3 46 This document was filed with the court before whom
the criminal indictment was pending and, on May 10, 1965, that court
"granted the motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of
the searches based on the [June, 1963] search warrants. 3 47 This court
found that the affidavits in support of the request for the issuance of
the search warrants were based upon "legal conclusions" and were,
therefore, insufficient; 34 "[tihis in spite of the findings of Judge
Wapner and the judgment previously made and entered. 3 49
The prosecution appealed and the California Court of Appeals
reversed the decision granting the motion to suppress insofar as it
involved Scofield and DeLong.3 50 The appellate court found that
"[t]he decision of Judge Wapner was binding . . .until such time as
[it was] overturned." 5 ' The court held that Scofield and DeLong had
a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the matter before Judge
340.
341.
342.
343.
that this
Court."
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id.
Id.
Id.
The author is convinced, but has been unable to confirm her conviction,
is the same Judge Wapner who would later gain fame on the "People's
249 Cal. 2d at 728-29, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 819-21.
Id. at 729, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 732, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
Id. at 729, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
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Wapner, whose decision was binding upon the superior court before
recognized
whom the criminal indictment was pending, and thereby
35 2
preclusion.
issue
criminal"
to
"civil
of
the permissibility
A New Jersey court recognized the phenomenon in Washington
Township v. Gould,35 3 in which the defendant, Gould, who operated
a trailer park, was convicted of violating a township zoning ordinance
by unlawfully expanding his trailer park, a nonconforming use under
the ordinance.35 4 After the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction,
355
Gould appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Approximately two weeks after the ordinance had been adopted,
on July 11, 1957, the Township commenced a civil action "seeking
to restrain [Gould] from operating his trailer park in violation of the
ordinance." 3 6 Gould answered and "counterclaimed for a declaratory
3 57 After hearing
judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional".
arguments, the court held that the ordinance was "not invalid" and
35
the parties entered into a consent judgment disposing of the action.
"About a year later, . . . the Township's building inspector filed
a complaint ... charging that ... the defendant violated the zoning
ordinance . . . by extending a nonconforming use . . . by increasing
the number of trailer coach spaces . . . and by installing . . . more
...trailer coaches." 3 5 9 After a hearing, the municipal court found
36
Gould guilty and imposed a fine of twenty-five dollars. 1 Gould
appealed to the county court, which held a trial de novo and rejected
6
Gould's argument that the ordinance was unconstitutional. ' The
that the
court found that "there is an estoppel by judgment, [and]
3 62
judgment.
that
of
terms
the
by
defendant here is bound
352. Id. at 728-29, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 822-29. The court was also concerned about
the fact that sanctioning Scofield's and DeLong's actions would directly encourage
"forum shopping, since if one judge should deny relief, defendants would try another
and another judge until finally they found one who would grant what they were
seeking." Id. at 728, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
353. 39 N.J. 527, 189 A.2d 697 (1963).
354. Id. at 529, 189 A.2d at 698.
355. Id.
356. Id. The ordinance "totally excluded trailer parks from" the Township. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. The consent judgment provided, in part, that the trailer park "shall
henceforth be treated and considered as non-conforming use under the presently
existing zone ordinance of the Township of Washington." Id.
359. Id. at 530, 189 A.2d at 699.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.

222

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Gould subsequently sought review by the Appellate Division and
the New Jersey Supreme Court, both of which affirmed his conviction.3 63 Gould argued that:
as the present case involves an alleged violation of a zoning
ordinance it is essentially criminal in nature; that the [declaratory] judgment having been rendered in a civil action is
'inadmissible as proof of any facts determined by such judgment' in a subsequent criminal proceeding; and that the county
court erred in 'finding that the judgment in the former acted
as an estoppel in the latter.' 3 64
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected both the argument and the
cases cited in support thereof:
Those cases are inapplicable. In both, a civil judgment had
been entered against the defendant based on a resolution of
factual issues. In a later criminal proceeding, the judgment
was held inadmissible as proof of facts relating to the issue of
guilty, because of the higher degree of proof required in a
criminal proceeding from that upon which the civil judgment
was based. In the present case, the question of the ordinance's
constitutionality does not relate to the issue of the defendant's
guilt which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; rather
it arises by way of affirmative defense and the defendant has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality
by showing clearly that the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable. . . . Hence, there was no difference between the two
proceedings in the degree of proof required on the issue of
the ordinance's constitutionality.365
Other decisions, however, have held that a civil judgment cannot
be utilized to preclude a criminal defendant from litigating an issue
that is central to the government's case against him.3 66 One example,
363. Id. at 535, 189 A.2d at 702.
364. Id. at 530, 189 A.2d at 701, citing State v. Sharkey, 73 N.J.L. 491, 63 A.
866 (Sup. Ct. 1906) and State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 149 A.2d 217 (1959).
365. Id. (citation omitted).
366. See, e.g., Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669 (1980), cert.
denied 449 U.S. 888 (1981); Zara Contr. Co. v. State, 249 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Ct. Cl.
1964); Helms v. State, 35 Ala. App. 187, 45 So. 2d 170, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 467,
45 So. 2d 171 (1950); State v. Snyder, 157 Ohio 15, 104 N.E.2d 169 (1952); Hodges
v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. App. 176, 222 P.2d 386 (1950); State v. Nungester, 17 Ohio
Supp. 10 (Ohio Com. P1. 1946); State v. German, 162 Or. 166, 90 P.2d 185 (1939);
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Helms v. State,3 67 involved a defendant who was indicted for "assault
with intent to murder one Cy English, by shooting him with a
pistol. ' 36s During the cross-examination of the defendant, "he was
questioned as to whether or not Cy English, the alleged assaulted
party, had signed a release in [a] civil suit filed by him against the
[defendant], [and] growing out of the same incident as [the] prose3 69
cution."

Lawton v. State, 152 Fla. 821, 13 So. 2d 211 (1943); People v. Barker, 29 C.A.2d
Supp. 766, 77 P.2d 321 (1938); Green v. State, 204 Ind. 349, 184 N.E. 183 (1933);
State v. Thompson, 333 Mo. 1069, 64 S.W.2d 277 (1933); State v. Ruthkowski, 180
Minn. 378, 230 N.W. 818 (1930); Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137 (1916),
cert. denied, Ex rel. Jay, 198 Ala. 691, 73 So. 1000 (1916); Wingrove v. Central
Penn. Tract. Co., 237 Pa. 549, 85 A. 850 (1912); Ireland v. State, 99 Ark. 32, 136
S.W. 947 (1911). Most of these cases predicate their holdings upon the "differing
burdens of proof" rationale. See, e.g., People v. Barker: "If [a civil] judgment
should be held as the basis of res judicata or estoppel in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, the practical effect would be to annul the rule that in criminal prosecutions the state must establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
29 C.A.2d Supp. at 769, 77 P.2d at 323, quoting State v. Weil, 83 S.C. 478, 65 S.E.
634, 26 L.R.A., N.S. 461, 463 (1909). As must be apparent from this passage,
Barker, and indeed all the above-cited cases, involved an attempt by the government
to introduce a civil judgment adverse to the defendant as establishing an essential
element of the crime with which he was charged.
Ruthkowski ties the rule to an additional requirement; "[A] judgment rendered
against a defendant in a civil suit, begun after the commission of the crime for which
he is on trial, is inadmissible to establish an essential ingredient or fact of the crime."
180 Minn. at 380, 230 N.W.2d at 819.
And a Texas case disposed of a procedural question: Ray Arnold was charged
with "cattle theft." Arnold v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. App. 310, 186 S.W.2d 995
(1945). See also 158 A.L.R. 1356 (1945).
When the case was called for trial, [Arnold] filed a motion for continuance on the ground that here was then pending a civil action involving the
ownership of the cow which [he] was accused of stealing. This motion has
no merit. It has been a consistent rule in this State that the judgment of a
civil court is not binding upon a criminal court and vice versa. The judgment
finally rendered in the civil action would not be evidence in the trial of this
case.
148 Tex. Crim. App. at __ , 186 S.W.2d at 998. Of course, the court also
held that members of a state cattlemen's association were not disqualified as
"private prosecutors" to pass upon Arnold's guilt, either as grand or petit jurors,
despite the fact that they funded an association the purpose of which was the
investigation and prosecution of cattle theft. See id. at -, 186 S.W.2d at 997.
367. 35 Ala. App. 187, 45 So. 2d 170, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 467, 45 So. 2d 171
(1950).
368. Id. at 188, 45 So. 2d at 170.
369. Id.
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Helms was convicted and then appealed, arguing that the references to the civil suit and the settlement thereof represented prejudicial
error.370 The Alabama Court of Appeals agreed.3 7' The court found
that "a judgment gained in a civil suit is not admissible against the
defendant in a criminal prosecution growing out of the same transaction", a72 and concluded that the rule applies with equal force to
settlements in civil actions:
It would rationally appear that if a judgment obtained in
a civil proceeding is inadmissible in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, where at least the civil judgment was obtained
after hearing and judicial supervision, then certainly a settlement in the civil cause, made without the protection of trial
safeguards, and perhaps merely to get rid of the worry of a
pending suit, cannot be said to have any probative value in
determining the issues of the criminal prosecution. It further
cannot be denied that evidence of the settlement of the civil
suit. . . would ordinarily tend to influence the mind of a juror
in the criminal prosecution to the prejudice of the defendant.3 73
Three years earlier, the Alabama Court of Appeals held that a
civil adjudication foreclosed the reconsideration of issues involved
therein in a criminal prosecution arising out of the same set of facts.
The case, Terry v. State,3 74 involved an automobile accident-related
prosecution for violation of a statute providing that "[a]ny person
who unlawfully, wantonly, or maliciously kills, disables, disfigures,
destroys, or injures any animal, or article or commodity of value, the
property of another" was subject, upon conviction, to be fined and
imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor, for "not
more than six months. ' 375
Both the prosecution and a prior civil suit arose from the
following facts:
[John Terry] was driving [his father's] automobile along a
paved highway about nine o'clock at night. There were four
other male persons in the car. As they traveled northward, at
370.
371.
372.
373.
discussed
374.
(1947).
375.

Id.
Id. at 189, 45 So. 2d at 171.
Id.
Id. See also United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 976 (2d Cir. 1978),
supra in Section IV(B)(2).
33 Ala. App. 75, 31 So. 2d 105, cert. denied, 249 Ala. 304, 31 So. 2d 107
Id.
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a moderate rate of speed, and had reached a vantage point of
about 200 yards, they first observed the lights from [Mrs.
Ray's] car, which was headed in a southern direction. When
they had proceeded about 50 yards, the driver saw that the
car ahead was stopped, but its exact location on the highway
could not at that time be determined, primarily because the
beams from its head and spot lights were extended at an angle
to the direction of the road. When [Terry's] car came within
15 or 20 yards of the parked car, the glaring light rays from
the latter blinded [him]. He steered further to the right, off
the paved surface of the road, and the collision occurred. It
is undisputed . . . that [Mrs. Ray's] car was parked on the left
side, ...
and was positioned so that its right wheels were
approximately three or four feet from the left edge of the
37 6
road pavement.
John Terry's father instituted the civil suit against Mrs. Ray, seeking
3 77
to recover for the damages which his car sustained in the collision.
The jury found for Terry and awarded damages; Mrs. Ray
appealed to the Alabama Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
award. 7 8 Sometime thereafter, John Terry was charged with violating
the criminal statute quoted above.3 79 He was tried and convicted, and
appealed to the Alabama Court of Appeals, arguing that his innocence
had already been established in the civil proceeding.380 The Court of
Appeals agreed:
In the [civil] case, ...
it was definitely held and determined
that the accident or collision, the basis of this prosecution,
was due to the negligence of Mrs. Ray ... by unlawfully
parking her automobile on the left side of the highway....
In the case at bar we are constrained to hold likewise, and
this results in the reversal of the judgment of the lower court
from which this appeal was taken.38 '
376. Ray v. Terry, 28 So. 2d 916, 917 (Ala. App. 1946), quoted in Terry v.
State, 33 Ala. App. 75, 77, 31 So. 2d 105, 106 (1947).
377. Id.
378. 28 So. 2d at 918.
379. 33 Ala. App. at 77, 31 So. 2d at 105.
380. Id. Actually, Terry was convicted twice, first in a county court and then in
a jury trial held in the local circuit court.
381. Id. In omitted portions of the above-quoted passage, the Court of Appeals
recites the circumstances as established by the evidence in Ray v. Terry and as
described in the passage from that opinion which was earlier quoted in the text
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Possibly the strongest holding in favor of "civil to criminal"
preclusion came in People v. Parker.a82 "On the third day of January,
1931, [Parker] was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county
[and] charged with larceny as bailee ....
with ... embezzlement and
...with larceny. ' 383 Parker waived a jury and was tried by the court,
which found him guilty of embezzlement. 3 4 "The count upon which
the defendant was found guilty charged that he, as agent in the
employ of the North American Trust Company, (formerly named
Iroquois Trust Company,) embezzled the sum of $349,000 which ...
had come into his possession ... by virtue of such employment. ' 38 5
The facts in the case were lengthy and involved, but essentially
involved allegations that Parker took unlawful advantage of the
position which he held with "the Guaranteed Reserve System" (hereinafter referred to as the Reserve System). 38 6 The Reserve System was
incorporated as a Delaware corporation on May 26, 1924.387 It was a
"personal service corporation" and, although he was not one of the
original incorporators, "Parker apparently owned and controlled the
Reserve System, and he apparently was the dominating factor in the
S.. company from the spring of 1926 through 1930."38
The Reserve System engaged in business dealings with another
entity, the North American Trust Company. 3 9 John J. Bailey was a
director of the North American Trust Company until 1929, when he
became chief executive officer.3 90 A rivalry seems to have developed
between Bailey and Parker, and in 1929 "a violent quarrel broke out
between Parker ... and Bailey . . [in which] Parker accused Bailey
*

.

. of defrauding investors of the .

.

. company." 3 9 Bailey made

above. See id. Cf. Commonwealth v. Stine, 127 Pa. Super. 169, 193 A. 344 (1937)
(verdict for motorist in civil action by husband of pedestrian fatally injured when
struck by motorist's automobile could not affect motorists's conviction for involuntary manslaughter where the contributory negligence of the victim or her husband
required a verdict in the civil action but was not an issue in the criminal action).
382. 335 111.258, 189 N.E. 352 (1934).
383. Id. at 259-60, 189 N.E. at 353.
384. Id. at 260, 189 N.E. at 353.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 261, 189 N.E. at 353.
388. Id. at 261-62, 189 N.E. at 354. "The Reserve System . . . was exclusively
engaged in perfecting plans for the raising of capital and for the sale of trust funds
by trust companies."Id. at 262, 189 N.E.2d at 354.
389. Id. at 262-65, 189 N.E. at 354-55.
390. Id. at 266, 189 N.E. at 355.
391. Id. at 274, 189 N.E. at 358.

1987:1411

CROSS-OVER ESTOPPEL

similar allegations against Parker and in September of 1929 Bailey
filed a lawsuit the purpose of which was to obtain an accounting
from Parker. 92 Bailey alleged that Parker "had appropriated large
sums of money from the . . . [North American Trust Company] for
his own purpose."3 93
On March 7, 1932, the chancery court issued a decision in Bailey's
civil action.3 94 The court found "that it appeared from [an] accounting
that Parker was not then indebted or in any way liable to the North
American Trust Company, but, on the contrary, the trust company
was indebted to Parker in the sum of approximately $3000." 39 5 The
criminal prosecution was based upon the allegations that were made
396
in Bailey's civil suit.
As noted above, an indictment was returned in 1931, and Parker
was convicted of embezzlement in a bench trial. 97 He appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court, which reversed the conviction:
The original suit . . .was filed long before the present indictment was returned. An accounting was demanded by the bill
in behalf of the trust company from the Reserve System and
the defendant. A certified public accountant was employed
....
The books were audited, the account stated and no
appeal prosecuted from the accountant's findings. The circuit
court of Cook county proceeded to a hearing in that cause
and rendered a final decree during the pendency of the case
at bar against the defendant. That decree is in full force and
effect. The circuit court had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter .... That decree specifically found that the
Reserve System was not indebted to the North American Trust
Company and the defendant was not indebted to the trust
company, but, on the contrary, the trust company was indebted both to the Reserve System and to the defendant. That
decree cannot be attacked collaterally in this proceeding. It is
conclusive as to the matters adjudicated by the decree, one of
which adjudications was the very accounts at issue in the
39
proceeding here. 1
392. Id. at 276, 189 N.E. at 359.
393. Id. Parker's position with the Reserve System, and that company's dealings
with the North American Trust Company, made it conceivable that he could have
misappropriated monies belonging to the latter. Id. at 260-80, 189 N.E. at 354-61.
394. Id. at 280, 189 N.E. at 361.
395. Id. at 281, 189 N.E. at 361.
396. Id. at 288, 189 N.E. at 363.
397. Id. at 260, 189 N.E. at 353.
398. Id. at 288, 189 N.E. at 364. See also People v. Cryan, 128 Misc. 358, 205
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V.

"CROSS-OVER"

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: AN ANALYSIS AND
PROPOSAL

A

This section critiques conventional wisdom on ''crossing-over"
and outlines a proposal for employing this often-overlooked concept
in representing those against whom criminal charges are pending or
against whom charges are likely to be filed.
A.

GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS: EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Condemnations of "cross-over" estoppel are predicated upon
several generally and uncritically accepted assumptions. These assumptions are: (1) that the parties to the two proceedings are not
identical; (2) that the different burdens of proof involved in civil and
criminal proceedings preclude "miscegenative" estoppel; (3) that estoppel is barred by a failure to litigate the issues that are involved in
the second proceeding; and (4) that a prior judgment of whichever
character is inadmissible as evidence in a second proceeding of a
dissimilar character.
But do these assumptions support a blanket condemnation of the
phenomenon? Two of the assumptions imply the existence of converse
propositions, i.e., that "crossing-over" is permissible (a) whenever
the parties in the two proceedings are identical, and (b) whenever the
issue involved in the second proceeding was fully litigated and determined in the first proceeding. 99 Although "differing burdens of
proof" is a favorite rationale for condemning "crossing-over", it,
too, is not without exception.
1. Identity of Parties
The first assumption 400 is an artifact from the era when the
doctrine of mutuality reigned.40° But that doctrine has been rejected
N.Y.S. 852 (1924), which states:
It is quite clear that the principle of res adjudicata applies, irrespective of
whether the criminal prosecution or civil action is first tried ....

The term

res adjudicata is a rule of evidence which holds that a fact which has once
been adjudicated or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction must
be accepted by the same parties as true in every other court.

128 Misc. at

__,

205 N.Y.S.

at 854-55.

399. The discussion discards the fourth assumption, i.e., that adjudications are
not admissible as evidence in subsequent proceedings of a dissimilar character, because
this article is not concerned with the evidentiary use of civil and/or criminal
judgments. The assumption is included in the listing above as a reminder of the
confusion that often exists in this area. See, e.g., FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, supra note
19, at § 653 ("Judgments in Criminal Cases as Evidence in Civil") and § 658
("Judgments in Civil Cases as Evidence in Penal and Criminal Actions").
400. See generally supra Section IV.
401. See supra Section II.
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in favor of a new test. The new test grants preclusive effect whenever
the party against whom a judgment is asserted had a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate the issue in the original proceeding. This
means that whenever a criminal adjudication is offered as collaterally
estopping litigation of an issue involved in a civil proceeding, or vice

versa, preclusion will be available as long as the party against whom
the adjudication is asserted enjoyed a "full and fair opportunity" to
litigate the issue in the original proceeding. The identity of the parties
is irrelevant.
This proposition is evident in several of the decisions considered
in Section IV(B), supra. Those decisions considered the preclusive effects of criminal convictions resulting from a jury verdicts of guilty
or guilty pleas. The courts recognized that the dispositive issue with
regard to preclusion is whether the issue was fully litigated in the

criminal proceeding.
If the issue is essential for determining guilt or innocence, courts
assume that the existence and availability of criminal sanctions provide
an incentive sufficient to ensure that the matter was "fully and fairly"
litigated, so that it is reasonable to allow an adverse determination to
preclude the relitigation of what has already been decided. This also
preclusion is asserted was a
assumes that the party against whom
40 2
proceeding.
earlier
defendant in the
Although the rationale is not logically applicable to convictions
based upon guilty pleas since there was no formal "adjudication" of

402. The state cannot, of course, use issue preclusion to establish any points
in a prosecution against one who never had a 'day in court' on those issues.
A judgment convicting one defendant of a particular crime would not even
establish the fact that the crime was committed in a later prosecution of an
accessory, or accomplice, or co-conspirator. Some courts have held, similarly, that a judgment of acquittal cannot be used to preclude issues in favor
of a different defendant in a later prosecutionote ... Other courts, however,
have allowed the assertion of issue preclusion by the defendant in such
With the demise of the mutuality doctrine generally . . . it has
cases ....
been suggested that any accused ... should be able to invoke the issuepreclusion effect of a prior criminal judgment to which he was not a party
in the same way that a non-party might invoke the issue-preclusion effect
of a civil judgment.
CASAD, RES JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 254-55. In Casad's scenario, a judgment of
acquittal is being asserted against one who was a party to the earlier proceeding and
who had the necessary incentive to "fully and fairly" litigate the issues therein,
namely, the government. But no such rationale holds when the issue is asserting a
criminal conviction against one who was not involved in the proceeding at which the
conviction was obtained.
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issues403 the courts have elected to treat plea-convictions as functional
equivalents of adjudicated convictions 40 The practice may be predicated upon the assumption that an analogue of adversarial adjudication occurs in negotiating plea bargains, so that it is reasonable to
assume that such a bargain reflects actual conduct.
Acquittals have no similar effect. They cannot be asserted as
establishing any of the issues involved in a particular prosecution.
This rule results from the presumption that acquittals are more likely
to reflect a failure of proof, the equivalent of the Scottish verdict of
"not proven", than a definitive adjudication of innocence.
Since
special verdicts of degrees of innocence do not exist, acquittals are
denied preclusive consequences.
More difficult issues arise in the opposite situation, i.e., when a
civil adjudication is asserted as estopping the litigation of issues
involved in a criminal proceeding. If the parties to the two proceedings
are identical, then there is no reason to deny preclusion. If the
government was a party to the civil proceeding, then one must assume
that it "fully and fairly" litigated the issues in that proceeding and
that there is, therefore, no obstacle to preclusion.
But what if the government was not a party to the civil proceeding? Can the judgment still be asserted in a criminal proceeding
arising out of the same operative set of facts? Resolution of this
question is more difficult, and requires an idiosyncratic, case-by-case
analysis.
0
In two decisions discussed above, Terry v. State4o
and People v.
46
Parker 0 the government was not a party to a civil suit arising from
the same facts that eventually produced a criminal prosecution. Both
Terry and Parker were convicted despite the fact that they prevailed
in the civil suit. State appellate courts reversed the convictions, holding
that the civil judgments conclusively established facts inconsistent with
47
a finding of guilt. 0
Terry and Parker notwithstanding, should the courts formulate
a categorical principle to the effect that civil adjudications can have
preclusive consequences for criminal prosecutions even when the
government was not a party to the civil proceeding? A categorical
rule could only encourage "collusive suits instituted solely to provide
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See supra Section IV(B).
See supra Section IV(B).
See supra notes 374-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 382-98 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV(B)(3).
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a bar to prosecution, "408 a result that is not only inconsistent with the
concept of policies that are responsible for the recognition of issue preclusion, but is also antithetical to the conclusions reached in this article.
However, making preclusion dependent upon an independent judicial
determination as to whether issues were "fully and fairly" determined
in a civil proceeding should effectively discourage collusive civil
suits. 4° 9 If the government was a party to the civil proceeding, then
this determination can ignore the possibility of collusion and concentrate upon whether a particular issue was actually litigated in that
proceeding.
2.

Differing Burdens of Proof

The "differing burdens of proof" involved in the civil and
criminal proceedings is the most popular excuse for rejecting "crossover" estoppel. Unfortunately, the excuse is often invoked ritualistically, with no explanation as to why its factors necessarily ban
"crossing-over."
a.

Criminal To Civil

Whenever a criminal judgment is asserted as having preclusive
consequences for a civil proceeding, the permissibility of "crossingover" will depend upon the nature of the judgment. If it is a
conviction based upon a jury verdict, then there is no obstacle; the
verdict represents as adjudication of guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Since the matters essential to that verdict have been established "beyond a reasonable doubt," there is no logical impediment
proceeding. 410
to holding that they conclude these matters for a civil
If the judgment is an acquittal, preclusion is barred because the
judgment may establish nothing more than the failure of government's
408. Note, Res Judicata--What Judgments are Conclusive, 64 HARV. L. REV.
1376, 1378 (1951), discussed in MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62 at

0.418[1].

409. This principle is derived from Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). See supra Section IV(B) for discussion of the Emich
case. In Emich the Supreme Court held that, in determining whether and to what
extent a criminal adjudication should be accorded preclusive effect in a subsequent
civil proceeding, the trial judge must examine the record in the criminal proceeding
to ascertain the issues adjudicated thereby. See 340 U.S. at 571-73.
410. This occurs whenever a criminal judgment is followed by forfeiture proceeding to recovery money and/or property involved in, or associated with, the
commission of the crime in question.In these proceedings, the accused's commission
of that crime is not a matter that can be relitigated and the adjudication of guilt is
taken as determining all facts essential thereto.
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proof. But the government's failure does not mean that a civil litigant
cannot prevail under a less rigorous standard of proof. That being
the case, preclusion is not available.41
b.

Civil To Criminal
Whenever a civil judgment is asserted as precluding litigation in
a criminal proceeding, the immediate conclusion is that the lessdemanding civil standard of proof prevents such an assertion. This is
the typical conclusion in decisions confronting this issue.
The conclusion is logically unassailable, for if it were otherwise
then the government could institute a civil proceeding, obtain an
adjudication against the defendant under the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard and then present this judgment as establishing at
least certain of the issues required for finding that the defendant was
criminally liable for the same conduct. Tolerating this practice would
deny the accused his right to be convicted by proof "beyond a
reasonable doubt, ' ' 412 which is why it is universally condemned.
But what if the government institutes a proceeding the purpose
of which is to establish the defendant's civil liability based upon a
certain set of circumstances, and the trier of fact finds for the
defendant? Does this finding preclude relitigation of criminal liability
arising from those same circumstances? It would seem so. Having
failed to establish the existence of certain facts by a "preponderance
of the evidence," how can the government hope to establish their
existence "beyond a reasonable doubt?"
No cases seem to have confronted this issue, but the conclusion
is unimpeachable in its logic: Preclusion is denied to criminal acquittals because it is conceivable that they establish no more than a failure
of proof at the heightened, criminal standard. One cannot infer a
similar failure under the civil burden, since that burden is less demanding. But when there is a failure of proof under the more relaxed
standard, is it not reasonable to infer a similar failure under the more
vigorous requirements of the criminal standard? Is it not reasonable
to accord preclusion based upon that inference?
According preclusion in this circumstance is supported by at least
one of the cases examined in Section IV. People v. Klein involved an
411. Convictions by pleas of guilty are not adjudications and should not, be
accorded preclusive effect. Certainly, they do not represent findings "beyond a
reasonable doubt." See supra Section V(A)(1), which suggests that the preclusive
effects accorded such judgments result from policy considerations and tradition rather
than reasoned doctrines of res judicata.
412. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8 (2d ed. 1986).
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arbitration proceeding to which the government of the state of New
York was a party; the arbitration resulted from allegations that two
individuals had defrauded their employer, a New York state hospital. 41 3 Having prevailed in the arbitration, the two were indicted on
4 14
charges arising from these same allegations. The trial court dismissed
the indictment because it found that the arbitration had conclusively
adjudicated the matters implicated in the indictment in the defendant's

favor .41

Klein suggests that the government's failure in a civil proceeding
can be used to bar the imposition of criminal liability arising from
matters at issue in the original proceeding. If an individual, a potential
criminal defendant, institutes a civil action against the government
and prevails, will this have a similar effect?
The answer depends upon the issue litigated: If it is an issue of
fact, then the outcome should be the same as when the government
instituted a proceeding and lost. The inquiry in both instances is
whether, having failed under the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, the government will be permitted an attempt to prevail
under the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard."
Both Terry and Parker gave preclusive effect to factual adjudications resulting from the civil standard. 41 6 Each adjudication absolved
its defendant of civil liability for acts which became the predicate for
a criminal indictment. The government was not a party to either
proceeding which meant (a) that it bore no responsibility for the
failure of proof, and (b) that it had not enjoyed an opportunity to
"fully and fairly" litigate the issues involved therein. Nevertheless,
the Terry and Parker courts found that criminal liability was precluded
by the civil adjudication.
Although Terry and Parker did not require the government's
presence in the original proceeding, the preferred rule should include
such a requirement if only to discourage collusive litigation. But when
is "the government" present? Is "the government" present whenever
any of its agencies are parties to a particular action, or must there be
some sort of institutional commitment before "the government's"
presence will be recognized? It is conceivable, for example, that "the
government" could argue that because a civil action was undertaken
by an agency that did not have access to the investigative resources

413.
414.
415.
416.

See 96 Misc. 2d at 694, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 374-98 and accompanying text.
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of its criminal instrumentalities, the latter should not be precluded by
the former's failure.
This argument illustrates the tenuousness inherent in the proposition that preclusion can be accorded whenever "the government"
was a party to the original proceeding. The fatal irresolution is the
identity of "the government." When will the failure of an office of
consumer affairs estop the state's attorney from instituting criminal
proceedings against the party who prevailed?
Is it fair to assume an identity of interests and free exchange of
information among the disparate entities of federal, state and local
governments? 417 Presumably, estoppel is "level-specific," so that the
federal government is precluded only by its own failures, the states
by theirs, and so on. Unfortunately, the permutations within these
categories are beyond the scope of this paper, and must be left for
another day.
What if the issue adjudicated was an issue of law? Is there any
obstacle to according preclusive effect to such an adjudication?
This was the issue in United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co. 418 and Washington Township v. Gould.4 1 9 Both held that a civil
declaration as to the effect of a particular enactment was binding in
a subsequent criminal proceeding. When the civil adjudication is
concerned with a declaration of applicable law, there can be no
obstacle to preclusion because burdens of proof are not the dispositive
consideration.
It is conceivable that the declaration may be limited in is applicability either in terms of issues or parties affected, and so may not
be isomorphic with the matters implicated in the criminal proceeding.
But when this is the case, the denial of preclusion is the result of
situation-specific considerations and not from the peculiar intricacies
of adjudicative estoppel.
3. Identity of Issues
The final excuse given for rejecting "cross-over" estoppel is that
a particular issue was not fully litigated and determined in the earlier
417. It may very well be that this assumption will not hold, and that parties to
proceedings of the nature hypothesized above will have to ensure that they are not
the objects of the unwanted attentions of various government entities, each of which
is bent upon imposing its own characteristic variety of liability for identical activities.
One tactic would be to join other government agencies as parties to the civil suit.
This device could limit the individual's exposure to actions instituted by various
governmental agencies, as when federal, state and local entities all believe that they
have claims against a certain party.
418. 229 U.S. 242 (1913). See also supra notes 215-30 and accompanying text.
419. 39 N.J. 527, 189 A.2d 697 (1963). See also supra notes 353-365 and
accompanying text.
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proceeding. This is not a principle with which one can quarrel, since
it derives from the ultimate rationale for recognizing res judicata4 20and
If
collateral estoppel, i.e., the elimination of redundant litigation.
an issue has never been litigated, there can be no redundancy and,
necessarily, no estoppel.
The difficulty lies in determining when a particular issue has been
litigated. This question, the resolution of which is beyond the scope
of this article, can become dreadfully complex when it arises in the
context of civil-to-civil or criminal-to-criminal litigation. In these
instances, the inquiry focuses on the correlations of two, generally
related concepts, whether they be civil causes of action or criminal
charges. But in "crossing-over," the "causes of action" are radically
dissimilar and arise from very different conceptions of individual
421
liability.
4.

The Unconscious Assumption

There is a final, unspoken assumption that inheres in discussions
of "crossing-over." This assumption is that the original civil litigation
was a serendipitous occurrence. No commentator has suggested that
a civil action might be a deliberate, calculated measure intended to
generate an adjudication that can be asserted to bar criminal prosecution or some aspect thereof. Such an action would not be a "collusive suit." 22 It would be a direct attack on an issue that is likely
to be dispositive of a criminal prosecution, should one ensue. The
attack is mounted against the government, which ensures an unbiased
adversarialism sufficient to support preclusive consequences.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has analyzed a concept which the author has denominated as "cross-over" collateral estoppel: "Cross-over" collateral
estoppel refers to the situation that arises whenever an adjudication
is asserted as collaterlly estopping the litigation of issues involved in
a proceeding of the opposite character. Although the situation arises
with relative rarity, "cross-over" collateral estoppel is a recognized,
420. See supra Section II. See also RESTATEMENT

29 (1982).

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 27-

421. See, e.g., CASAD, RES JUDICATA, supra note 7, at 122-72.
422. Note, Res Judicata-What Judgments are Conclusive, 64 HARV. L. REV.
1376, 1378 (1951), quoted in MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 62, at

0.418[1].

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

viable legal concept that can have significant consequences for the
conduct of civil and criminal litigation.
This article has explored this concept in several sections. Sections
I and II have offered a brief introduction to "cross-over" estoppel
and have described the historical evolution of the legal proposition
that a validly-entered judgment has issue-preclusive effects upon subsequent litigation involving identical factual issues. Section III has examined the role which issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, plays
in the criminal law, while Section IV has analyzed the peculiar
phenomenon of collateral estoppel which "crosses over" from civil
to criminal litigation, and vice versa.
Section V has offered a critique of the general assumptions that
are responsible for the concept's relative obscurity, specifically: (1)
differences in the identities of the parties; (2) different burdens of
proof between civil and criminal proceedings; (3) failure, in the initial proceeding, to litigate the specific issues involved in the second
proceeding; and (4) the fact that a prior judgment of one character
(civil or criminal) is not admissible as evidence in a second proceeding
of a dissimilar character. This section, and the article, concludes by
arguing that these assumptions should not support a blanket prohibition against "cross-over" estoppel. Rather, the conventional wisdom
as to the disutility of the concept must be rejected, to be replaced
with a more analytical approach to the specific virtues which the concept can exhibit in an appropriate context.

